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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
_________________________________________
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS
ASSESSMENT
STOA
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AN APPRAISAL OF TECHNOLOGIES
OF POLITICAL CONTROL |
Working document
(Consultation version)
(Consultation version)
Luxembourg, 6 January 1998
PE 166 499
Directorate General for Research
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Cataloguing
data:
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Title:
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An
appraisal of technologies for political control
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Publisher:
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European
Parliament
Directorate General for Research Directorate B The STOA Programme |
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Author:
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Mr. Steve
Wright - Omega Foundation - Manchester
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Editor:
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Mr. Dick
Holdsworth
Head of STOA Unit |
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Date:
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6 January
1998
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PE Number:
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PE 166 499
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This
document is a working document. The current version is being circulated for
consultation. It is not an official publication of STOA or of the European
Parliament.
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This
document does not necessarily represent the views of the European Parliament.
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AN APPRAISAL OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF
POLITICAL CONTROL
The
objectives of this report are fourfold: (i) to provide Members of the European
Parliament with a guide to recent advances in the technology of political control;
(ii) to identify, analyse and describe the current state of the art of the most
salient developments; (iii) to present members with an account of current
trends, both in Europe and Worldwide; and (iv) to develop policy
recommendations covering regulatory strategies for their management and future
control.
The report
contains seven substantive sections which cover respectively:
(i) The role
and function of the technology of political control;
(ii) Recent
trends and innovations (including the implications of globalisation,
militarisation of police equipment, convergence of control systems deployed
worldwide and the implications of increasing technology and decision drift);
(iii)
Developments in surveillance technology (including the emergence of new forms
of local, national and international communications interceptions networks and
the creation of human recognition and tracking devices);
(iv)
Innovations in crowd control weapons (including the evolution of a 2nd.
generation of so called 'less-lethal weapons' from nuclear labs in the USA).
(v) The
emergence of prisoner control as a privatised industry, whilst state prisons
face increasing pressure to substitute technology for staff in cost cutting
exercises and the social and political implications of replacing policies of
rehabilitation with strategies of human warehousing.
(v) The use
of science and technology to devise new efficient mark-free interrogation and
torture technologies and their proliferation from the US& Europe.
(vi) The
implications of vertical and horizontal proliferation of this technology and
the need for an adequate political response by the EU, to ensure it neither
threatens civil liberties in Europe, nor reaches the hands of tyrants.
The report
makes a series of policy recommendations including the need for appropriate
codes of practice. It ends by proposing specific areas where further research
is needed to make such regulatory controls effective. The report includes a
comprehensive bibliographical survey of some of the most relevant literature.
AN APPRAISAL OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF
POLITICAL CONTROL
The
objectives of this report are fourfold: (i) to provide Members of the European
Parliament with a guide to recent advances in the technology of political
control; (ii) to identify. analyze and describe the current state of the art of
the most salient developments; (iii) to present members with an account of
current trends, both in Europe and Worldwide; and (iv) to develop policy
recommendations covering regulatory strategies for their management and future
control. The report includes a large selection of illustrations to provide
Members of Parliament with a good idea of the scope of current technology
together with a representative flavour of what lies on the horizon. The report
contains seven substantive sections, which can be summarised as follows:
THE ROLE & FUNCTION OF POLITICAL CONTROL
TECHNOLOGIES
This section
takes into account the multi-functionality of much of this technology and its
role in yielding an extension of the scope, efficiency and growth of policing
power. It identifies the continuum of control which stretches from modem law
enforcement to advanced state suppression, the difference being the level of
democratic accountability in the manner in which such technologies are applied.
RECENT TRENDS & INNOVATIONS
Taking into
account the problems of regulation and control and the potential possessed by
some of these technologies to undermine international human rights legislation,
the section examines recent trends and innovations. This section covers the
trend towards militarisation of the police technologies and the
paramilitarisation of military technologies with an overall technological and
decision drift towards worldwide convergence of nearly all the technologies of
political control. Specific advances in area denial, identity recognition,
surveillance systems based on neural networks, discreet order vehicles, new
arrest and restraint methods and the emergence of so called 'less lethal
weapons' are presented. The section also looks at a darker side of
technological development including the rise of more powerful restraint,
torture, killing and execution technologies and the role of privatised
enterprises in promoting it.
The EU is
recommended to: (i) develop appropriate structures of accountability to prevent
undesirable innovations emerging via processes of technological creep or
decision drift; (ii) ensure that the process of adopting new systems for use in
internal social and political control is transparent, open to appropriate
political scrutiny and subject to democratic change should unwanted or
unanticipated consequences emerge; (iii) prohibit, or subject to stringent and
democratic controls, any class of technology which has been shown in the past
to be excessively injurious, cruel, inhumane or indiscriminate in its effects.
DEVELOPMENTS IN SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
This section
addresses the rapid and virtually unchecked proliferation of surveillance
devices and capacity amongst both the private and public sectors. It discusses
recent innovations which allow bugging, telephone monitoring, visual
surveillance during night or day over large distances and the emergence of new
forms of local, national and international communications interceptions
networks and the creation of human recognition and tracking devices.
The EU is
recommended to subject all surveillance technologies, operations and practices
to: (i) procedures ensuring democratic accountability; (ii) proper codes of
practice consistent with Data protection legislation to prevent malpractice or
abuse; (iii) agreed criteria on what constitutes legitimate surveillance
targets, and what does not, and how such surveillance data is stored, processed
and shared. These controls should be more effectively targeted at malpractice
or illegal tapping by private companies and regulation further tightened to
include additional safeguards against abuse as well as appropriate financial
redress.
The report
discusses a massive telecommunications interceptions network operating within
Europe and targeting the telephone, fax and email messages of private citizens,
politicians, trade unionists and companies alike. This global surveillance
machinery (which is partially controlled by foreign intelligence agencies from
outside of Europe) has never been subject to proper parliamentary discussion on
its role and function, or the need for limits to be put on the scope and extent
of its activities. This section suggests that that time has now arrived and
proposes a series of measures to initiate this process of reclaiming democratic
accountability over such systems. It is suggested that all telephone
interceptions by Member States should be subject to consistent criteria and
procedures of public accountability and codes of practice. These should equally
apply to devices which automatically create profiles of telephone calls and
pattern analysis and require similar legal requirements to those applied for
telephone or fax interception.
It is
suggested that the rapid proliferation of CCTV systems in many Member States
should be subject to a common and consistent set of codes of practice to ensure
that such systems are used for the purpose for which they were authorised, that
there is an effective assessment and audit of their use annually and an
adequate complaints system is in place to deal with any grievances by ordinary
people. The report recommends that such codes of practice anticipate technical
change including the digital revolution which is currently in process, and
ensure that each and every such advance is subject to a formal assessment of
both the expected as well as the possible unforeseen implications.
INNOVATIONS IN CROWD CONTROL WEAPONS
This section
addresses the evolution of new crowd control weapons, their legitimation,
biomedical and political effects. It examines the specific introduction of new
chemical, kinetic and electrical weapons, the level of accountability in the
decision making and the political use of such technologies to disguise the
level of violence being deployed by state security forces. The research used to
justify the introduction of such technologies as safe is reanalysed and found
to be wanting. Areas covered in more depth include CS and OC gas sprays, rubber
and plastic bullets, multi-purpose riot tanks, and the facility of such
technologies to exact punishment, with the possibility that they may also bring
about anti-state retaliatory aggression which can further destabilise political
conflict.
This section
briefly analyses recent innovations in crowd control weapons (including the
evolution of a 2nd. generation of so called 'less-lethal weapons' from nuclear
labs in the USA) and concludes that they are dubious weapons based on dubious
and secret research. The Commission should be requested to report to Parliament
on the existence of formal liaison arrangements between the EU and the USA to
introduce such weapons for use in streets and prisons here. The EU is also
recommended to (i) establish objective common criteria for assessing the
biomedical effects of all so called less lethal weapons and ensure any future
authorization is based on independent research; (ii) ensure that all research
used to justify the deployment of any new crowd control weapon in the EU is
published in the open scientific press and subject to independent scientific scrutiny,
before any authorization is given to deploy. In the meantime the Parliament is
asked to reaffirm its current ban on plastic bullets and that all deployment of
devices using peppergas (OC) be halted until such a time as independent
European research on its risks has been undertaken and published.
NEW PRISON CONTROL SYSTEMS
This section
reports on the emergence of prisoner control as a privatised industry, whilst
state prisons face increasing pressure to substitute technology for staff in
cost cutting exercises. It expresses concern about the social and political
implications of replacing policies of rehabilitation with strategies of human
warehousing and recommends common criteria for licensing all public and private
prisons within the EU. At minimum this should cover operators responsibilities
and prisoners rights in regard to rehabilitation requirements; UN Minimum
Treatment of Prisoners rules banning the use of leg irons; the regulation and
use of psychotropic drugs to control prisoners; the use of riot control,
prisoner transport, restraint and extraction technologies. The report
recommends a ban on (i) all automatic, mass. indiscriminate prisoner punishment
technologies using less lethal instruments such as chemical
irritant or
baton rounds; (ii) kill fencing and lethal area denial systems; and (iii) all
use of electro-shock, stun and electric restraint technology until and unless
independent medical evidence can prove that it safe and will not contribute to
either deaths in custody or inhumane treatment, torture or other cruel and
unusual punishments.
INTERROGATION, TORTURE TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGIES
This section
discusses the use of science and technology to devise new efficient mark-free
interrogation and torture technologies and their proliferation from the US
& Europe. Of particular concern is the use and abuse of electroshock
devices and their proliferation. It is recommended that the commercial sale of
both training in counter terror operations and any equipment which might be
used in torture and execution, should be controlled by the criteria and
measures outlined in the next section.
REGULATION OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION
The
implications for civil liberties and human rights of both the vertical and
horizontal proliferation of this technology are literally awesome. There is a
pressing need for an adequate political response by the EU, to ensure it
neither threatens civil liberties in Europe, nor reaches the hands of tyrants.
The European Council agreed in Luxembourg in 1991 and in Lisbon in 1992 a set
of eight Common Criteria for Arms Exports which set out conditions which should
govern all decisions relating to the issue of licences for the export of arms
and ammunition, one condition of which was "the respect of human rights in
the country of final destination." Other conditions also relate to the
overall protection of human rights. However these eight criteria are not
binding on member states and there is no common interpretation on how they should
be most effectively implemented. However, a code of conduct to achieve such an
agreement was drawn up and endorsed by over 1000 Non-Governmental Organizations
based in the European Union.
Whilst it is
recognised that it is not the role of existing EU institutions to implement
such measures as vetting and issuing of export licences, which are undertaken
by national agencies of the EU Member States, it has been suggested by Amnesty
International that the joint action procedure which was used to establish EU regulations
on Export of Dual use equipment could be used to take such a code of practice
further.
Amnesty
suggest that the EU Member States should use the Joint Action procedures to
draw up common lists of (i) proscribed military, security and police equipment
and technology, the sole or primary use of which is to contribute to human
rights violations; (ii) sensitive types of military, security or police
equipment and technology which has been shown in practice to be used for human
rights violations; and (iii) military, security and police units and forces
which have been sufficiently responsible for human rights violations and to
whom sensitive goods and services should not be provided. The report makes
recommendations to help facilitate this objective of denying repressive regimes
access to advanced repression technologies made or supplied from Europe.
FURTHER RESEARCH
The report
concludes by proposing a series of areas where new research is required
including: (i) advanced area denial and less-lethal weapon systems; (ii) human
identity recognition and tracking technologies; (iii) the deployment of
'dum-dum' ammunition within the EU; (iv) the constitutional issues raised by
the U.S. National Security Agency's access and facility to intercept all European
telecommunications; (v) the social and political implications of further
privatisation of the technologies of political control and (vi) the extent to
which European based companies have been complicit in supplying equipment used
for torture or other human rights violations and what new independent measures
might be instituted to track such transfers.
CONTENTS
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1
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1
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2
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3
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3
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6
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4
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15
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5
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22
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6
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40
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7
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44
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8
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53
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9
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59
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10
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60
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11
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Bibliography [Separate file (85K); Zip-compressed version 32K]
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73
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Appendix
1. Military, Security & Police Fairs. [Not provided with report]
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Whilst sole
responsibility for the accuracy and contents of this study rest with the
authors, the Omega Foundation would like to thank the following individuals and
organisations for providing information and assistance to compile this report:
Professor Jonathan
Rosenhead of the London School of Economics, London, U.K; Simon Davies and
David Banisar of the London and Washington branches of Privacy International;
Tony Bunyan & Trevor Hemmings of Statewatch, London; John Stevenson, House
of Commons, London; Julian Perry Robinson of Sussex University; Detlef Nogala
of the University of Hamburg; Heiner Busch Of CILIP, Berlin; Hilary Kitchin of
the Local Government Information Unit, London; The Committee For The
Administration of Justice, Belfast; David Eisenberg, Center For Defense
Information, Washington; Terry Allen of Covert Action Quarterly, Washington;
Brian Wood of the International Secretariat of Amnesty International, London;
Kate O'Malley of Amnesty International U.K. Section London; Human Rights Watch,
Washington; Lora Lumpe and Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American
Scientists, Washington; Brian Martin of the University of Wollongong,
Australia; Cathy Rodgers of RDF Films, London; Martyn Gregory Films, London and
Dr. Ray Downs, Program Manager of Technology Development, U.S. National
Institute for Justice, Washington.
Thanks are
due to the Press officers serving the Northern Ireland Office, the British Army
and RUC Information Offices between 1976 - 1982, who provided the comprehensive
statistical data required to perform the quantitative analysis outlined in
section 5.
We would
also like to thank David Hoffman for permission to use many of the black and
white images used to illustrate the text.
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Chart
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Title
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Page
No. |
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1
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Declining
Legitimacy and Repressive State Violence
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5
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2
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The
Pattern of Revolution
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7
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3
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The Main
Chemical Riot Control Agents
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12
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4
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Comparative
Impact Effects of Various 'Less Lethal' Kinetic Impact Weapons
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13
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5
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US Human
Engineering Laboratory Technology Assessment of Various 'Less Lethal' Kinetic
Weapons
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26
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6
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Trends in
Riot Weapon Use in Northern Ireland from 1969-1986
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27
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7
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Impact of
Introduction of New Riot Weapons on the Level of Political Killings in
Northern Ireland
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28
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8
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Structure
of Riot Weapon Use
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29
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9
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Multi
Variant Time Series Analysis of Northern Irish Conflict 1976-1981
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30
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10
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Biderman's
Chart of Coercion
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48
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11
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Pre-Interrogation
Treatment Used on Detainees
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49
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12
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Techniques
used by the British Army in Northern Ireland to Mimic Sensory Deprivation
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50
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13
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Police
Torture Exports Licensed by the US Commerce Department 1991-1993
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56
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Table of Figures
[JYA Note:
Figures were not provided with the report]
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Section 3. Recent Trends and
Innovations
1 Public
Order - Tactical Options
2
Convergence of Police and Military Systems
3
Interception - Punishment
4 Cochrane
Area Denial
5
Fingerprint Recognition Systems
6 Night
Vision. From Vietnam to Belfast
7 Discreet
Order Vehicles
8 New
Arrest & Restraint Methods
9
Convergence and Riot Technology
10 Insect
Like Images of Riot Police
11 US
Peppergas Adverts
12 'Dum
Dum' ammunition and effects
13 Wound
effects of expanding ammunition
14 Frag
12. Pre-fragmented exploding ammunition
15 Typical
forms of execution technology
16
Targetted Execution Technology
17 Special
Force Killing
Section 4. Developments in
Surveillance Technology
18
Parabolic Microphone
19 JAI
Stroboscopic Cameras
20
Automated Vehicle Recognition Systems
21 US Made
cameras in Tiananmen Square
22 CCTV in
Tibet
23 Video
Capture/Video Fit
24 Taps
and Bugs
25 US/UK
NSA European Communication Interception Network
Section 5. Innovations in Crowd
Control Weapons
26 The
Philosophy of Crowd Control Weapons
27 Israeli
and Chinese Riot Weapons
28
Chemical Spray Backpack & Effects
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Table of Figures (contd.)
