this is not eBay, but a very specific market online , what it doesn't say is how to reach the sellers. Of course, I am not the one explaining this, because the one's interested know as much as I do, and I'm sure not gonna help the "system" by doing their jobs and helping their beautiful "system"

Ammonium diuranate 1g

http://onyxmet.com/?route=product/product&product_id=935

The following entities are engaged in or providing support for, including through other illicit means, the DPRK's nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile-related programs, or are persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction:

(intelligence info gathering) 

1) KOREA MINING DEVELOPMENT TRADING CORPORATION
(a.k.a. CHANGGWANG SINYONG CORPORATION; a.k.a. EXTERNAL
TECHNOLOGY GENERAL CORPORATION; a.k.a. DPRKN MINING
DEVELOPMENT TRADING CORPORATION; a.k.a. &KOMID8). Central
District, Pyongyang, DPRK. The Korea Mining Development
Trading Corporation (KOMID) is the DPRK,s primary arms
dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to
ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. KOMID
offices are located in multiple countries and facilitate
weapons sales while seeking new customers for its
weapons. 

2) KOREA RYONBONG GENERAL CORPORATION (a.k.a. KOREA
YONBONG GENERAL CORPORATION; f.k.a. LYONGAKSAN GENERAL
TRADING CORPORATION, Pot,onggang District, Pyongyang,
DPRK; Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK).
The DPRK defense conglomerate Korea Ryonbong General
Corporation specializes in acquisition for DPRK defense
industries and support to that country,s military-related
sales. An English-language DPRK trade journal (Foreign
Trade of the DPRK), has carried advertisements from
International Chemical, a subsidiary of Korea Ryonbong
General Corporation, offering ammonium diuranate (ADU), a
processed form of yellowcake, for sale on the
international market. 

3) TANCHON COMMERCIAL BANK, f.k.a. CHANGGWANG
CREDIT BANK; f.k.a., KOREA CHANGGWANG CREDIT BANK. Saemul
1-Dong Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Tanchon
Commercial Bank, headquartered in Pyongyang, inherited
from the Korea Changgwang Credit Bank Corporation (KCCBC)
the role as the main DPRK financial agent for sales of
conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and good related to
the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. Since the
late 1980s, Tanchon,s predecessor, KCCBC, collected
revenue from weapons-related sales that were concentrated
in a handful of countries mainly located in the Mid-East
and several African states. These revenues provide DPRK
with a significant portion of its export earnings and
financially aid DPRK,s own development of nuclear-related,
other weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic
missile-related programs and arms-related purchases.

4) HESONG TRADING CORPORATION. Pyongyang, DPRK.
Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) is the parent
company of Hesong Trading Corporation.

5) KOREA COMPLEX EQUIPMENT IMPORT CORPORATION.
Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Korea
Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of
Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation.

6) KOREA INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL JOINT VENTURE
COMPANY. a.k.a. CHOSON INTERNATIONAL CHEMICALS JOINT
OPERATION COMPANY; a.k.a. CHOSUN INTERNATIONAL CHEMICALS
JOINT OPERATION COMPANY; a.k.a. INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL
JOINT VENTURE CORPORATION. Hamhung, South Hamgyong
Province, DPRK; Man gyongdae-kuyok, Pyongyang, DPRK;
Mangyungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK. Korea Ryonbong General
Corporation is the parent company of Korea International
Chemical Joint Venture Company. 

7) KOREA KWANGSONG TRADING CORPORATION.
Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Korea
Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of
Korea Kwangsong Trading Corporation. 

8) KOREA PUGANG TRADING CORPORATION. Rakwon-dong,
Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Korea Ryonbong
General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Pugang
Trading Corporation. 

9) KOREA RYONGWANG TRADING CORPORATION. a.k.a.
KOREA RYENGWANG TRADING CORPORATION Rakwon-dong,
Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Korea Ryonbong
General Corporation is the parent company of Korea
Ryongwang Trading Corporation. 