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Section 5. Contd.
29 Crowd
Dispersion and Capture
30 French
patients suffering severe burns from CS sprays
31 Capstun
OC & Manufacture
32 British
and German riot guns used in Northern Ireland
33
Injector Weapons
34 2nd
Generation Less Lethal Weapons
35 Sticky
Foam
36 Laser
weapon systems
Section 6. New Prison Control
Systems
37 Prison
Control Technology
Section 7. Interrogation, Torture
Techniques and Technology
38 Redress
Trust Map of Torture States
39
Restraining Technology. Hiatt Leg Irons. Chinese Thumb Cuffs
40 British
and Chinese Thumb Cuffs & Leg Irons
41 House
of Fun
42 Hand
Held Electro-shock Weapon
43
Electronic Shield
44 Taser
Gun and Dart H
45 Tibetan
Monk Palden Gyatso
46 Torture
Techniques use in Uruguay
47 Chilean
Torture Technique 1
48 Chilean
Torture Technique 2
49 US
Counter Insurgency Training at the School of the Americas
50 Chinese
Electro-shock manufacture and quality control
51
Electro-shock weapons on display at Chinese Security Fairs
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Table of Figures (contd.)
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Section 8. Regulation of
Horizontal Proliferation
52 Arwen
Riot Control Weapon on display at COPEX
53
Electro-shock weapons offered at European Security Fairs
54
Supplying the security needs of authoritarian regimes in Latin America
55 Ispra
Gas Riot Packs
56 SAE
Alsetex Back Pack + on display at IDEF Military Exhibition in Turkey, 1995
57 Foreign
Internal Security Equipment on display at IDEF 1995 (Turkey)
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AN APPRAISAL OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF
POLITICAL CONTROL
PROJECT No I/STOA/RSCH/LP/POLITCON.1
The purpose
of this report is to explore the most recent developments in the technology of
political control and the major consequences associated with their integration
into processes and strategies of policing and internal control. A brief look at
the historical development of this concept is instructive.
Twenty five
years ago, the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science warned that
a new technology of repression was being spawned in an effort to contain the
conflict in Northern Ireland. (B.S.S.R.S., 1972). In 1977, members of BSSRS
took this concept further in a seminal work, the Technology of Political
Control (Ackroyd et. al., 1977). BSSRS analysed the role and function of this
technology in terms of a new apparatus largely created as a result of research
and development undertaken as part of Britain's colonial wars, (most recently
in the ongoing Northern Ireland conflict), and whose main purpose was quelling
internal dissent. According to critical U.S. NGO research organisations of that
period such as NARMIC & NACLA, work on this technology of political control
was further enhanced by technical developments achieved by the United States'
military industrial complex, largely as a result of the extended global
military interests of the U.S., and its deployment of highly technocratic counter-insurgency
doctrines, particularly during the.Vietnam War.1
Up until
that period, shrewd commentators on technology and society such as Haabermas
Ellul (1964) recognised the potential risk of a specific loss of traditional
freedoms and civil liberties associated with broad technological advances in
the future, such as surveillance. However, BSSRS was the first group of
scientists and technologists to identify and characterise a whole class of
technology whose principal designated function was to achieve social and
political control.
In Ackroyd
et. al (1977), BSSRS. defined the technology of political control as "a
new type of weaponry." "It is the product of the application of
science and technology to the problem of neutralising the state's internal
enemies. It is mainly directed at civilian populations, and is not intended to
kill (and only rarely does). It is aimed as much at hearts and minds as at
bodies." For BSSRS, "This new weaponry ranges from means of
monitoring internal dissent to devices for controlling demonstrations; from new
techniques of interrogation to methods of prisoner control. The intended and
actual effects of these new technological aids are both broader and more
complex than the more lethal weaponry they complement."
The concept
of technology has many and varied interpretations. As emphasised in the interim
report (Omega 1996), the definition adopted for the purposes of this work
encompasses not just the 'hardware' - the tools, instruments, machines,
appliances, weapons and gadgets (i.e. the apparatus of technical performance);
but also the associated standard operating procedures, routines, skills,
techniques (the software); and the related forms of rationalised human social
organisations, arrangements, systems and networks (the liveware) of any
programme of political control.2 In other words, it is
insufficient to describe developments in a purely technical sense, it is also
necessary to consider these technologies as social and political factors.3
1
When first
published in 1977, 'The Technology of Political Control' anticipated that the
deployment of these technologies in Northern Ireland, which acted as a
laboratory for their future development, would spread to mainland Britain. For
BSSRS, governments would no longer reach for the machine gun when threatened at
home. It will have plastic bullets which kill only occasionally, depth
interrogation which tortures without leaving physical scars. It uses
electronics for telephone tapping and night surveillance; computers to build
files on actual or potential dissidents. NARMIC also warned that this
technology was not just reserved for low intensity conflicts overseas but would
return to be used to quell dissent on the homefront.(NARMlC, 1971) Little by
little this has happened.
There have
been quite awesome changes in the technologies available to states for internal
control since the first BSSRS publication, a quarter of a century ago. So many
new technologies have been created that specialist publications have emerged to
service the burgeoning market.4
In the limited space available here, it is not possible to describe all the
many new technologies which have been developed. However, a broad selection of
illustrations have been incorporated (at the end of the report), to give MEPs a
good idea of the scope of the current technology and a representative flavour
of what lies on the horizon. An extensive bibliography has been provided for
those Members of the European Parliament wishing to explore specific areas and
implications in more depth.5
For the
purposes of this report and its focus on appraising subsequent developments in
the technology of political control, it is worth focussing on the same areas of
Technology covered by BSSRS, which have not already been the subject of recent
STOA reports. Whilst the need to examine the critical role of Northern Ireland
in the evolution of some of these technologies makes the overall assessment
somewhat anglo-centric, every effort has been made to show evidence of the
proliferation and impact of this technology in other European countries and
worldwide by naming the actual companies and corporations involved in both
manufacture and supply.
Taking into
account the multi-functionality of much of this technology, Section 2. of this
report explores its role and function and the continuum of control which
stretches from modern law enforcement to advanced state suppression. With
specific reference to problems of regulation and control and the potential some
of these technologies present for undermining international human rights
legislation, Section 3. provides a analysis of recent trends and innovations.
Section 4. explores current developments In surveillance technology, from bugs
and wiretapping to new global systems of mass supervision and
telecommunications surveillance already approved by the European Union. Section
5. discusses the political and biomedical implications of innovations in crowd
control weapons including the prospect of a 2nd. generation of paralysing and
disabling technologies currently being developed by former US nuclear weapons
laboratories, together with the secret arrangements to incorporate such
technologies into EU policing practices and export markets. Section 6. is
devoted to the emergence of new prison control systems and the prospects of
privatised multinational prison corporations transforming crime control into
industry. Section 7. presents evidence of Research & Development devoted to
the creation of new interrogation, torture techniques & technologies which
leave few marks and the growing role of EU member states and their allies in
creating export markets for supplying this equipment to tyrannical states.
The report
ends with an examination of the whole question of future regulation of the
vertical & horizontal proliferation of this dual use technology, in the
face of relatively weak
2
democratic
controls on its manufacture, deployment and export. Some of these technologies
are highly sensitive politically and without proper regulation can threaten or
undermine many of the human rights enshrined in international law, such as the
rights of assembly, privacy, due process, freedom of political and cultural
expression and protection from torture, arbitrary arrest, cruel and inhumane
punishments and extra-judicial execution. Proper oversight of developments in
political control technologies is further complicated by the phenomena of
'bureaucratic capture' where senior officials control their ministers rather
than the other way round Politicians both at European and sovereign state
level, whom citizens of the community have presumed will be monitoring any
excesses or abuse of this technology on their behalf, are sometimes
systematically denied the information they require to do that job. Therefore
possible areas of policy change are presented at the end of each section, which
could bring much of this technology back within the reach of democratic control
and accountability, as well as suggesting some further areas of future
research.
Throughout
the Nineties, many governments have spent huge sums on the research,
development, procurement and deployment of new technology for their police,
para-military and internal security forces.6 The objective of this
development work has been to increase and enhance each agency's policing
capacities. A dominant assumption behind this technocratisation of the policing
process, is the belief that it has created both a faster policing response time
and a greater cost-effectiveness. The main aim of all this effort has been to
save policing resources by either automating certain control, amplifying the
rate of particular activities, or decreasing the number of officers required to
perform them.7
The resultant
innovations in the technology of political control have been functionally
designed to yield an extension of the scope, efficiency and growth of policing
power. The extent to which this process can be judged to be a legitimate one
depends both on one's point of view and the level of secrecy and accountability
built into the overall procurement and deployment procedures. There are
essentially two opposing schools of thought.
The first
school of thought identifies developments in policing technology with efficiency,
cost-effectiveness and modernisation. This school believes that the police and
internal security agencies require the most up to date forms of equipment to
fight crime, mob-rule and terrorism. Sophisticated law enforcement is viewed as
value free and state security agencies are considered to be in the best
position to determine their operational requirements. (See Applegate 1969), New
technologies aid the police by ensuring that messages are rapidly received and
dealt with, personnel are freed for other duties and overall efficiency is
enhanced. Only those with something to hide need fear the enlarged data
gathering capacities of police computers. Modern riot technology is presented
as a much preferred non-lethal alternative to the use of guns and the police
should always be allowed to use 'minimum force when dealing with actual or
potential law breakers. Existing controls and regulations governing the use of
this technology are considered by adherents of this school to have been
adequately designed to ensure that no misuse takes place. Advanced police
technology is therefore understood in this context as an invaluable aid to
upholding the freedoms cherished as inalienable rights by citizens living in
Western Liberal democracies. Its export to other countries sharing the same
economic and ideological views, is viewed as an opportunity to help modernise
law enforcement and buttress mutual stability, law and order.
3
The opposing
school of thought on the other hand views police technology and the associated
'policing revolution' quite differently (See Manwaring-White, 1983). They
believe that innovations in political control technology has put powerful new
tools at the disposal of states in need of technical fixes for their most
pressing and intractable social and political problems. It is at the point
where authority fails that repression begins (Hoefnagels, 1977) and at that
point an illegitimate government will use more force just to keep the lid
on.(See Chart.1a.) As the crisis deepens, further force is required and the
role of technology in such a situation is to act as a force amplifier. Once the
shaded area is reached (Chart.1b), terror becomes the only government service.
New police
technologies are perceived to be one of the most important factors in
attempting sub-state conflict control. Such 'control' is viewed as more
apparent than real, but serves the purpose of disguising the level of coercive
repression being applied. This school of thought argues that once operationally
deployed, these technologies exert a profound effect on the character of
policing. Whether these changes are symptom or cause of the ensuing change in
policing organisations, a major premise of this school of thought is that a
range of unforeseen impacts are associated with the process of integrating
these technologies into a society's social, political and cultural control
systems.
The full
implications of such developments may take time to assess but they are often
more important and far reaching than the first order intended effects. It is
argued that one impact of this process is the militarisation of the police and
the para-militarisation of the army as their roles, equipment and procedures
begin to overlap. This phenomena is seen as having far reaching consequences on
the way that future episodes of sub-state violence is handled, and influencing
whether those involved are reconciled, managed, repressed, 'lost' or
efficiently destroyed. Police telematics and their use of databanks (the
subject of an earlier STOA report in this area) for example, facilitate
prophylactic or pre-emptive policing as 'data-veillance' is harnessed to target
certain strata or classes of people rather than resolve individual crimes.
(E.g. the proposed introduction of the Eurodac system which will utilise
biometric information to control and restrict the entry of all Asylum seekers
into Europe, building in the process a new technopolitics of exclusion).8 New surveillance
technology can exert a powerful 'chill effect' on those who might wish to take
a dissenting view and few will risk exercising their right to democratic
protest if the cost is punitive riot policing with equipment which may lead to
permanent injury or loss of life. As highlighted in the interim report, the
human response to the deployment of such technologies may be counter-intuitive
and render progressive, deployments of newer more powerful systems either
obsolete or dysfunctional. This possibility is discussed in greater detail
below.
Any
evaluation of these opposing schools of thought needs to identify common ground
since few would doubt that there are fundamental changes taking place in the
types of tactics techniques and technologies available to internal security
agencies for policing purposes. Yet many questions remain unanswered,
unconsidered or under-researched. Why for example did such a transformation in
the technology used for socio-political control dramatically change over the last
twenty five years? Is there any significance in the fact that former communist
regimes in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and continuing centralised economic
systems such as China, are beginning to adopt such technologies? What are the
reasons behind a global convergence of the technology of political control
deployed in the North and South, the East and West? What are the factors
responsible for generating the adoption of such new policing technology - was
it technology push or demand pull? What new tools for
4
Chart 1. Declining Legitimacy & Repressive State
Violence
5
policing lie
on the horizon and what are the dynamics behind the process of innovation and
the need for a vast arsenal of different kinds of technology rather than just a
few? Are the many ways this technology affects the policing process fully
understood? Who controls the patterns of police technology procurement and what
are the corporate influences?
In deciding
between these schools of thought, we need to determine the extent to which
future innovation is about the maintenance of existing power relationships,
rather than citizen protection In other words, the extent to which their
deployment ensures that only certain permitted ways of behaving are allowed to
continue without interference. Since this technology provides a continuum of
flexible responses or options, perhaps the overriding factor is the extent to
which its development and deployment is subject to democratic control. Is the
process of regulation democratically accountable or are there more hidden
processes at work? Do these technologies proliferate, if so why and how and
what are the most important mechanisms or processes involved?
Since all
this technology represents an unequal distribution of coercive power, it is
important for Members of the European Parliament to be satisfied that
sufficient democratic control is exercised to ensure that such powers are not
abused and that unwanted technological and decision drift is adequately
checked. Whilst the Interim Report (Omega, 1996) provided a brief analysis of
the role and function of specific classes of political control technology, what
follows is an analysis of the state of the art in certain key areas of this
technology which the authors believe warrant further scrutiny.
Since the
'Technology of Political Control' was first written (Ackroyd et al.,1977) there
has been a profusion of technological innovations for police, paramilitary,
intelligence and internal security forces. Many of these are simple advances on
the technologies available in the 1970's. Others such as automatic telephone
tapping, voice recognition and electronic tagging were not envisaged by the
original BSSRS authors since they did not think that the computing power needed
for a national monitoring system was feasible. The overall drift of this
technology is to increase the power and reliability of the policing process,
either enhancing the individual power of police operatives, replacing personnel
with less expensive machines to monitor activity or to automate certain police
monitoring, detection and communication facilities completely. A massive Police
Industrial Complex has been spawned to service the needs of police,
paramilitary and security forces, evidenced by the number of companies now
active in the market.9
An overall trend is towards globalisation of these technologies and a drift to
increasing proliferation, without much regard to local conditions.