10) KOREA RYONHA MACHINERY JOINT VENTURE
CORPORATION. a.k.a. CHOSUN YUNHA MACHINERY JOINT OPERATION
COMPANY; a.k.a. KOREA RYENHA MACHINERY J/V CORPORATION;
a.k.a. RYONHA MACHINERY JOINT VENTURE CORPORATION.
Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangungdae-gu,
Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, DPRK.
Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company
of Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation.

11) TOSONG TECHNOLOGY TRADING CORPORATION
Pyongyang, DPRK. Korea Mining Development Corporation
(KOMID) is the parent company of Tosong Technology Trading
Corporation.

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE38608_a.html

"The acquisition of these items is especially critical for states like the DPRK that are attempting to advance their ballistic missile capability. -"Nitrogen stabilized duplex stainless steel (N-DSS) having all of the following characteristics: a) containing at least 18 percent by weight chromium and 4.5-8.0 percent by weight nickel; b) a ferritic-austenitic microstructure (also referred to as a two-phase microstructure) of which at least 10 percent is austenite by volume (according to ASTM E-1181-87 or national equivalents); and c) having any of the following forms: i. ingots or bars having a size of 100 mm or more in each dimension; ii. sheets having a width of 600 mm or more and a thickness of 5 mm or less; or iii. tubes having an outer dimension of 600 mm or more and a wall thickness of 5 mm or less." Nitrogen stabilized duplex stainless steels very nearly replicate the material strength requirements of titanium stabilized duplex stainless steel, which is MTCR controlled. This specialized steel is particularly useful in liquid propellant missile applications given its high strength, ease of welding and resistance to corrosive liquid propellant oxidizers such as inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA). -"Graphite designed or specified for use in EDM machines." Electrical discharge machining (EDM) graphite has the ability to significantly contribute to ballistic missile programs by virtue of its use in EDM machines producing complex and highly precise cuts such as required for liquid rocket engine components. This level of machining is not required in the manufacture of farming. -"5 mm or thinner stainless steel sheets." Stainless steel in thin sheet form is highly sought after by some ballistic missile programs of concern for rocket motor casings and pressure vessels. -"Para-aramid fiber (Kevlar and other Kevlar-like), filament and tape." Para-aramid fibers such as Kevlar and other Kevlar-like filaments and tapes are usable in the fabrication of solid propellant rocket motor cases, rocket motor nozzles and nozzle extensions, propellant tanks, nose tips, and missile airframe and warhead structures. -"Austenitic stainless steel." Certain austenitic steel alloys possess the strength and corrosion resistance to be employed in many liquid missile applications including propellant tanks and missile interstages. -"Aerospace-grade aluminum in bar and sheet form." Aerospace grade aluminum alloys with high strength and corrosion resistance are useful in liquid ballistic missile structures and airframes. -"Fine-grain spherical aluminum powder (500 micron and below, with purity equal to or greater than 75 percent)." Aluminum powder is used as a fuel substance in solid rocket motor propellant formulations. The use of spherical aluminum powder allows higher aluminum loading, with a corresponding increase in propellant performance. "

20 Dec 2000: Japan--A man scattered a small amount of iodine-125 at a subway ticket gate in Osaka

The Mission - Deliverance

we can explore other approaches to get depleted uranium, from sea water near nuclear facilities, or " uranium 238 in urine samples for workers in the phosphate industry ..." difficult part was not getting this information (i mean its not exactly a piece of cake...:) the difficulty is finding the kit :

Combine extraction and concentration functions with this apparatus. Provides efficient, continuous extraction of organic compounds from a 1-liter water sample into a solvent like methylene chloride.

Product #   Description   Add to Cart 64809-U Drip Spout Union Preço   64808 Extraction Chamber Preço   64710-U Flask for Kuderna-Danish size 500 mL, ground joint Preço   64811-U Liquid/Liquid Heater Block Preço   64763 Plastic Clip for use with ST 19/22 ground joint, pkg of 5 ea Preço   64764 Plastic Clip for use with 24/40  Preço   64695 Receiving Vessel size 10 mL, ground joint Preço   64810-U Side Arm Elbow Preço

https://www.sigmaaldrich.com/analytical-chromatography/analytical-products.html?TablePage=9642266

What's their security study, over intrusion in a nuclear facility:

 
the area entrance. Ejection of key nozzle, opening sensor, go to the building, (time before detection: 15 sec., detection probability: 0.9, time after detection: 30 sec
the fence. Climbing the fence and cutting concertinas, infrared barrier, go to the building, (time before detection: 15 sec., detection probability : 0.5, time after detection: 45 sec
the window. Cutting the protection grid and breaking the glass, broken glass sensor, go to the store airlock, (time before detection: 1 min 30 sec., detection probability : 0.5, time
after detection: 10 sec
the entrance door. Ejection of key nozzle, opening sensor, go to the store airlock,(time before detection: 25 sec., detection probability : 0.5, time after detection: 1 min 55 sec
the outer wall. Installation of the explosive, firing, clearing a way through, seismic sensor, go to the cabinet housing the target (time before detection: 1 min, detection probability: 0.99, time after detection: 1 min 30 sec.
the store airlock. Forcing the airlock first door, then the second door, volumetric sensor inside the airlock, go to the housing the target (time before detection: 30 sec., detection probability: 0.99, time after detection: 2 min
the target. Penetrating the store and cutting the door of the cabinet housing the target, with an electrical saw, opening detector, escape (time before detection: 2 sec., detection
probability: 0.8, time after detection: 4 min

THREE IN ONE : (nuclear intel)

1. In 2007 an effort to break-in at the Pelindaba nuclear site in South Africa went south. Two groups of four armed men each breached the significant security barriers at the site, but reportedly left empty handed after shooting an employee in the site’s emergency center.

For a period of time they were reported to have had a laptop computer seized from the site in their hands, but later dropped it during the escape. None of the intruders were ever captured by authorities. The wounded employee achieved a full recovery.

Now comes word from an unlikely source about what the intruders were after at the site. Early press reports published in 2007 said that they wanted to steal highly enriched uranium (HEU) which can be used to make atomic bombs. South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons program long ago, but kept the unused HEU at the Pelindaba site.

It turns out, according to a news report in the Toronto, CA, Globe & Mail, for Feb 27 that the what the thieves really wanted was technology plans and specifications related to South Africa’s Pebble Bed nuclear reactor program.  The revelation comes from the unauthorized release of intelligence documents from the South African government obtained and published by the Al Jazeera news network. It alleges the intruders were paid to do the deed by China in search of the so-called nuclear fuel secrets of the pebble bed modular reactor (PBMR).

PBMR TRISO Fuel Elements

A pebble bed reactor is a fast reactor which uses uranium fuel enriched to about 9% U235 in the form of fuel elements shaped like tennis balls.

A graphite coating surrounds the fuel which heats inert helium to temperatures of up to 500C.

The South African government poured millions of dollars in R&D into the design, but eventually abandoned the work, but not because of issues with the fuel.

However, according to the Globe & Mail report, citing the released documents, that China was behind the break-in because it wanted the pebble bed technology and stealing it was cheaper than buying it.

The report says that as a result of acquiring the technical information from South Africa, by 2009 China was leaping ahead to develop a whole nuclear city at Shandong built around a network of pebble bed reactors. The Chinese embassy in Pretoria, South Africa, called the story “a fabrication.”

What’s wrong with this story?

There are a number of holes in this story leading to possible conclusions that the so-called “intelligence documents” are either fabrications or disinformation or something else, but whatever the case may be, the story doesn’t hold water. Here’s why.