One core
trend has been towards a militarisation of the police and a paramilitarisation
of military forces in Europe. Often this begins via special units involved in
crisis policing, such as the Special Weapons and Tactics Squads such as the
Grenz Schutz Gruppe in Germany; the Gendarmeries National in France; the
Carabinieri in Italy; and the Special Patrol Group in the UK or the federal
police paramilitary teams in the United States (FBI, DEA& BATF) that adopt
the same weaponry as their military counterparts. Then a growing percentage of
ordinary police are trained in public order duties and tactics which
incorporate some element of firearms training. The tactical training is often a
mirror image of the low intensity counter-revolutionary warfare tactics adopted
by the military (See Chart 2). In Britain, where 10% of police on a revolving
basis train according to a military style manual,
6
|
Insurgent Phases
|
Sequence of Insurgent Action
|
Counter Action
| |||
|
Communist
Concept
(Based on Sino- Japanese War 1937) |
British
Interpretation |
With Aim of Achieving Revolution
|
By security force
| ||
|
'Passive'
[Organizational] |
|
| | | | | | | | | | |
Preparatory
|
Activity
by anti-government organisations, including political agitation and
manoevering propaganda activities. Formation of cells & cadres,
(political, intelligence and military), and civil and industrial unrest.
Infiltration into positions of authority. In general covert preparations by
those whose aim is to achieve a revolution. Any overt military preparations
take place in the remotest areas.
|
1.
|
Civil
&
Law Enforcement Activity |
|
Active
Resistance
[Terrorism]
|
Civil
disobedience, disturbances, riots, strikes, lawlessness. Sabotage,
particularly against communications. Assassinations, coercion and terrorism
on a limited scale. Use of propaganda & psychological means to discredit
the government.
Ambushes
and minor insurgent activity on a limited scale. Increased terrorism, a
climate of dissidence, civil and industrial disobedience is engendered.
|
2.
|
Internal
Security Operations | ||
|
'Active'
[Direct Action] |
|
| | | | | | | | | | |
Insurgency
[Guerilla
Warfare] |
Operations
involving the use of guerrilla tactics by local formed units have resulted in
the guerillas gaining control over parts of the country. Insurgent bases are
established in relatively safe areas. Increased activity in daylight. More
ambitious operations by formed units with some perhaps from a neighbouring
country.
A whole
series of operations ranging up to actions between formed units with a
simultaneous situation of widespread guerrilla activity. Areas dominated by
guerrillas may be enlarged and declared liberated.
|
3.
|
Counter
Insurgency Operations |
|
|
| | | | | | | | | | |
Open
Offensive
|
As above
but having escalated to include regular land and perhaps sea and air forces
of the opposing sides. The revolutionary movement now assumes the form of a
peoples war against the government. Large areas dominated by the guerrillas.
|
4.
|
Almost
using the techniques of Limited War | |
|
Counter
Offensive |
Decision
|
Negotiations
leading to a cessation of hostilities with the revolutionaries either in a
position to achieve their aim without further fighting or with the legal
government back in control.
| |||
Chart 2. The Pattern of Revolution
7
'Public
Order - Tactical Options' using batons, shields and colonial style military
wedges (See Fig.1[No figures provided with report]) (Northam, 1988). In
the US, one study uncovered a pattern of former and reserve soldiers being
intimately involved in police operations with almost 46% of trainees drawing
expertise from "police officers with special operations in the
military." (Krasker & Kapella, 1997).
In some
European countries, that trend is reversed, e.g. Last year, the Swiss
government (Federal Council and the Military Department) made plans to re-equip
the Swiss Army Ordungsdienst with 118 million Swiss Francs of less-lethal
weapons for action within the country in times of crisis. (These include 12
tanks, armoured vehicles, tear gas, rubber shot and handcuffs). The decision
was made by decree preventing any discussion or intervention. Their role will
be to help police large scale demonstrations or riots and to police frontiers
to 'prevent streams of refugees coming into Switzerland'.10 A disturbing case of
police deploying riot weapons against a peaceful festival occurred last year in
Zurich on 1 May, using water cannon laced with CN irritant and rubber bullets
below the advised 20 metres threshold, shows the process of convergence well.11
Convergence
is the process whereby the technology used by police and the military for
internal security operations converges towards being more or less
indistinguishable. The term also describes the trend towards a universal
adoption of similar types of technologies by most states for internal security
and policing. Security companies now produce weapons and communications systems
for both military and the police.(Fig.2). Such systems increasingly represent
the muscle and the nervous system of public order squads. For example,
according to BSSRS(1985), GCHQ's telephone interception network was used to
track UK miners during the 1984-5 strike, so that when miner's cars were
stopped, police knew who they were and punishment or dissuasion could be
targeted appropriately.(See Fig.3)
3.1 Area
Denial replaces
personnel guarding either areas or perimeters. It has involved deploying
technology which can either create punishment when its limits are infringed or
systems with built in intelligence which can both locate the point of
infringement and activate a corrective response.12 Sophisticated
varieties incorporate punishment mechanisms which vary from pain induced by
electroshock to kill fences and fragmentation mines. Many European companies
make electrified razor coil stun fences e.g. Bollore, Cogny & Santerne in
France; Birmingham Barbed Tape, Gallagher and Armbell, in UK; Reinaet
Electronics in the Netherlands. Many South African companies remain in the
market from the 'snake of fire' days, e.g., Edair; Grinaker; Microfence.13 Nowadays, the South
African Government has introduced new regulations on the maximum voltage for
stun fences and new criteria for not mixing barbed wire and stun capacities -
if snagged a victim can't be repelled and continues receiving current. Europe
needs to adopt best practice in this regard. It would also be useful if
existing research justifying company claims for sub-lethality of stun fences
should be made public. These systems are not cattle fences and the same
criteria cannot be used.
Neural
networks with semi-intelligence are being introduced to protect sensitive
control zones. Systems produced by companies, such as Productivity Systems in
France and Cambridge Neurodynamics in the UK, can allow pattern recognition and
an ability to learn. Neural systems will play an increasing role in sentinel
duties as robot technology improves Already prototypes known as insectoids are
being evolved to cheaply replace personnel on routine guard duties that require
24 hours cover and can be programmed to track the fence and carry either lethal
or sub-lethal weapons (Knoth, 1994).
8
The
Non-lethal Warfare programmes discussed in 5.6 below are also exploring area
denial technology. For example, Defense Week reported (19/11/96) that
Alliant Tech Systems (USA) is working on alternatives to anti-personnel land
mines. One of these is a wire barrier system dispersed by the Volcano Mine
System. The company received a 10 month contract in early August [1996] from
the Army Armament, Research, Development and Engineering Center at Picatinny
Arsenal, New Jersey. The company is still to decide what kind of wire to use
for the canister-launched area-denial weapon system, but the general idea is
that the Volcano system will shoot out thin wire with something like fish hooks
along it in enough mass to cover a soccer-field sized area. "It's intended
to snag. It's not going to kill you" said marketing manager Tom Bierman.
3.2
Surveillance Technologies are one of the fastest growing areas of the technology of political
control and a key problem is how to deal with the torrent of information it
yields The term covers a vast range of products and devices but the overall
trend is towards miniaturization, more precise resolution through the adoption
of digital technology and increasing automation so that the technology can be
more effectively targeted. The technology also parallels political shifts in
targeting so that instead of investigating crime, a reactive activity, the
fastest growing trend is towards tracking certain strata, social classes and
races of people living in red-lined areas before any crime is committed. Such a
form of proactive policing is based on military models of gathering huge
amounts of low grade intelligence. With new systems such as Memex, it is
possible to quickly build up a comprehensive picture of virtually anyone by
gaining electronic access to all their records, cash transactions, cars held,
etc. Such pre-emptive policing means the majority are ignored and policing
resources are more tightly focused on certain groups. Such powerful forms of artificial
intelligence need continuous assessment. They have an important role to
play in tracking criminals. The danger is that their infrastructure is
essentially a massive machinery of supervision that can be retargeted fairly
quickly should the political context change.
Automatic
fingerprint readers are
now common place, and many European companies make them14 (see Fig 5). But any
unique attribute of anatomy or personal style can be used to create a human
identity recognition system. For example Cellmark Diagnostics(UK) can recognise
genes; Mastiff Security Systems(UK) can recognise odour, Hagen
Cy-Com(UK) and Eyedentify Inc.(USA) can recognise the pattern of capillaries at
the back of the retina; whilst AEA Technology (UK) are capable of signature
verification. Over 109 companies in Europe are known to be supplying such biometric
systems. DNA fingerprinting is now a reality and Britain has set up
the first DNA databank, and is already carrying out mass dawn raids of over
1000 people at targeted suspects.15 Plans are being drawn
up by at least one political party to DNA profile the nation from birth.16 The leading edge
companies are racing towards developing face recognition systems which
they see as being able to revolutionise crime customs and intruder detection as
well as service access control. Whilst fully reliable systems are perhaps five
years off, prototype systems have been developed in France17, Germany18 the UK19 and the USA20.
Night vision
technology developed
as a result of the Vietnam war has now been adapted for police usage (See
Fig.6). Particularly successful are heli-tele surveillance versions
which allow cameras to track human heat signatures in total darkness. The art
of bugging has been made significantly easier by a rapidly advancing
technology and there is a burgeoning European market.21 Many systems described
in Section 4 (below), do not even require physical entry into the home or
office. For those who can secure access to their target room,
9
there is a
plethora of devices, many pre-packaged to fit into phones, look like cigarette
packets or light fittings and some, like the ever popular PK 805 and PK 250,
that can be tuned into from a suitable radio. However, the next generation of
covert audio bugs are remotely operated, for example the multi-room monitoring
system of Lorraine Electronics called DIAL (Direct Intelligent Access Listening)
allows an operator to monitor several rooms from anywhere in the world without
effecting an illegal entry. Up to four concealed microphones are connected to
the subscribers line and these can be remotely activated by simply making a
coded telephone call to the target building. Neural network bugs go one
step further. Built like a small cockroach, as soon as the lights go out they
can crawl to the best location for surveillance.22 In fact Japanese researchers
have taken this idea one step further, controlling and manipulating real
cockroaches by implanting microprocessors and electrodes in their bodies. The
insects can be fitted with micro cameras and sensors to reach the places other
bugs can't reach.23
Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging developed by the US Millitech
corporation can scan people from up to 12 feet away and see through clothing to
detect concealed items such as weapons, packages and other contraband.
Variations of this through-clothing human screening under development (by
companies such as the US Raytheon Co.), include systems which illuminate an
individual with a low-intensity electromagnetic pulse. A three side very-low X
ray system for human useage, in fixed sites such as prisons, is being developed
by Nicolet Imaging Systems of San Diego. Electronic monitoring of
offenders or 'tagging', where the subject wears an electronic bracelet
which can detect if they have relocated from their home after certain hours
etc, has entered into use in the 1990's after being developed to regulate
prison populations in the USA. (Schmidt, 1988). Satellite tracking of
VIPs, vehicles, etc., is now facilitated by the once military
Global-Positioning System(GPS) which is now available for commercial uses. Vehicle
recognition technologies are discussed in Section 4 below.
3.3
Data-veillance - The use
of telematics by the police has revolutionised policing in the last decade and
created the shift towards pre-emptive policing. It is properly the focus of an
earlier STOA report on the technology of political control. Some of the most
recent trends are discussed in Section 4 below. A comprehensive analysis of how
such equipment has led to widespread abuse of civil liberties and human rights
has been published by Privacy International (1995) and includes 100 pages of
all the companies involved in servicing the security requirements of the
regimes mapped in Fig.38.
Using data
profilers, torturing states have used these systems to compile death lists. For
example, the Tadiran computer supplied to Guatemala and installed in the
control center of the national palace. According to a senior Guatemalan
military official, "the complex contains an archive and a computer file on
journalists, students, leaders, people on the left, politicians and so
on." Meetings were held in the annex to select assassination victims. A US
priest who fled the country after appearing on such a death list said,
"They had printout lists at the border crossings and at the airport. Once
you got on that - then its like bounty hunters."24 Within Europe,
systems, such as that produced by Harlequin, allow the automatic production of
maps of who phoned whom to show friendship networks. Other companies such as
Memex described above, allow entire life profiles of virtually anyone in a
state having an official existence. Photographs and video material can be
included in the record and typically up to 700 other databases can be hoovered
at any one time, to extend the data profile in real time.25 Significant changes in
the capacity of new surveillance systems can be anticipated with the advent of
new materials such as Buckminster Fullerene, which will lead to minaturisation
of systems by several orders of magnitude.26
10
3.4-Discrete
Order Vehicles - Hundreds
of companies are now manufacturing police and internal security vehicles in
Europe.27 The
newer companies entering the market for law enforcement vehicles tend to
manufacture for both military and police purposes (e.g., armoured personnel
carriers, patrol, riot control, mobile prison, perimeter patrol etc.) and
configured to have a 'non-aggressive design'. In real terms this means that
their external appearance rather than their operational characteristics are
modified to give a non-threatening appearance. Such 'discreet order vehicles'
look benign - like ambulances, whilst retaining a retaliatory capacity, capable
of dispersing, containing or capturing dissident groups or individuals.(See
Fig.7 Savage, 1985). Some models such as the Amac vehicle and more recently the
Talon incorporate repellant electrified panels as well as a weapons capacity
such as water cannon. Such vehicles are frequently used to seal people into a
dispersal zone where the riot squads are at work, rather than chase them out.
3.5
Less-lethal Weapons - For
reasons explained more fully in Section 5 (below), the essential role of new
crowd control weapons and tactics is to amplify the level of aggression that
can be unleashed by an individual officer. Thus the same rationale lies behind
the use of the new US side handle batons, the use of horse, riot shield charges
using riot wedges and snatch squads and the new martial arts style arrest
techniques which entered European policing training in the mid 1980's.28 (see Fig 8). The
biggest growth area however, has been in what used to be called 'non-lethal
weapons.' The fact that some of these weapons kill, blind, scalp and
permanently maim led the authorities and manufacturers to act - they came up
with a new name - "less-lethal weapons" - i.e. they only sometimes
kill. Again a PR objective is catered for in the names which sound as if the
security forces are using relative restraint. Whether it be in Belfast or
Beijing, these technologies are converging around the same design types. (See
Fig 8). One of the authors of the 'Technology of Political Control' (Ackroyd,
1977) Professor Jonathan Rosenhead, believed that the emergence of such
technology in China vindicated their original thesis. That is, after the
Tiananmen Square massacre, the Chinese authorities needed weapons options which
would not excite international criticism, particularly when some much lucrative
foreign investment was entering the Tiger economies of the Pacific Rim.29
As described
in Section 5 below, this area has seen prodigious innovation including a second
generation of new weapon types being produced in the former nuclear weapon
laboratories of the US in conjunction with big business.30 The Council for
Science & Society explained the phenomenon in terms of technological and
decision drift (CSS, 1978). BSSRS argued that such processes were integral to
any attempt to apply technical fixes - an alternative explanation is that the
riot control arsenal is never complete. Much of a weapon's effect lies in
creating a sense of uncertainty.31 Even the insectoid
appearance of riot squad members is part of the threat impact despite its
ostensible purpose of personal protection.(See Fig 10).
Individually
these weapons are becoming more powerful, for example each new riot agent is
more powerful than the one it replaces. Thus CS is nearly 20 times more
powerful than the CN it replaced; CR is more than 30 times more powerful than
CN and the newest and most aggressively marketed agent OC, (See Fig.11), the
most powerful of them all (Chart 3). Little notice has been taken of the
professional hazard assessments of the most commonly used kinetic impact weapons
deployed in Europe and USA which have consequences in the 'dangerous or severe
damage region'. (See Chart 4).
11
|
Chemical Name and
Formula |
Code
|
Form
|
Melting
Point C° |
Effects
|
Relative
Power |
ICt50 (mg min/m3) (1)
|
|
1-Chloroacetophenone
_
// \\_C_CH2CI
\ _ / |
_ |
O
|
CN
|
White
Solid
|
59
|
Burning
sensation in the eyes. Blisters at very heavy concentration. Salivation,
nausea and headaches.
|
1
|
20
|
|
2-Chlorobenzylidene
malonitrile
_
// \\_CH=C(CN)2
\ _ /
_ \
CI
|
CS
|
White
Solid
|
94
|
Strong
lachrymation with involuntary closing of the eyes. Burning sensation on moist
skin, 2nd degree burns. Coughing and vomiting at higher concentrations.
|
5
|
3.6
|
|
Dibenz
(b.f.)-1,4-oxazepine
_ o
/ \/ \/ \
|
| | ||
\ /\ /\\/
N=CH
|
CR
|
Pale
Yellow
Solid |
72
|
Very
intense skin pain particularly around moist areas. Involuntary closing of
eyes resulting in temporary blindness which may induce panic or hysteria.
|
30
|
0.7
|
|
Oleoresin
Capsicum
|
OC
|
Colourless
|
65
|
Uncontrollable
coughing and gasping for breath. Eyes close immediately. Loss of body motor
control. Intense burning sensation on skin. Leads to immediate
incapacitation.
|
Most
powerful
(exact figs unavailable) |
N/A
|
|
(1) ICt50
The mean incapacitating dose. The dose that will affect 50% of the test
population.
| ||||||
Chart 3. The Main Chemical Riot Control Agents
12
|
Weapons (2)
|
Manufacturer
|
Country
|
Weight of
Projectile |
Range
|
Impact Energy /
Joules (1) |
|
L5A3
Plastic Bullet
|
Royal
Ordinance
|
UK
|
135g
|
25-60m
|
150-210
|
|
'Cross
Cartridge'
|
Heckler
and Koch
|
Germany
|
179g
|
up to 30m
|
above 125
|
|
Flash Ball
|
Verney
Carron
|
France
|
28g
|
12m
|
200
|
|
Jelly
Baton
|
Crown
Aircartridge |
Netherlands
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
265
|
|
Bean Bag
|
MK
Ballistics
|
USA
|
40g
|
10-30m
|
120
|
|
'Cease and
Desist'
|
Milstor
Corp
|
USA
|
N/A
|
Less than
18m
|
130
|
|
Impact
Energy
|
Severity
of Injury
|
|
Under 20
Joules
|
Safe/low
|
|
Between
40-122 Joules
|
Dangerous
|
|
Over 122
Joules
|
Severe
damage region
|
|
Notes:
|
|
(1)
Testing of kinetic energy projectiles was carried out at the Aberdeen Proving
Grounds in the USA in 1975 to assess their safety and the likelihood, and
type, of injuries that might result from their use (see Technical Report
Number 24-75: Evaluation of the Physiological Effects of a Rubber Bullet, a
Baseball and a Flying Baton, Wargovich, et al., US Army Land and Warfare
Laboratory, September 1975.) The results showed that for kinetic energy
projectiles at different energies the level of injury was as shown above. (J.
Rosenhead, New Scientist, 16/12/76, pp. 672-74)
(2) Information
taken from manufacturers product data, updated to modern measurement units
where required.
|
Chart 4. Comparative Impact Effects of Various Kinetic
'Less Lethal' Weapons
13
3.5 Lethal
Weapons - Police
Forces in Europe have acquired many of the weapons normally associated with the
military i.e. hand guns, rifles and submachine guns, e.g., the Heckler &
Koch MP5. Shotguns are increasingly favoured by police forces because their
wide spread of shot enables a blast to hit more than one target and in the US,
shotguns are standard issue for a wide range of tasks including anti-terrorist
and riot control. Indeed many shotguns and holsters specially adapted for
police use have appeared on the market. E.g., those by Ithaca, Mossberg,
Remington, Sage International and Wilson Arms. Many of these are literally sawn
off shotguns and their wider spread increases the number of likely targets. For
example, the Witness shotgun has a barrel of only 12.5 inches. Specialist shotgun
ammunition enables some of these weapons to smash the cylinder block off a car
or literally cut a human in half. The shotgun 'bolo round' advert e.g. claims
"it slices - it dices". Shotgun ammunition leaves no evidence of what
weapon was used to fire it. Similarly caseless cartridges do not leave "a
spent cartridge signature" and this has significant implications for
associating a particular weapon with a specific crime.
In theory,
police weapons should have a different level of lethality and penetration
compared with those used by the military. In urban settings there is always the
risk of hitting passers-by and if a round has high velocity and penetration, it
will easily pass through an intended target and continue penetrating walls and
go on perhaps to kill innocents beyond the observed fire zone. To obviate this
problem, manufacturers are increasingly producing hollow point, expanding, or
'dum-dum' ammunition for police and special forces use.(See Fig 12).
Paradoxically, the Hague Declaration (IV,3) of 1989, which prohibited the use
of hollow point or dum dum ammunition, does not apply to the policing of civil
conflicts. Soft nosed ammunition which mushroom in the body, cause far more
serious damage than ordinary ammunition. Dum-dums would take an arm or a leg
off, whereas ordinary ammunition would sail through leaving a relatively clean
hole.(See Fig.13). Some these weapons like Winchester's Black Talon or the high
explosive filled pre-fragmented Frag 12 (see Fig.14) cause horrific injuries
and raise serious questions about due process and the right to a fair trial
since without immediate medical attention, a target would be effectively an
extra-judicial execution. Many companies are now producing these bullets in
Europe.
3.6
Execution technologies - The equipment illustrated in (Fig.16) are not just museum pieces. In the
USA, companies such as Leutcher Associates Inc of Massachussetts supplies and
services American gas chambers, as well as designing, supplying and installing
electric chairs, auto-injection systems and gallows. The Leutcher lethal
injection system costs approx. $30,000 and is the cheapest system the company
sells. Their electrocution systems cost £35,000 and a gallows would cost
approximately $85,000. More and more states are opting for Leutcher's $100,000
"execution trailer" which comes complete with a lethal injection
machine, a steel holding cell for an inmate, and separate areas for witnesses,
chaplain, prison workers and medical personnel.34 Some companies in
Europe have in the past offered to supply such devices as gallows (Michael
Huffey Ltd, UK) or tender designs for the construction of 'Libyan
Rehabilitation centre" complete with stainless steel execution bays. (Observer,
5/84). A fuller picture is unavailable, but what is known is that European
designers are tendering for Middle Eastern prison building work with all the
attendant requirements to cater for Islamic shari'a laws and requisite
punishments and amputations. Modern target acquisition aids such as laser
sights, coupled with silenced weapons technology also make extra-judicial
execution much easier (see fig. 16) or if the deed must be achieved in public,
systems like 'syncrofire' (fig.16) take the guilt away from the execution squad
by allowing the firemaster to achieve it by pushbutton. Special forces are of
course taught how to achieve such executions (See Fig.17 and this is one of the
areas of expertise transfer that needs to be brought back within democratic
control. (see Section 8 below)
3.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) Given
the civil liberties implications associated with new technologies of political
control, there is a pressing need to avoid the risks of such technologies
developing faster than any regulating legislation. Therefore the EU should
develop appropriate structures of accountability to prevent undesirable
innovations emerging via processes of technological creep or decision drift.
(2) In
principle, the process of innovation of new systems for use in internal social
and political control should be transparent, open to appropriate public
scrutiny and be subject to change should unwanted and unanticipated
consequences emerge.
(3) Any
class of technology which has been shown in the past to be excessively injurious,
cruel, inhumane or indiscriminate in its effects, should be subject to
stringent and democratic controls. Therefore within Europe:-
(a) No
development or deployment of blinding laser weapons and ancillary devices for
police and internal security purposes should be permitted;
(b) No
deployment of 'sub-lethal' area denial mine systems such as the Volcano
(discussed above), should be allowed for law enforcement or correctional
purposes;
(c) Police
personnel should not be routinely armed with 'dum-dum' bullets, use of which is
banned in international armed conflicts. Further research should be
commissioned by the European Parliament to clarify the legal situation
particularly in relation to the suggestion that such ammunition can bypass the
legal process and effect extra-judicial execution.
(d) Further
measures should be developed to regulate electrified 'stun' & 'kill'
fences. Dual function fences with a kill function should not be permissable as
their use violates the right to life and the right to a fair trial.
Surveillance
technology can be defined as devices or systems which can monitor, track and
assess the movements of individuals, their property and other assets. Much of
this technology is used to track the activities of dissidents, human rights
activists, journalists, student leaders, minorities, trade union leaders and
political opponents.
"Subtler and more far reaching
means of invading privacy have become available to the government. Discovery
and invention have made it possible for the government, by means far more
effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what
is whispered in the closet."
So said US
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, way back in 1928. Subsequent developments
go far beyond anything which Brandeis could have dreamt of. New technologies
which were originally conceived for the Defence and Intelligence sectors, have
after the cold war, rapidly spread into the law enforcement and private sectors.
It is one of the areas of technological advance, where outdated regulations
have not kept pace with an accelerating pattern of abuses. Up until the 1960's,
most surveillance was low-tech and expensive since it involved following
suspects around from place to place and could use up to 6 people in teams of
two working 3 eight hour shifts. All of the material and contacts gleaned had
to be typed up and filed away with little prospect of rapidly cross checking.
Even electronic surveillance was highly labour intensive. The East German
police for example employed 500,000 secret informers, 10,000 of which were
needed just to listen and transcribe citizen's phone calls.
By the
1980's, new forms of electronic surveillance were emerging many of these were
directed towards automation of communications interception. This trend was
fuelled in the U. S. in the 1990's by accelerated government funding at the end
of the cold war, with defence and intelligence agencies being refocussed with
new missions to justify their budgets, transferring their technologies to
certain law enforcement applications such as anti-drug and anti-terror
operations. In 1993, the US department of defence and the Justice department
signed memoranda of understanding for "Operations Other Than War and Law
Enforcement" to facilitate joint development and sharing of technology.
According to David Banisar of Privacy International, "To counteract
reductions in military contracts which began in the 1980's, computer and
electronics companies are expanding into new markets - at home and abroad -
with equipment originally developed for the military. Companies such as E
Systems, Electronic Data Systems (founded by Ross Perot ) and Texas Instruments
are selling advanced computer systems and surveillance equipment to state and
local governments that use them for law enforcement, border control and Welfare
administration."36
According to
Banisar, the simple need for increased bureaucratic efficiency - necessitated
by shrinking budgets has been a powerful imperative for improved identification
and monitoring of individuals. "Fingerprints, ID cards, data matching and
other privacy invasive schemes were originally tried on populations with little
political power, such as welfare recipients, immigrants, criminals and members
of the military, and then applied up the socioeconomic ladder. One in place,
the policies are difficult to remove and inevitably expand into more general
use."37
These technologies fit roughly into three broad categories. namely
surveillance, identification and networking, and are often used in conjunction
as with video cameras and face recognition or biometrics and ID cards. For
Banisar, "They facilitate mass and routine surveillance of large segments
of the population without the need for warrants and formal investigations. What
the East German secret police could only dream of is rapidly becoming a reality
in the free world."38
4.1 Vehicle Recognition Systems
A huge range
of surveillance technologies has evolved, including the night vision goggles
discussed in 3 above; parabolic microphones to detect conversations over a kilometre
away(see Fig.18); laser versions marketed by the German company PK Electronic,
can pick up any conversation from a closed window in line of sight; the Danish
Jai stroboscopic camera (Fig.19) which can take hundreds of pictures in a
matter of seconds and individually photograph all the participants in a
demonstration or March; and the automatic vehicle recognition systems which can
identify a car number plate then track the car around a city using a
computerised geographic information system.(Fig.20) Such systems are now
commercially
available, for example, the Talon system introduced in 1994 by UK company Racal
at a price of £2000 per unit. The system is trained to recognise number plates
based on neural network technology developed by Cambridge Neurodynamics, and
can see both night and day. Initially it has been used for traffic monitoring
but its function has been adapted in recent years to cover security
surveillance and has been incorporated in the "ring of steel" around
London. The system can then record all the vehicles that entered or left the
cordon on a particular day.39
Such
surveillance systems raise significant issues of accountability particularly
when transferred to authoritarian regimes. The cameras in Fig 21 in Tiananmen
Square were sold as advanced traffic control systems by Siemens Plessey. Yet
after the 1989 massacre of students, there followed a witch hunt when the
authorities tortured and interrogated thousands in an effort to ferret out the
subversives. The Scoot surveillance system with USA made Pelco camera were used
to faithfully record the protests. the images were repeatedly broadcast over
Chinese television offering a reward for information, with the result that
nearly all the transgressors were identified. Again democratic accountability
is only the criterion which distinguishes a modern traffic control system from
an advanced dissident capture technology. Foreign companies are exporting
traffic control systems to Lhasa in Tibet, yet Lhasa does not as yet have any
traffic control problems. The problem here may be a culpable lack of
imagination.(Fig.22) Several European countries are manufacturing vehicle and
people tracking technologies, including France40, Germany41, The Netherlands42 and the UK43.
4.2 CCTV Surveillance Net Works
In fact the
art of visual surveillance has dramatically changed over recent years. of
course police and intelligence officers still photograph demonstrations and
individuals of interest but increasingly such images can be stored and
searched. (Fig. 23) The revolution in urban surveillance will reach the next
generation of control once reliable face recognition comes in. It will
initially be introduced at stationary locations, like turnstiles, customs
points, security gateways, etc., to enable a standard full face recognition to
take place. However, in the early part of the 21st. century, facial recognition
on CCTV will be a reality and those countries with CCTV infrastructures will
view such technology as a natural add-on.
It is
important to set clear guidelines and codes of practice for such technological
innovations, well in advance of the digital revolution making new and
unforeseen opportunities to collate, analyze, recognise and store such visual
images. Such regulation will need to be founded on sound data protection
principles and take cognizance of article 15 of the 1995 European Directive on
the protection of Individuals and Processing of Personal Data.44 Essentially this says
that:
"Member States shall grant the
right of every person not to be subject to a decision which produces legal
effects concerning him or significantly affects him and which is based solely
on the automatic processing of data."
The attitude
to CCTV camera networks varies greatly in the European Union, from the position
in Denmark where such cameras are banned by law to the position in the UK,
where many hundreds of CCTV networks exist. Nevertheless, a common position on
the status of such systems where they exist in relation to data protection
principles should apply in general. A specific consideration is the legal
status of admissibility as evidence, of digital material such
17
as those
taken by the more advanced CCTV systems. Much of this will fall within data
protection legislation if the material gathered can be searched, e.g., by car
number plate or by time. Given that material from such systems can be
seamlessly edited, the European Data Protection Directive legislation needs to
be implemented through primary legislation which clarifies the law as it
applies to CCTV, to avoid confusion amongst both CCTV data controllers as well
as citizens as data subjects. Primary legislation will make it possible to
extend the impact of the Directive to areas of activity that do not fall within
community law. Articles 3 and 13 of the Directive should not create a blanket
covering the use of CCTV in every circumstance in a domestic context.