• The South African nuclear R&D program couldn’t make the pebble bed design work. It overspent on the project to the point that the government washed its hands of the whole effort. It hadn’t solved problems, especially with regard to materials capable of handing the high temperatures, related to efficient heat transfer, and the design seemed better suited for process heat applications for industry than for power generation of electricity for general use.
• Even the U.S. was not impressed by South Africa’s work on the PBMR.  A delegation of scientists and engineers from the Idaho National lab, led by then U.S. Energy Secretary Steven Chu, went to South Africa to see if there was anything worth saving. The idea was if there was to transfer it to the Idaho lab. Except for ongoing work on testing the pebble bed TRISO fuel, not much came out of the visit.
• The CBS television news program 60 Minutes went to Pelidaba in 2008 to investigate the break-in and learned nothing new about it. The CBS News report hyped the theory the thieves were trying to steal HEU.
• The so-called stolen computer was recovered by security teams at Pelindaba according the Miach Zenko, now an expert affiliated with the Council on Foreign Relations. In 2007 I interviewed him about the break-in shortly after his OP ED about it appeared in the Washington Post. He told me two things. First, the thieves were after the 600 kg (1300 lbs) of HEU stored there. Second, the only thing they got after a pitched, hand-to-hand battle with the employee in the emergency center, shooting him in the process, was a computer which they later dropped during their escape. It is unlikely they would have had time to copy the contents of the hard drive while running across the site in the dark.
• While the thieves were successful in breaching a 10,000 volt electric fence, and getting past an array of security sensors, including CCTV, they didn’t seem to know where to go once inside the perimeter. One of the two groups spent nearly an hour being lost on the site and never met up with the other. Overall, there is a disconnect between the ability of the intruders to get inside the plant and their behaviors once they got there. How the eight men involved in the break-in were going to unpack and walk way with 1300 pounds of HEU remains unexplained.
• In 2007 the Chinese government was well on its way toward developing their pebble bed reactor design. Plus, they were getting help from American nuclear expert Andrew Kadak who at the time was working at MIT. Kadak’s work on pebble bed reactors. His work with China precedes the Pelindaba break-in by several years. An MIT press release from 2003 highlights Kadak’s work on the technology with Tsinghua University in Beijing. The Chinese already had the technical expertise they needed so why steal it from South Africa?

Spy stories, and spectacular allegations of stolen nuclear secrets, make great content for selling newspapers, or gaining eyeballs on the Internet. In this case, count me as a skeptic about the so-called truth in these reports.

Postscript: My friend and colleague in nuclear blogging Rod Adams reminds me that Pebble Bed reactors are not fast reactors.

“Each pebble contains about 210 grams of graphite and only 9 grams of fuel material. The graphite serves as a neutron moderator, making the neutron spectrum in these machines thermal vice fast.”

https://neutronbytes.com/2015/03/01/ghosts-of-pelindaba-nuclear-site-break-in-return-to-haunt-south-africa/

2. Small, fast neutron spectrum nuclear power plant with a long refueling interval 

WO 2011142869 A3

http://www.google.tl/patents/WO2011142869A3?hl=pt-PT

3. 

The SC-HTGR is a two-loop modular high-temperature steam supply system with inherent safety design allowing co-location with industrial facilities. The 102-column prismatic block annular configuration reactor core geometry provides ideal radial conduction to maximize the benefits of naturally passive decay heat removal.

AREVA NP'S HTGR: INDUSTRIAL PROCESS HEAT, HYDROGEN, ELECTRICITY

AREVA NP’s Steam Cycle High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (SC-HTGR) is a small, modular, graphite-moderated and helium-cooled, high-temperature nuclear reactor with a nominal peak power of 625 MWt.

he reactor uses tristructural-isotropic (TRISO) coated particle fuel. At the center of each fuel particle is a kernel of uranium oxycarbide, enriched to less than 20 percent uranium-235. The kernel is surrounded by three alternating layers of pyrolytic carbon and silicon carbide. The particles are embedded in cylindrical compacts of graphite matrix material with a diameter of slightly more than 1 cm, and the compacts are loaded into graphite fuel blocks. Nominal power distribution is controlled in the core through the use of a combination of particle packing fraction, burnable poison, and enrichment, as appropriate for each specific fuel cycle. At its heart, the SC-HTGR uses a 102-column prismatic block-type reactor core based on AREVA NP’s ANTARES concept. The core is sized to take maximum advantage of the passive heat removal capability of modular high-temperature reactors (HTR).