A proper
code of practice should cover the use of all CCTV surveillance schemes
operating in public spaces and especially in residential area. The Code of
Practice should encompass:- a) a purpose statement covering the key objectives
of the scheme; b) a consideration of the extent to which the scheme falls
within the scope of Data Protection legislation; c) the responsibilities of the
owner of the scheme and those of local partners; d) the way the scheme is to be
effectively managed and installed; e) the principles of accountability; f) the
availability of public information on the scheme and the principles of its
operation in residential areas; g) the formal approaches to be used to assess,
evaluate and audit the performance of both the scheme and the accompanying Code
of Practice; h) mechanisms for dealing with complaints and any breaches of the
Code including those of security; i) detailing the extent of any police
contacts or use of the scheme; and j) the procedures for democratically dealing
with proposals of technological change.
Given that
the United Kingdom has one of the most advanced CCTV network coverage in Europe
and that the issues of regulation and control have been perhaps more developed
that elsewhere, it is suggested that the Civil Liberties Committee formally
consider the model Code of Practice for CCTV produced by the Local Government
Information Unit (LGIU, 1996) in London (A Watching Brief) at a future meeting
of this committee, with a view to recommending it for adoption throughout the
EU.
4.3 Bugging & Tapping Devices
A wide range
of bugging and tapping devices have been evolved to record conversations and to
intercept telecommunications traffic. (See Fig. 24) In recent years the
widespread practice of illegal and legal interception of communications and the
planting of 'bugs' has been an issue in many European states. For example,
Italy, France, Sweden,45
Belgium,46
Germany,47
Norway,48 the
Netherlands49 and
the U.K.50 The
level and scale of some of these illegal activities is astonishing. For
example, a court meeting on 30 September 1996 was told that the Presidential
Palace's anti-terrorist unit was tapping six former Mitterand administration
officials, including ex-cabinet chief Giles Manage.51 An official panel, the
independent Commission for the Control of Security Interceptions, said that
100,000 telephone lines are illegally tapped each year in France and that state
agencies may be behind much of the eavesdropping. They found that curbs imposed
by official bodies may have tempted them to farm out their illegal bugging to
private firms.52
However,
planting illegal bugs like the one shown in (Fig 24) is yesterday's technology.
Modern snoopers can by specially adapted lap top computers like that shown in
(Fig.24), and simply tune in to all the mobile phones active in the area by
cursoring down to their number. The machine will even search for numbers 'of
interest' to see if they are active. However,
18
these bugs
and taps pale into insignificance next to the national and international state
run interceptions networks.
4.4 National & International Communications
Interceptions Networks
Modern
communications systems are virtually transparent to the advanced interceptions
equipment which can be used to listen in. Some systems even lend themselves to
a dual role as a national interceptions network. For example the message
switching system used on digital exchanges like System X in the UK supports an
Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) Protocol. This allows digital
devices, e.g. fax to share the system with existing lines. The ISDN subset is
defined in their documents as "Signalling CCITT1-series interface for ISDN
access. What is not widely known is that built in to the international CCITT
protocol is the ability to take phones 'off hook' and listen into conversations
occurring near the phone, without the user being aware that it is happening. (SGR
Newsletter, No.4, 1993) This effectively means that a national dial up
telephone tapping capacity is built into these systems from the start. (System
X has been exported to Russia & China) Similarly, the digital technology
required to pinpoint mobile phone users for incoming calls, means that all
mobile phone users in a country when activated, are mini-tracking devices,
giving their owners whereabouts at any time and stored in the company's
computer for up to two years. Coupled with System X technology, this is a
custom built mobile track, tail and tap system par excellence.(Sunday
Telegraph, 2.2.97).
Within
Europe, all email, telephone and fax communications are routinely intercepted
by the United States National Security Agency, transferring all target
information from the European mainland via the strategic hub of London then by
Satellite to Fort Meade in Maryland via the crucial hub at Menwith Hill in the
North York Moors of the UK. The system was first uncovered in the 1970's by a
group of researchers in the UK (Campbell, 1981). The researchers used open
sources but were subsequently arrested under Britain's Official Secrets
legislation. The 'ABC' trial that followed was a critical turning point in
researcher's understanding both of the technology of political control and how
it might be challenged by research on open sources.(See Aubrey,1981& Hooper
1987) Other work on what is now known as Signals intelligence was undertaken by
researchers such as James Bamford, which uncovered a billion dollar world wide
interceptions network, which he nicknamed 'Puzzle Palace'. A recent work by
Nicky Hager, Secret Power, (Hager,1996) provides the most comprehensive
details to date of a project known as ECHELON.
Hager interviewed more than 50 people concerned with intelligence to document a
global surveillance system that stretches around the world to form a targeting
system on all of the key Intelsat satellites used to convey most of the world's
satellite phone calls, internet, email, faxes and telexes. These sites are
based at Sugar Grove and Yakima, in the USA, at Waihopai in New Zealand, at
Geraldton in Australia, Hong Kong, and Morwenstow in the UK.
The ECHELON
system forms part of the UKUSA system but unlike many of the electronic spy
systems developed during the cold war, ECHELON is designed for primarily
non-military targets: governments, organisations and businesses in virtually
every country. The ECHELON system works by indiscriminately intercepting very
large quantities of communications and then siphoning out what is valuable
using artificial intelligence aids like Memex. to find key words. Five nations
share the results with the US as the senior partner under the UKUSA agreement
of 1948, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and Australia are very much acting as
subordinate information servicers.
19
Each of the
five centres supply "dictionaries" to the other four of keywords,
phrases, people and places to "tag" and the tagged intercept is
forwarded straight to the requesting country. Whilst there is much information
gathered about potential terrorists, there is a lot of economic intelligence,
notably intensive monitoring of all the countries participating in the GATT
negotiations. But Hager found that by far the main priorities of this system
continued to be military and political intelligence applicable to their wider
interests. Hager quotes from a"highly placed intelligence operatives"
who spoke to the Observer in London. "We feel we can no longer
remain silent regarding that which we regard to be gross malpractice and
negligence within the establishment in which we operate." They gave as
examples. GCHQ interception of three charities, including Amnesty International
and Christian Aid. "At any time GCHQ is able to home in on their
communications for a routine target request," the GCHQ source said. In the
case of phone taps the procedure is known as Mantis. With telexes its called
Mayfly. By keying in a code relating to third world aid, the source was able to
demonstrate telex "fixes" on the three organisations. With no system
of accountability, it is difficult to discover what criteria determine who is
not a target.
In February,
The UK based research publication Statewatch reported that the EU had secretly
agreed to set up an international telephone tapping network via a secret
network of committees established under the "third pillar" of the
Mastricht Treaty covering co-operation on law and order. Key points of the plan
are outlined in a memorandum of understanding, signed by EU states in
1995.(ENFOPOL 112 10037/95 25.10.95) which remains classified. According to a Guardian
report (25.2.97) it reflects concern among European Intelligence agencies that
modern technology will prevent them from tapping private communications.
"EU countries it says, should agree on "international interception
standards set at a level that would ensure encoding or scrambled words can be
broken down by government agencies." Official reports say that the EU
governments agreed to co-operate closely with the FBI in Washington. Yet
earlier minutes of these meetings suggest that the original initiative came
from Washington. According to Statewatch, network and service providers in the
EU will be obliged to install "tappable" systems and to place under
surveillance any person or group when served with an interception order. These
plans have never been referred to any European government for scrutiny, nor one
suspects to the Civil Liberties Committee of the European Parliament, despite
the clear civil liberties issues raised by such an unaccountable system. We are
told that the USA, Australia, Canada, Norway and Hong Kong are ready to sign
up.All these bar Norway are parties to the ECHELON system and it is impossible
to determine if there are not other agendas at work here. Nothing is said about
finance of this system but a report produced by the German government estimates
that the mobile phone part of the package alone will cost 4 billion D-marks.
Statewatch
concludes that "It is the interface of the ECHELON system and its
potential development on phone calls combined with the standardisation of
"tappable communications centres and equipment being sponsored by the EU
and the USA which presents a truly global threat over which there are no legal
or democratic controls."(Press release 25.2.97)
Clearly,
there needs to be a wide ranging debate on the significance of these proposals
before further any further political or financial commitments are made. The
following recommendations have that objective in mind.
20
4. RECOMMENDATIONS
(i) All
surveillance technologies, operations and practices should be subject to
procedures to ensure democratic accountability and there should be proper codes
of practice to ensure redress if malpractice or abuse takes place. Explicit
criteria should be agreed for deciding who should be targeted for surveillance
and who should not, how such data is stored, processed and shared. Such criteria
and associated codes of practice should be made publicly available.
(ii) All
requisite codes of practice should ensure that new surveillance technologies
are brought within the appropriate data protection legislation.
(iii) Given
that data from most digital monitoring systems can be seamlessly edited, new
guidance should be provided on what constitutes admissible evidence. This
concern is particularly relevant to automatic identification systems which will
need to take cognizance of the provisions of Article 15, of the 1995 European
Directive on the Protection of Individuals and Processing of Personal Data.
(iv)
Regulations should be developed covering the provision of electronic bugging
and tapping devices to private citizens and companies, so that their sale is
governed by legal permission rather than self regulation.
(v) Use of
telephone interception by Member states should be subject to procedures of
public accountability referred to in (i) above. Before any telephone
interception takes place a warrant should be obtained in a manner prescribed by
the relevant parliament. In most cases, law enforcement agencies will not be
permitted to self-authorise interception except in the most unusual of
circumstances which should be reported back to the authorising authority at the
earliest opportunity.
(vi) Annual
statistics on interception should be reported to each member states'
parliament. These statistics should provide comprehensive details of the actual
number of communication devices intercepted and data should be not be
aggregated. (This is to avoid the statistics only identifying the number of
warrants, issued whereas organisations under surveillance may have many
hundreds of members, all of whose phones may be subject to interception).
(vii) Technologies
facilitating the automatic profiling and pattern analysis of telephone calls to
establish friendship and contact networks should be subject to the same legal
requirements as those for telephone interception and reported to the relevant
member state parliament.
(viii) The
European Parliament should reject proposals from the United States for making
private messages via the global communications network (Internet) accessible to
US Intelligence Agencies. Nor should the Parliament agree to new expensive
encryption controls without a wide ranging debate within the EU on the
implications of such measures. These encompass the civil and human rights of
European citizens and the commercial rights of companies to operate within the
law, without unwarranted surveillance by intelligence agencies operating in
conjunction with multinational competitors.
(ix) The
Committee should commission a more detailed report on the constitutional issues
raised by the National Security Agency (NSA) facility to intercept all European
telecommunications and the impact this supervisory capacity has on a) any
existing
21
constitutional
safeguards protecting individuals or organisations from invasion of privacy
such as those extant for example in Germany, b) the political, cultural and
economic autonomy of European member states. This report should also cover the
social and political implications of the EU/FBI proposals made to operate a
global telecommunications surveillance network as discussed above. This report
should also analyze the financial and constitutional implications of the proposals
and provide an update of the work undertaken so far and the status of political
approval.
(x) Relevant
committees of the European Parliament considering proposals for technologies
which have civil liberties implications for example the Telecommunications
Committee in regard to surveillance, should be required to forward all relevant
policy proposals and reports to the Civil Liberties Committee for their
observations in advance of any political or financial decisions on deployment
being taken.
(xi) All
CCTV surveillance schemes operating in public spaces and especially in
residential areas should be governed by a comprehensive Code of Practice which
encompasses:- a) a purpose statement covering the key objectives of the scheme;
b) a consideration of the extent to which the scheme falls within the scope of
Data Protection legislation; c) the responsibilities of the owner of the scheme
and those of local partners; d) the way the scheme is to be effectively managed
and installed; e) the principles of accountability; f) the availability of
public information on the scheme and the principles of its operation in
residential areas; g) the formal approaches to be used to assess, evaluate and
audit the performance of both the scheme and the accompanying Code of Practice;
h) mechanisms for dealing with complaints and any breaches of the Code
including those of security; i) detailing the extent of any police contacts or
use of the scheme; and j) the procedures for democratically dealing with
proposals of technological change. It is suggested that the Civil Liberties
Committee formally consider adopting the model Code of Practice for CCTV,
produced by the Local Government Information Unit (LGIU) in London (A Watching
Brief, 1996).
The original
development of riot weapons goes back to Paris before the first World War,
where the police began chemical crowd control using bombs filled with ethyl
bromoacetate, an early form of teargas. The British colonies proved to be the
forcing ground for the wide range of chemical and kinetic impact weapons which
followed. The irritant CS for example was first used in Cyprus in 1956, and
between 1960 and 1965, CN and CS were used on 124 occasions in the colonies.
(Ackroyd et al, 1977).The growing demands of counter-insurgency and urban
warfare generated a first generation of new riot weapons serviced by a growing
police industrial complex.
Thus plastic
and rubber bullets were products of British colonial experience in Hong Kong
where the flying wooden teak baton round became the template for future kinetic
weapons. The concept was one of a flying truncheon which could disperse a crowd
without using small arms. They were however regarded as too dangerous for use
on white people, so in 1969, Porton Down came up with a 'safer' version for use
in Northern Ireland in 1970. Just as plastic bullets were considered far too
dangerous for use in mainland Britain until 1985 when they proliferated
throughout the UK's police forces,so were wooden baton rounds regarded as too
dangerous for the residents of Northern Ireland but not Hong Kong. Now plastic
bullets have been deployed in virtually every continent from the USA to
Argentina, from South Africa
22
to Israel
and China. Obviously, the shift in whether or not a riot weapon was appropriate
or safe had nothing to do with differences in physiology. Wooden and plastic
baton rounds created injuries which did not take account of generation or race.
A predominant concern appears to have been what can be portrayed as politically
safe in a particular context.
The
seductive notion of soft and gentle knockout weapons is recent but not new. It
has its roots back in the 1970's when so called 'non-lethal' weapons formed the
holy grail of riot weapon Research & Development. During that decade, then
Congressman James Scheur outlined a new philosophy of crowd control
weapons.(see Fig.26). He saw such developments resulting from 'spinoffs from
medical, military, aerospace and industrial research' and expressed the view
that: 'We are now in the process of developing devices and products capable of
controlling violent individuals and entire mobs without injury.'53 The veracity of this
assessment is briefly examined below, particularly the assertion that control
is achieved without harm.
Some idea of
the range and variety of riot control weapons under consideration at that time
can be gleaned from the 1972 US National Science Foundation's Report on
Non-lethal Weapons. (NSF, 1972). Altogether it listed 34 different weapons,
including chemical and kinetic weapons; electrified water jets; combined
stroboscopic light and pulsed sound weapons; infrasound weapons; dartguns which
fire drug-filled flight stabilized syringes; stench parts which give off an
obnoxious odour; the taser which fires two small electrical contacts
discharging 50,000 volts into the target; and instant banana peel which makes
roads so slippery, they are impassable.
Many of
these weapons were then only partly developed or had problems of public
acceptability:others have since achieved operational status. They include:
incapacitation weapons such as the electronic riot shields and electro-shock
batons (discussed in Sections 6, 7, & 8 below); Bulk chemical irritant
distributor systems, (delivered by watercannon such as the UK made Tactica or
the many back pack sprays like those made by the Israeli company Ispra (Fig.27
or the German Heckler 8 Koch (Fig. 28); New forms of irritant such as OC (or
peppergas); kinetic impact weapons like the German & UK plastic bullet guns
(shown in Fig. 32) or the South African hydraulically fired, TFM Slingshot
rubber bullet machine; biomedical weapons, such as the compressed air fired
drug syringe now commercially available both in the US & China (shown in
Fig. 33).
The range of
weapons currently deployed for crowd control is vast indeed and defies any
attempts to be comprehensive. In Britain, since the first use of CS gas, rubber
bullets and water cannon at the beginning of the Northern Irish Conflict in
1969, there has been a globalisation of such public order technologies. To our
knowledge some 856 companies across 47 countries have been or are currently
active in the manufacture and supply of such weapons. This proliferation has
been fuelled by private companies wishing to tap lucrative security markets, a
process which has led to both vertical and horizontal proliferation of this
technology. (See Appendix 1 [not provided with report]) For example, one
company, Civil Defence Supply, who provide nearly all UK police forces with
sidehandled batons, boast of an international riot training programme, having
trained the entire Mexican Police Granaderos with armadillo linked riot
shields, CS and baton firing guns like the Arwen and what they call the
complete 'Early Resolution System', for its elite forces.
To
understand why this arsenal of crowd control weapons has been developed, it is
vital
23
to understand
the thinking which underlies their construction. An important task in assessing
new crowd control technologies is to examine the criteria used to evaluate just
what is an 'acceptable' police weapon, and to whom. In the discussion below, an
attempt is made to clarify why the theory of 'non-lethal' weapons used for
'minimum force' policing, does not match the reality of para-militarised riot
squad approaches to 'peacekeeping'. Governments themselves have been using
Technology Assessment to evaluate the relative effectiveness of such weapons.
For example, since 1963, there has been an exchange of information on public
order weapons between the US, Canada, Britain& Australia, allowing Porton
Down to share technical evaluation of proposed non-lethal hardware, with US
military scientists. Virtually all the most recent US government projects on
this weaponry have been classified as "special access" (see 5.6
below) but the early work is quite revealing. Military scientists working at
the US Army Human Engineering Laboratory in the early 1970's elaborated a
systematic set of procedures to evaluate the desirable and undesirable effects
of particular weapons. (See Chart 5a), covering a comparative assessment of
both the medical and physiological consequences of each weapon type, together
with an evaluation of public acceptability.(See Chart 5b).54
5.1 Cost-Effective Crowd Control Weapons
The
simplistic theory which underlies the use of riot weapons assumes that a
'minimum force' strategy of area denial or dispersal can actually contain deep
seated conflicts. The problem with this approach is that real peace can never
be simply defined as an absence of anyone remaining in the conflict zones.
'Minimum force' is an elastic concept, particularly when the force deploying it
no longer enjoys widespread legitimacy.
A dominant
assumption behind the acquisition of new police weapons, is the belief that
they will create both a faster policing response time and a greater
cost-effectiveness. Again, a key aim has been to save policing resources by
either automating certain control functions, amplifying the rate of particular
control activities, or decreasing the number of officers required to perform
them. Consequently, nearly all the weapons discussed in this report, have been
functionally designed to yield an extension of the scope, efficiency and growth
of policing power. New riot weapons enable police, paramilitary and state
security forces to distribute more coercion to a greater number of people.
Therefore they allow a fewer number of officers to threaten a larger number of
people in a crowd and over a distance. Hence, riot weapons allow fewer officers
to break up a disturbance than when using unarmed personnel, or a larger
gathering to be tackled than could otherwise be taken on. The basis of this
cost-effectiveness criterion has been neatly summed up by the then Brigadier,
Sir Frank Kitson:
"For example, three or four
times as many troops might be required, if they were only allowed persuasion,
as would be needed if they were allowed to use batons and gas; and three or
four times as many troops might be needed if they were restricted to using
batons and gas, as would be required if they were allowed to use small arms."
(Kitson, 1971,p. 90).
However,
although in the short term, it may seem that these weapons can contain overtly
violent conflict, their use in the longer term may feed or exacerbate the
processes responsible for its development. A study undertaken at the Richardson
Institute at the University of Lancaster, described evidence of such processes
at work in Northern Ireland. (Wright, 1987)55 The study found that
less-lethal weapons used in the context of a phased deployment of
counter-insurgency strategies, could lead to more force being used. In the
beginning this was
24
evidenced by
the deployment of higher numbers of riot weapons, then the substitution of each
new less-lethal weapon by a more severe type. The initial use of water canon
thus gave way to the use of CS gas. This was augmented by rubber bullets which
were then replaced by the harder hitting PVC variety, (See Chart 6) and in
greater quantities. Further empirical work suggested that because these riot
systems were being deployed in the context of a phased set of
counter-insurgency tactics, the resistance they bred led to a successive
deployment of each subsequent and more violent phase of the low intensity
conflict programme. In effect they bred the dissent they were designed to
'fix". (Wright, 1981 ) Graphing the deployment of less-lethal weapons
against the crude indicator of political killings in Northern Ireland revealed
a pattern which appeared to corroborate this finding. As each new weapon
deployment was associated with an upsurge in the death count (See Chart 7).
Over longer time periods, another study detected predictable levels of weapon
utilization. (Wright, 1981)
For example,
fairly constant levels of munitions were used as if the supply itself was the
greatest determinant of usage. (See Chart 8). A new form of multivariant time
series analysis was evolved to describe the effect of deployments of these
weapons and tactics. (Wright, 1987). What emerged was a complex set of causal
influences which locked the participants into their own violent behaviour.
During the period when this conflict broke down, variables indicating violent
behaviour of the various participants, were most influenced by their own
previous behaviour. (See Chart 9) Paradoxically, whilst these weapons were
meant to provide a new series of flexible responses, their ultimate effect was
to programme their targets into traditional anti-state activities and
procedures. In other words, their most invidious characteristic may be to
undermine non-violence as a means of public protest. (Wright, 1992) The real
physical effects of these weapons described below, may go some way to
explaining their dysfunctional impact on conflict behaviour.
5.2 Harmless Weapons? - The Scientific Evidence
Statements
made by military scientists and police chiefs about "non-lethal"
weapons and "minimum force", have led the public to believe that
crowd control weapons were designed for humanitarian reasons and are in fact
harmless. Such sentiments have been echoed by many governments and reinforced
by reports from laboratories and the manufacturers actually creating the
technology of political control.
If safety
was the prime consideration, we might expect the research on such weapons to be
especially thorough prior to their authorization. Since most future
developments are still essentially modifications of existing chemical or
kinetic impact weapons, it is worth reexamining the historical research which
has permitted and legitimised this research in respect to the European state
which has used these weapons the most, i.e. the United Kingdom.
5.3 Harmless Kinetic Impact Weapons?
In January
1977, the then Secretary of State For defence, was asked about the research on
the likely death and injury rates from rubber and plastic bullets carried out
prior to their introduction. The reply referred to a report produced by four
surgeons working at the Victoria Hospital in Belfast in 1972, (two years after
rubber bullets had been used in Northern Ireland), and said that comparable
information for plastic bullets was not available.56
25
Chart 5. US Human Engineering Laboratory Technology
Assessment of various 'less lethal' kinetic weapons
Assessment of various 'less lethal' kinetic weapons
26
Chart 6. Trends in Riot Weapon use in Northern Ireland
from 1969 - 1986
27
Chart 7. Impact of introduction of new riot weapons on
the level of political killings in Northern Ireland
the level of political killings in Northern Ireland
28
Chart 8. Structure of riot weapon use
29
Chart 9. Multi variant time series analysis of
Northern Irish conflict 1976 - 1981
30
The Belfast
surgeons report makes stark reading.(Millar et al, 1972). It informs us that of
90 patients who sought hospital treatment after being hit by rubber bullets, 41
needed in patient treatment. Their injuries included three fractured skulls, 32
fractures of the facial bones (nose,jaw, cheek etc.), eight ruptured eye globes
(all resulting in blindness), three cases of severe brain damage, seven cases
of lung injury, and one case of damage to liver, spleen and intestine. The
overall role call included one death, two people blinded in both eyes, five
with severe loss of vision in one eye and four with sever disfigurement of the
face. The surgeons also found evidence of rubber bullets being fired at much
closer ranges than those for which they were designed. Rubber bullets were not
meant to be fired at distances of less than 25 metres but the surgeons found
that half of those brought into hospital had been shot at less than 15 metres
and one third at less than 5 metres. Part of the problem is that such area
dispersal weapons are meant to create a dispersal zone. If anyone is
unfortunate enough to be in such a zone, there may not be much choice in
avoiding being targeted by such weapons, since part of their threat is the fear
of becoming a random victim.
In the
1970's, military researchers in the US undertook their own research on kinetic
weapons. They concluded that rubber bullets had an extremely high probability
of undesirable effects in any scenario for their possible operational use. The
US Army research undertaken on live animals, found that impact weapons with
energy levels of above 90 ft. lbs., caused injuries, "in the severe damage
region."(Thein, et al, 1974; Wargovitch, et al, 1975). A member of BSSRS,
Jonathan Rosenhead, was able to use the comparative kinetic energy/damage
figures in the US literature, to establish that given their muzzle velocity
(about 293 ft. lbs.), for most if not all of its range, the rubber bullet is in
the severe damage region. (Rosenhead, 1976).
It is worth
noting that for the purposes of this present study, sample kinetic riot weapons
from the USA, the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands were assessed using the
original US military criteria on impact effects. It was found that all these
weapons were in either the dangerous or severe damage region categories. (See
Chart 4)
Plastic
bullets totally replaced rubber bullets in Northern Ireland by 1975. Although
authoritative sources such as Jane's Infantry Weapons (1976), asserted
that rubber bullets were withdrawn because the disability and serious injury
rates 'were not considered acceptable', the official explanation was simply the
plastic baton round's greater accuracy.57 Rosenhead argued that given
the even higher muzzle velocity of the plastic bullet, it was even more
dangerous, especially at close range.
His analysis
has been amply born out by the history of injuries and deaths caused by plastic
bullets in Northern Ireland. A survey undertaken by Mr Laurance Rocke, (Senior
Registrar at the Royal Victoria Hospital in Belfast), reported in the Lancet
during 1983, that plastic bullets are even more deadly than the rubber bullets
they replaced.(Rocke, 1983). They cause more severe injuries to the skull and
brain and therefore more deaths. Despite the security forces rule that baton
rounds must be aimed below the waist, 31 of the 99 plastic bullet victims
covered in the Rocke survey suffered head injuries, He attributed the
difference in the respective injuries and deaths for rubber and plastic bullets
to their corresponding ballistic characteristics. Plastic bullets caused
serious injuries less often than rubber bullets because the latter was less
stable in flight and tended to hit a victim sideways. Plastic bullets resulted
in more fractured skulls, lacerated scalps and deaths.
More
worrying are the human faces behind these statistics. Between May 1973 and
August
31
1984, 12
people were killed by plastic bullets. Inquests have found that six of the
twelve fatalities were not involved in any civil disturbances when they were
shot and seven of the twelve victims were children aged under 15.58
During August
1981, an international commission of enquiry, sponsored by the Association of
Legal Justice, travelled to Belfast to investigate the use of plastic bullets.
One of its members was senior British research scientist, Dr. Tim Shallice, who
wrote in the New Statesman, "The conclusion seemed inescapable to
members of the commission: the Northern Ireland authorities were knowingly
allowing widespread, indiscriminate and illegal use of a weapon whose lethal
potential was well known" (Shallice, 1981).
Since then
it has been very much business as usual. Just last summer in Northern Ireland,
the RUC used the now British owned Heckler and Koch anti-riot weapon to fire
thousands of plastic bullets. Whilst an immediate inquiry was called, few
reports emerged of the way that innocent residents out for a night socialising
were corralled by Landrovers and fired upon as all escape exits were sealed
off.
Evidence
Gathered by the Committee for the Administration of Justice in Northern Ireland
(CAJ), suggests a serious flouting of official guidelines for the RUC use of
plastic bullets, when over 6002 plastic bullets were fired in just one weekend
(July, 1996). CAJ recorded instances of the RUC firing indiscriminately when no
disturbances were going on (including people being injured by plastic bullets
as they were coming out of a disco); young people being shot by plastic bullets
as they left a fast food restaurant; CAJ observers and journalists shot at by
plastic bullets; people who were clearly attempting to leave areas of
disturbance were also targeted. Victims of the conflict seeking medical
attention at Altnagelvin Hospital were subject to a baton charge by riot police
who had entered the casualty area dressed in full riot gear with dogs. Witness
statements were gathered which suggested that many people refused to seek
treatment from injuries they sustained from baton rounds for fear of arrest.
(CAJ, 1996)
In such
circumstances, the indiscriminate deployment of plastic bullets removes
people's rights of assembly and may remove their rights to freedom of movement
and in some situations their right to life. The provisions of the UN Code of
Conduct for Law Enforcement Officers in regard to the principle of
proportionality appear to have been breached last summer by the RUC, (as well
as their duty not to use excessive force if it is possible to use non-violent
means before resorting to force and firearms). We can think of no reason to
challenge the European Parliament's decision of May, 1982 which called for a
ban on the use of plastic bullets within the EU, and recommend that the
European Parliament reaffirm their call for a total ban on this weapon.
5.4 Harmless Chemical Irritant Weapons?
We know that
over 300 companies are currently manufacturing and marketing chemical incapacitants
to military, security, prison and police forces around the world and a vast
range of equipment is available, including cartridges, grenades, backpack
sprays and hand held aerosols. Yet the safety of the commonly used riot control
agents is also questionable. In high doses they can kill, a reality harshly
brought home by deaths of children in South Africa during the apartheid years.
Even in lower doses, there are a range of very unpleasant side effects
including bronchitis, asthma, lung and eye damage, contact dermatitis and
prolonged diarrhoea. An examination of the actual research undertaken on CS
prior to its authorization
32
for use in
the Derry riots of 1969 reveal some gross omissions and assumptions. The claim
that CS did not harm people with breathing ailments rested on a study of two
bronchitic rabbits; possible effects on the unborn child were tested by the
response on fertilised chicken eggs when injected with CS.59 Inadequate evidence
had been gathered on its effects on those suffering from heart complaints and
experiments to determine whether or not CS was carcinogenic, were not completed
until two years after it had been intensively used in Northern Ireland.
After the
1969 Derry riots, a committee of inquiry was set up, (the Himsworth Committee)
to look at the medical and toxicological effects of CS. Although it drew
heavily on existing Porton studies, the Himsworth Committee accepted that under
certain circumstances CS can kill and that it can also produce highly
unpleasant but non-fatal injuries to the lungs. Himsworth made the sensible
recommendation that in future, riot agents should be regarded more akin to
drugs than weapons and the authorities should publish the results of safety
tests, in the scientific press, in full, prior to any authorization. (HMSO,
Cmnd 4775, 1971). This is such a clear and reasonable precautionary stance,
that we recommend that the European Parliament adopt it as the baseline
criterion for all the chemical irritants which might ever be deployed in the
EU.