So, let's reach a conclusion. This image is the "real" nuclear suitcase. Why ' because it has a spherical tokamak. So you to understand...and why, some intel media, always putted the question about Lebed claims...its because the traditional nuclear bomb, is a fission bomb, meaning chocking particles, their biggest problem ever, was stabilizing the weapon, and the first invention was van graaf device! however, carrying a nuclear "fission" device is close to impossible, because of stability; therefore, the nuclear suitcase is a "fusion" nuclear bomb; "fusion" is separation of particles (the opposite of fission) that natural occurs on nature, and so it doens't poses the stability problem; Then, this sphere is a hallow steel sphere, called a mini fusion reactor. Conclusion, 1970th nuclear suitcases are actually a myth; only in 1995 they start having some workable one's. Anyway, the true smuggling of this, is to be done, by lunching small undetect missiles, close to the ground , and deliver the suitcase inside of the cap.

hey! all suitcases smuggled on the cold war to the US, are useless. the israelis steal whatever they can, because HEU is enriched for a mx time of 15 years, than must have all the process again. Meaning, you need a suitcase manufacture in 2015. They all produce ogives, 10 to 10 years. There is no such a thing as disarmament or non proliferation

WT-C7 50 MEGATON NUCLEAR BOMB SUITCASE

WT-C7 50 MEGATON NUCLEAR BOMB SUITCASE

The WT-C7 50 megaton nuclear bomb suitcase.

There has never been a 50MT nuclear suitcase created, it is entirely fictional, The USSR produced 
these suitcase nukes during the cold war for sabotage missions against the west, none have ever been built 
with a yield greater than 2KT, many of them were under 1KT yield. 
They were "said" to be destroyed after the fall of the USSR in the early 90's, 
but not all were accounted for, and a few have been reported missing.

It explodes in a massive 50 Megaton blast, with all custom particles and sounds, forming a tall mushroom cloud over the area. 
It is intended to be used for FUN, as it does not damage, push or lag anything or anyone.

Open/Close, Arm-Switch activated, or Timer-menu Activated. 
You can set the timer from any 6 preset counts. 
10 Seconds 
30 Seconds 
2 Minutes 
10 Minutes 
1 Hour 
2 Hours

You can Drop it anywhere you'd like, set the timer to 2 hours and leave. 
In 2 hours time it will explode. Excellent for covert and sabotage operations.

FEATURES 
-Openable/Closeable Suitcase 
-Openable Keyboard and Cover inside 
-Arm Switch activated (20 second countdown) 
-Timer-Menu activated (anywhere from 10 seconds to 2 hours countdown) 
-Animated LCD screen 
-Massive 50 MT explosion 
-Custom Sound FX 
-Custom Particle FX 
-Visible Countdown Timer 
-Particle explosion only, no lag/no push/no damage 
-Fully modifiable and copiable

HOW TO USE: 
Drop Suitcase at any desired location 
Touch Top of suitcase to open 
Touch the screen to activate Menu-Timer OR, 
Touch keyboard and cover to further open Suitcase nuke 
Touch "ARM SWITCH" to start immediate countdown

DISCLAIMER: 
Although it comes fully modifiable and copiable I am not held responsible in what manner it is used. 
Please use responsibly in moderation.

If you have C7 Suitcase under Version 11. Please contact me for a free update.

https://marketplace.secondlife.com/p/WT-C7-50MT-Nuclear-Bomb-Suitcase-Nuke/113052?id=113052&slug=WT-C7-50MT-Nuclear-Bomb-Suitcase-Nuke