Alas, for
the amount of attention the UK government paid to this recommendation, we have
only to look at the circumstances surrounding the introduction for use throughout
the UK in certain special circumstances, of CR in 1973. CR is an incapacitant
which causes temporary blindness. According to one Porton report, it feels like
being thrown blindfolded into a bed of stinging nettles. (See Fig. 28)60 In 1977 the Secretary
of State for Defence was challenged to withdraw authorization for CR until the
Himsworth recommendations were complied with. The Minister refused, claiming
this was already the case and went on to quote a string of articles all except
one of which was published after 1973. None of these articles addressed the
issue of carcinogenicity, an important consideration for chemicals that are
intended for direct spraying on the skin. If research on these new weapons was
not fully completed before they were used then the idea that they were deployed
because of safety considerations must be rejected. Less-lethal weapons of this
type are also presented as more acceptable alternatives to guns. But these weapons
augment rather than replace the more lethal weapons in police arsenals.
Euphemistic labels such as watercannon, teargas and rubber bullets are used to
create the impression that these weapons represent soft and gentle forms of
control, CS is never referred to by the authorities as vomit gas, in spite of
its capacity to cause violent retching.
A further
danger of stronger incapacitating chemicals sprayed directly on to crowds is
the impact it can have on changing police practices. In the 1960's crowd dispersion
was seen as the key requirement so that the a provision of escape routes was
part of the training packages used. With the advent of new paralysing systems,
crowd capture becomes a possibility as foam barriers to seal off all escape
routes become a precursor for mass arrest. This tactic was deployed against
German anti-nuclear protestors in Wackendorf, over ten years ago, when 7,000
police were used to ring a crowd of 1000 activists.61 (See Fig 29). On this
occasion chemical foam was used in area denial rather than capture so the
example is illustrative. However, with the back pack sprayers now being
produced, much fewer personnel could achieve the same tactic. This is part of
the problem on the horizon.
33
5.5 Harmless Irritant Gas Sprays?
The
introduction of hand held gas irritant sprays into Europe into countries such
as Germany, France and most recently, the UK, has yielded an offensive as well
as a defensive capacity. Again1 in the UK we might have assumed they would be
governed by existing UK policy on the introduction of new chemical weapons for
domestic control.
Until the
nineties, despite intensive research, only four chemical agents were primarily
used for such purposes, namely CN, CS, CR and most recently (Peppergas) OC.
This is because there are real difficulties in marrying an agent with low
toxicity and high effectiveness. CN and CS (developed by Porton Down in the
fifties) are in fact war gases and hundreds of deaths are attributed to their
use in the Vietnam conflict where they were used to flush out Vietcong in
tunnels.62
Porton
scientists have always been quite realistic about the possible dangers of new
chemical weapons for public order control. "As with other foreign
chemicals to which man may be exposed, no matter how detailed, extensive and
carefully effected are the pre-clinical toxicity investigations and
observations in controlled human exposures, there can be no complete guarantee
from such studies that there is absolute safety in use for a given
chemical."63
Such caution about weapons designed to be sprayed directly in the face is well
founded. Their use in riot control is based on an assumption that the level of
irritant will be dispersed because they will be deployed in wide open spaces.
There are special dangers associated with using chemical aerosols in tight confines
where dangerous concentrations can build up. As another scientist has
commented, "Politician and scientist alike must accept the inescapable
conclusion that any substance capable of producing an intolerable irritation at
low concentrations must also produce a concomitantly high toxicity. In other
words, the existence of ideal riot agents of sufficient safety not to impair
the health of rioters or accidently exposed innocents is merely notional."64
As we have
seen, there is evidence that CS can cause permanent but non-lethal lung damage
at comparatively low doses65,
as well as second degree burns with blistering and severe dermatitis.66 In situations where
high exposure to CS has occurred, heart failure, hepatocellur damage and death
have been reported (HMSO, 1971). Some evidence also exists that people subject
to repeated doses of CS develop tolerance, further increasing their level of
exposure.67 One
study has concluded that a single exposure to high level of respiratory
irritants similar to CS have led to the development of 'reactive airways
disease syndrome' in some individuals, characterised by prolonged cough and
shortness of breath.68
New restraint tactics used alongside gas sprays are a potential recipe for
fatalities.
It is
revealing that when tests on French made (SAE Alsetex) CS spray took place in
the UK, a Metropolitan police inspector suffered burns to his eyes during tests
in Northampton - thought to be due to the propellant.69 It also emerged that
Dr Jill Tan, the Home Office scientist who gave these devices the all clear,
suffered blisters to her face when sprayed with the CS product during tests.
Self-Defence expert Inspector Pete Boatman who was training the instructors
when the accident happened has now been banned from training officers outside
his region because his Chief Constable is worried about being sued by people
injured by the incapacitant.70
Throughout the CS trials in the UK, which began on March 1, 1996, the public
were constantly reassured about the safety of this product based on French
studies, studies undertaken in the USA and military research conducted at
Porton Down. A UK Channel 4 Dispatches programme revealed serious flaws in
these assumptions. (Liberty,
34
1996). The
French gendarmerie keep no statistics or records of CS use to suggest it is
safe. Indeed Professor Jean Claud Roujeau of the Hospital Henri Mondor in Paris
can quote much evidence to the contrary. "I have to disagree because we
have seen, in the last few years, several cases of patients suffering from
severe skin reactions to these spray. These reactions look like acute burns,
they are very spectacular and sometimes need hospitalisation for several days,
and can reach 10-20 per cent of the body surface area of the patient. (See Fig.
30) It is generally agreed that above 20 per cent there is a risk of death, so
I think it is impossible to consider these products as generally safe and
harmless." (Liberty, opp cit)
The British
Government also cited work by the US National Toxicology Programme (NTP) in
Boston, but one of the world's leading toxicologists Professor Howard Hu said,
"The NTP was purely designed to assess whether CS can cause cancer in
laboratory animals. It was not designed to see whether CS could cause pulmonary
(breathing) problems of a non carcinogenic nature, or skin problems and it
really says nothing about the potential of CS to cause health problems in
vulnerable people." Professor Hu also said that CS may actually cause
asthma. "One of the conditions that CS may cause is commonly referred to
as RADS, a variant of asthma caused by a very high, brief intense exposure to
an irritant like CS". He also said that CS may be linked to chromosomal
mutation - damage to the body's DNA itself.
In fact, the
French made spray was given a specification in the UK which demanded that it be
a 5% solution and release 5 centileters of fluid per burst which compares with
U.S. versions which contain a 1% solution and release a 1% burst. In other
words the French Sprays adopted by the UK were 25 times as strong as those used
in the United States. It is perhaps somewhat revealing that the UK Government
gave the go ahead for deployment of these sprays before the trials were
complete and before all the relevant research was published in the scientific
press.
In fact the
safety concerns outlined above, are even more pressing in regard to this newly
introduced disabling chemical, Oleoresin Capsicum (OC), or 'peppergas'. OC is a
new irritant based on extracts from Chile pepper. As a plant toxin it is banned
for use in war by the 1972 Biological Weapons convention but not for internal
security use.
Porton Down
began researching analogues of capsicum after it was used as a military
harassing agent in World War I in the form of acylated vanillylamide and its
more potent homologues such as VAN as a possible replacement for the riot agent
CN. However, the agent was predominantly used in the seventies for Porton
funded studies in the neurophysiology of pain such as those conducted in 1975
by Foster and Ramage at Manchester University's Medical School.71 However, it was in the
USA that companies transformed this irritant into a commercial product which is
now widely used by both police, corrections departments and private citizens.
The effects
of peppergas are far more severe, including temporary blindness which last from
15-30 minutes, a burning sensation of the skin which last from 45 to 60
minutes, upper body spasms which force a person to bend forward and
uncontrollable coughing making it difficult to breathe or speak for between 3
to 15 minutes.
For those
with asthma, taking other drugs, or subject to restraining techniques which
restrict the breathing passages, there is a risk of death. The Los Angeles
Times has reported at least 61 deaths associated with police use of pepper
spray since 1990 in the USA,72
and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) documented 27 deaths in custody
of people
35
sprayed with
peppergas in California alone, since 1993.73
Whilst
peppergas has been widely adopted in the US and Canada so far it has not seen
widespread usage in Europe. Nevertheless, several European companies such as
France,74
Germany,75 Spain76 and the UK77 are known to be either
marketing their own brand or importing OC sprays and backpacks from the USA.
However, the US Army concluded in a 1993 Aberdeen Proving Ground study that
pepper spray could cause "Mutagenic effects, carcinogenic effects,
sensitization, cardiovascular and pulmonary toxicity, neurotoxicity, as well as
possible human fatalities .There is a risk in using this product on a large and
varied population" (Salem, 1993) However, the pepper spray got the go
ahead despite the reservations of the US military scientists after FBI tests
gave it the all clear.
It has
subsequently been revealed that the head of the FBI's Less-Than lethal Weapons
Programme, Special Agent Thomas WW Ward, took a $57,000 bribe from a peppergas
manufacturer to give the Zarc product Capstun, the all clear. British
researchers highlighted the conflict of scientific evidence to the South
California branch of ACLU who then took vigourous action to have the agent
withdrawn. Berkley's Police Commission voted for a 60 day moratorium on
Peppergas.78 ACLU
is now looking at the legal implications and has asked the FBI to immediately
retract and rescind all research documentation. Allan Parachini, Public Affairs
Director of ACLU has said "The Ward Scandal in some ways exceeds the
Rodney King beatings in terms of its potential impact on law enforcement, since
FBI research helped convince police departments across the country that pepper
spray was a safe and effective way to subdue suspects." In fact the breach
of trust is much more serious since many other countries as disparate as
Australia and India have subsequently adopted peppergas on the back of US
research.
Not
surprisingly, recent company marketing has focused on providing training and
certification to insulate officers from lawsuits associated with deaths in
custody cases. The effects of OC are so severe that companies such as Bioshield
& Foxguard have started to market decontamination wipes to meet peppergas
"post application requirements which in turn reduces the potential for
litigation".
In the face
of such findings, any European Member State who permits the deployment of the
OC irritant, may well find themselves facing legal action in the future, if
fatalities or other unusual impacts emerge. It is recommended that the European
Parliament errs on the side of caution and calls for a moratorium on the
acquisition, sale and deployment of Oleoresin Capsicum irritant sprays, until
independent research is undertaken on its safety and published in full in the
scientific press for peer review.
5.6 Second Generation Incapacitation Weapons
In the
Nineties, the revolution in so called 'non-lethal weapons' was given fresh
impetus by new US programmes to fight internal conflicts - ostensibly without
casualties. The US Government was driven towards finding a universal panacea
because of a series of embarrassing and widely publicised debacles including
the Rodney King beating, the Waco siege and their unfortunate experiences in
Somalia, where they failed in crowd control operations with only lethal
technology. The new policy was avidly pushed in the States by the likes of Col.
John Alexander (who made his name as part of the Phoenix Assassination
programmes during the Vietnam war) and science fiction writers such as Alvin
Toffler (Toffler, 1994) and Janet and Chris Morris, (Morris& Morris, 1990,
1994) and picked up by the
36
DoD and
Justice Department.
Thus a
second generation of kinetic, chemical, optico-acoustic, microwave, disabling
and paralysing technologies is on the horizon, to join the existing arsenal of
weapons designed for public order control. Much of the initial new work has
been undertaken in US nuclear laboratories such as Oak Ridge, Lawrence
Livermore and Los Alamos. Many cynics see the work as a rice bowl initiative
with scientists looking for new weapons projects to justify their future
careers as the cold war made their old skill redundant. Already they have come
up with a pandora's box of new technologies. These include:
*
Ultra-sound generators, which cause disorientation, vomiting and involuntary
defecation, disturbing the ear system which controls balance and inducing
nausea. The system which uses two speakers can target individuals in a crowd.
* Visual
stimulus and illusion techniques such as high intensity strobes which pulse in
the critical epileptic fit-inducing flashing frequency and holograms used to
project active camouflage.
* Reduced
energy kinetic weapons. Variants on the bean bag philosophy which ostensibly
will result in no damage ( similar claims were once made about plastic
bullets). (See Fig. 32)
* New
disabling, calmative, sleep inducing agents mixed with DMSO which enables the
agent to quickly cross the skin barrier and an extensive range of pain causing,
paralysing and foul-smelling area-denial chemicals. Some of these are
chemically engineered variants of the heroin molecule. They work extremely
rapidly, one touch and disablement follows. Yet one person's tranquillization
may be another's lethal dose. (See Fig. 33)
* Microwave
and acoustic disabling systems. (see Fig. 34)
* Human
capture nets which can be laced with chemical irritant or electrified to pack
an extra disabling punch. (See Fig. 34)
* Lick 'em
and stick 'em technology such as the Sandia National Laboratory's foam gun
which expands to between 35-50 times its original volume. Its extremely sticky,
gluing together any target's feet and hands to the pavement. (See Fig. 35)
* Aqueous
barrier foam which can be laced with pepper spray.
* Blinding
laser weapons and Isotrophic radiator shells which use superheated gaseous
plasma to produce a dazzling burst of laser like light. (See Fig. 36)
* Thermal
guns which incapacitate through a wall by raising body temperature to 107
degrees.
* Magnetosphere
gun which delivers what feels like a blow to the head.
We are no
longer at a theoretical stage with these weapons. US companies are already
piloting new systems, lobbying hard and where possible, laying down potentially
lucrative patents. For example, last year New Scientist reported that
the American Technology Corporation (ATC) of Poway California has used what it
calls acoustical heterodyning technology to target individuals in a crowd with
infra-sound to pinpoint an individual 200-300
37
metres away.
The system can also project sonic holograms which can conjure audio messages
out of thin air so just one person hears.79 Meanwhile, Jane's
reported that the US Army Research Laboratory has produced a variable velocity
rifle for lethal or non lethal use a new twist to flexible response.80 Other companies are
promoting robots for use in riot and prison control.
The National
Institute of Justice in the US is now actively soliciting new ideas for such
weapons from corporate bodies,81 and corporate US has
responded with bodies like SPIE (The International Society For Optical
Engineering), which have enthusiastically responded with a special conference
on 'Enabling Technologies for Law Enforcement and Security' at the Hynes
Convention centre in Boston, Nov 19-21, 1996. The panel on less than lethal
technologies has experts talking on subjects such as: The non-lethal laser
baton; design of a variable velocity gun system for law enforcement
applications; sticky shocker; definition of lethality thresholds for KE
less-lethal projectiles; violence reduction and assailant control with laser
sighted police pistols; directed energy technologies: weaponisation and barrier
applications; pepper spray projectile for countering hostage and barricade
situations; aqueous foam as a less than lethal technology for prison
applications etc. A formal Pentagon policy on the use of non-lethal weapons was
prepared last year in response to Congressional instructions to initiate a
joint acquisitions programme. Whilst there are practical problems regarding
whether it is preferable to leave an enemy or a citizen dead rather than
permanently maimed, and whether or not hallucinogenic or other psychotropic
'calmative' agents fall foul of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the spending
call was for $15 million annually over the next three years, to fund new and
existing projects.82
Critics of
such projects suggest that non-lethal war is a contradiction in terms. Many of
the so called non-lethal weapons are in reality are far from non-lethal. They
can and have killed, maimed, blinded and scalped innocent bystanders. There is
a real danger that they will make conflicts more lethal by enraging crowds and
by paralysing people making them more vulnerable to other operations by the
military and security forces. In that sense these weapons could be considered
pre-lethal and actually lead to higher casualty rates. (See above) In fact the
US proponents of these weapons are under no illusions. Their focus is 'not to
replace lethal munitions but to augment existing and future capabilities which
will provide a spectrum of force response options.'83 The area most
commentators have not addressed is the extent that such weapons will help the
military create new roles for themselves as part of internal policing
operations.
Most of the
debate has been about their role in war. We know from the proceedings of the
Non Lethal Defence II conference, (organised by The American Defence
Preparedness Association held in March last year), that the that the Joint
Program Office of Special Technology Countermeasures (JPO-STC) have developed a
multi-service co-ordination strategy that incorporates both the HQ Allied
Forces of Southern Europe and the 'Doctrine & Training HQ' of the United
Kingdom.84 Other
formal liaison links between the USA non-lethal research community and Member
States are anticipated but little public information has emerged.
The work
done so far has led to dubious weapons based on dubious research, strongly
influenced by commercial rather than humanitarian considerations. There is a
pressing need for a wide ranging debate in the European Parliament of the
humanitarian and civil liberties implications of allowing these weapons on to
European soil to become part of the technology of political control in the EU.
Much of the work that has been undertaken in secret, but part of the
bibliography of the present report covers a representative sample of the
available literature. What is required is a much more detailed assessment of
these weapons than space
38
permits here
and it is recommended that a new study be commissioned to achieve this work. In
the meantime, it would be useful to ask for the European Commission to report
on existing liaison arrangements between Member States and the US on Non-lethal
weapons and the nature and extent of any joint activities.
5.6 RECOMMENDATIONS
(i).
Informed by principle 3 of the United Nations Basic Principles on The Use of
Force & Firearms (which states that: " the development and deployment
of non-lethal incapacitating weapons should be carefully evaluated in order to
minimise the risk of endangering uninvolved persons, and the use of such
weapons should be carefully controlled.") and principle 4 (which require
governments to take steps to ensure that arbitrary or abusive use of force is
not used by law enforcement officers, and that force is used "only if
other means remain ineffective"), the committee should consider asking the
European Parliament to reaffirm its demand of May 1982, for a ban on the use of
plastic bullets.
(ii). In the
light of last summer's events at Drumcree in Northern Ireland, the Committee is
advised to seek confirmation from the Commission that: Member States are fully
aware of their responsibilities under Principles 3 and 4 of the United Nations
Basic Principles on the Use of Force & Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials
and to ask for clarification of exactly what steps individual Member States are
taking to ensure that these are fully met as the power of "less-lethal
weapons" changes and whether consistent standards apply.
(iii). The
European Parliament should be asked to establish objective criteria for
assessing the biomedical effects of so called non-lethal weapons that are
independent from existing commercial or governmental research undertaken
to-date. It is also recommended that further research is commissioned on the
range and types of technologies which have been developed by the US non-lethal
doctrine so far, together with an assessment of their anticipated and
unforeseen social and political implications.
(iv). The
Commission should be requested to report on the existing liaison arrangements
for the second generation of non-lethal weapons to enter European Union from
the USA and call for an independent report on their alleged safety as well as
their intended and unforeseen social and political effects. During the interim
period, deployment by the police, the military or paramilitary special forces,
of US made or licensed chemical irritant, kinetic, acoustic, laser,
electromagnetic frequency, capture, entanglement, injector or electrical
disabling and paralysing weapons, should be prohibited within Europe.
(v). The
European Parliament should: (a) Note the biased research on Peppergas (OC)
undertaken by corrupt FBI officials and the continuing use of FBI safety
assurances in other countries on the basis of this flawed research; (b) Call
for a ban on Peppergas (OC) deployment or usage within EU Member States, until
new independent research on OC is undertaken.
(vi). That
all research on chemical irritants should be published in open scientific
journals before authorization for any usage is permitted and that the safety
criteria for such chemicals should be treated as if they were drugs rather than
riot control agents.
(vii).
Research on the alleged safety of existing crowd control weapons and of all
future innovations in crowd control weapons should be placed in the public
domain prior to any decision towards deployment.
39
Some of the
equipment described above, such as the surveillance, area denial, surveillance
and crowd control technologies, also finds a ready use inside permanent prisons
and houses of correction. Other devices such as the area denial, perimeter
fencing systems such as portable coils of razor wire, prison transport vehicles
with mini cage cells, and tagging equipment are used to create temporary
holding centres.
Permanent
prisons are however, literally custom built control environments, where every
act and thing, including the architecture, the behaviour of the prison officers
and daily routines, are functionally organised with that purpose in mind.
Therefore many of the technologies discussed above are built in to the prison
structure and integral to policing systems used to contain their inmates. For
example, area denial technology, intruder detection equipment and surveillance
devices are instrumental in hermetically sealing high security prisons.
Everything from electronically operated prison gates and cell doors, to razor
wire and video surveillance on the perimeter walls, serve this end.
If
disturbances develop within a prison, the riot technologies and tactics
outlined above, are also available for use by prison officers. The trend has
been to train specialized MUFTI (Minimum Force Tactical Intervention ) squads
for this purpose. Outside Europe, irritant gas has been used not only to crush
revolt but also to punish political detainees,85 or to eject reticent
prisoners from their cells before execution.86 Anyone deemed to be a
trouble maker may become the potential target for further containment, the type
and variety of which, depend to a large extent on the prevailing norms and
political climate. Thus physical restraint equipment covers a range from
straitjackets and body-belts at one end of the spectrum to thumbcuffs and leg
shackles at the other. Recently, the International Observatory on Prisons
criticized Spain's so called Register of Special Treatment Prisoners held in solitary
confinement for prolonged periods and said this could be infringing the
European Convention against Torture.87
Other
approaches include special stripped and padded cells, segregated units which
have been used Inverness in Scotland to form a cage within a cage;88 isolation units like
the now abandoned system used at Wakefied Jail;89 the Tote Trakt cells
used to imprison the Bader Meinhof gang in Germany, which were designed to
mimic sensory deprivation; or entire blocks of segregated isolation cells like
the 750 Security Housing Units and 3,000 maximum security cells run by the California
House of Corrections department at the punitive warehousing prison at Pelican
Bay.90 The
Pelican Bay complex is a good example of where a lack of proper accountability
can bring widespread systematic abuse, even if the prison is one of the most
modern. In 1995, Judge Thelton E. Henderson said the prison was one of the most
abusive and that prison officers not only ignored the abuses but "also
followed a management strategy that permitted the use of excessive force for
the purpose of management and deterrence." The Judge informed the Federal
District Court of guards who assaulted prisoners in cells with batons, high
voltage taser guns, chained them up for hours in "fetal restraints"
with their wrists bound to their ankles for 22 hours a day.91
Apart from
mechanical restraint, prison authorities also have access to pharmacological
approaches for immobilising inmates, colloquially known as 'the liquid cosh.'
These vary from psychotropic drugs such as anti-depressants, sedatives and
tranquilliser to powerful hypnotics. Drugs like largactil or Seranace offer the
chemical equivalent of a strait jacket and their usage is becoming increasingly
controversial as prison populations rise and larger numbers on inmates are
'treated'. In the United States, the trend for punishment to become therapy
reaches its apotheosis with 'behaviour modification' which uses Pavlovian
reward and
40
punishment
routines to recondition behaviour. Drugs like anectine, (a curare derivative),
which produce either fear or pain, are used in aversion therapy. In prisons,
the possibilities of testing new social control drugs are extensive, whilst
actual controls are few. Houses of correction form the new laboratories for
developing the next generation of drugs for social reprogramming, whilst the
pharmacology laboratories of both the universities and the military provide
scores of new psychoactive drugs each year.92
Way back in
the 1970's, J.A. Meyer of the US Defence Department suggested a countrywide
network of transceivers for monitoring all prisoners on parole, via an
irremovable transponder.93
The idea was that parolees movements could be continuously checked and the
system would facilitate certain areas or hours to be out of bounds, whilst
having the economic advantage of cutting down on the costs of clothing and
feeding the prisoner. If prisoners go missing, the police can automatically
home in on their last position. The system came into operation use in America
in the mid 1980's when some private prisons started to operate a transponder
based parole system.94
The system has now spread into Canada and Europe where it is known as
electronic tagging. Whilst the logic of tagging is difficult to resist, critics
have argued that whilst tagging carries the promise of being an effective
alternative to prison, a look at the criminological literature, this assertion
is questionable.(MacMahon, 1996). The clientele appears not to be offenders who
would have been imprisoned but rather low risk offenders who are most likely to
be released into the community anyway. Because of this, the system is not
cheaper since the authorities gain the added expense of supplying monitoring
devices to offenders who would have been released anyway. Electronic tagging is
however beneficial to the companies who sell such systems. Tagging also has a
profitable role inside prisons in the U.S. and in some prisons, notably, DeKalb
County Jail near Atlanta, all prisoners are bar coded. (Christie, 1993, p. 96)
Critics such
as Lilly & Knepper (1992, 186-7) argue that in examining the international
aspects of crime control as industry, more attention is needed to the changing
activities of the companies which used to provide supplies to the military. At
the end of the cold war, "with defence contractors reporting declines in
sales, the search for new markets is pushing corporate decision making, it
should be no surprise to see increased corporate activity in criminal
justice." Where such companies previously profited from wars with foreign
enemies, they are increasingly turning their energy to the new opportunities
afforded by crime control as industry.(Christie, 1994). Increasingly in the
U.S, we witness the trend toward private prisons and the critical issue here is
can the privatisation of prison control create a rehabilitation process if its
dominant raison d'etre is profit from control systems and hence cost cutting.
Many
European countries are now experiencing a rapid process of privatisation of
prisons by corporate conglomerations, predominantly from the USA. Many of the
prisons run by these organisations in the US have cultures and control
techniques which are alien to European traditions. Such a process of
privatisation can lead to a bridgehead for importing U.S. corrections
mentality, methods and technologies into Europe and there is a pressing need to
ensure a consensus on what constitutes acceptable practice. There is a further
danger that such privatisation will lead to cost cutting practices of human
warehousing, rather than the more long term beneficial practice of prisoner
rehabilitation.
In some
European countries, particularly Britain, where changes in penal policy are
leading to a rapid rise in prison population without additional resources being
applied to the sector, the imperative is to cut costs either through using
technology or by privatising prisons.95 Already, the UK Prison
Service has compiled a shopping list of computer based options with existing
CCTV surveillance systems being complemented by geophones, identity
41
recognition
technology and forward looking infra-red systems which can spot weapons and
drugs.96
Alongside such proactive technologies, UK prisons will face increasing pressure
to tool up for trouble. Much this weaponry including the contract for between
£950,000 and £2,500,000 of side handled batons, kubotans, riot shields etc.
made by the Prison Service in March 1995, are likely to be originally
manufactured in the United States.97
The U.S.A
adopts a far more militarised prison regime than anywhere in Europe outside of
Northern Ireland. A massive prison industrial complex has mushroomed to
maintain the strict control regimes that typify American Houses of Correction.
The future prospect is of that alien technology coming here, with very little
in the way of public or parliamentary debate. A few examples of US prison
technologies and proliferation illustrate the dangers.
Many US
prisons now use peppergas. The Department of Justice and every Federal Court
that has looked at its use in correctional facilities has found abuses. For
example at the privately run West Tennessee Detention Facility, prison guards
pumped peppergas into two dormitories seized by inmates.98 In late 1994, the
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, investigated a County Jail in
Syracuse, New York, and reported "an unacceptably high and improper use of
pepperspray . . . Nearly every inmate told of excessive and improper use . . .
particularly when inmates are not resistant and after the inmate has been
restrained and presents no danger." One suicidal inmate in Syracuse was
restrained with three cans of pepperspray and died shortly afterwards of
positional asphyxia.99
In the US, Federal Laboratories are already marketing a remote control systems
(TG Guard), which can automatically dispense peppergas through specific zones
in a prison complex from a remote firing location.100 (See Fig. 37).
Many prisons
in the U.S, use Nova electronic 50,000 volt extraction shields, electronic stun
prods and most recently the REACT remote controlled stunbelts. In 1994, the US
Federal Bureau of Prisons decided to use remote-controlled stunbelts on
prisoners considered dangerous to prevent them from escaping during
transportation and court appearances. By May 1996, the Wisconsin Department of
Corrections said that no longer will inmates be chained together "but will
be restrained by the use of stunbelts and individual restraints." Stun
Tech of Cleveland Ohio has said that it wants to see its stunbelts introduced
into the chain gang programs of Alabama, Florida and Louisiana. In fact by
1996, it was reported that the US Marshals service and over 100 county agencies
have obtained such belts as well as 16 state correctional agencies including
Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Ohio and
Washington (Amnesty International, 1997).
Stun Tech
literature claims that its high pulse stunbelt can be activated from 300 feet.
After a warning noise, the Remote Electronically Activated Control Technology
(REACT) belt inflicts a 50,000 volt shock for 8 seconds. This high pulsed
current enters the prisoners left kidney region then enters the body of the
victim along for example blood channels and nerve pathways. Each pulse results
in a rapid body shock extending to the whole of the brain and central nervous
system. The makers promote the belt "for total psychological supremacy . .
. of potentially troublesome prisoners." Stunned prisoners lose control of
the bladders and bowels. "After all, if you were wearing the contraption
around your waist that by the mere push of a button in someone's hand, could
make you defecate or urinate yourself, what would you do from the psychological
standpoint?"101
Amnesty International wants Washington to ban the belts because they can be
used to torture, and calls them, "cruel, inhuman and degrading." Some
officials say the belts can save money because fewer guards would be needed.
But human rights activists and some jailers oppose them as the most degrading
new measure in an increasingly barbaric field." (Kilborn,1997) Already,
some European countries are in the process of evaluating stunbelt systems for
use here. (Marks, 1996)
42
The U.S.
Federal Bureau of Prisons is responsible for a prison population of some
101,000 inmates experiencing according to their Chief of Security, Jim Mahan, a
25% overcrowding effect within the 81 feral prisons across the U.S.A. An
additional 17 new facilities are under construction and 10 others will be
privatised. As a result of rising tensions within US jails and the need to
respond, the Federal Bureau of Prisons has become a formal part of the new
research programme on less-lethal weapons. Disturbance control squads are
specialised units used in US jails to quell riots and Mahan identified future
needs in term of (a) aqueous foams; (b) containment nets; (c) anti-traction
devices; (d) aesthetic darts/pellets; (e) chemical area dispensers; (f) noise
weapons such as acoustic generators; (g) infra-ultrasound; (h) low energy
lasers; (i) optical munitions in addition to the kinetic energy, chemical and
electrical weapons they now deploy.102
Without
proper licensing and a clear consensus on what is expected from private prisons
in Europe, multinational private prison conglomerations could act as a
bridgehead for similar sorts of technology to enter the European crime control
industry. Proper limits need to be set when a licence is granted with a
comprehensive account taken of that company's past track record in terms of
civil liberties, rehabilitation and crisis management rather than just cost per
prisoner held.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
The
Committee should ask the Commission to:
(i). Ensure
that the UN Minimum treatment of prisoners rules banning the use of leg irons
on prisoners are implemented in all EU correctional facilities.
(ii).
Implement a ban on the introduction of inbuilt gassing systems inside European
gaols on the basis of the manufacturers warnings of the dangers of using
chemical riot control agents in enclosed spaces. Restrictions should also be
made on the use of chemical irritants from whatever source in correctional
facilities wherever research has shown that a concentration of that irritant
could either kill or be associated with permanent damage to health.
(iii).
Ensure that all private prison operations within the European Union should be
subject to a common and consistent licensing regime by the host member. No
licence should be granted where proven human rights violations by that
contractor have been made elsewhere. Any failure to secure a licence in one
European state should debar that private prison contractor from bidding for
other European contracts (pending evidence of adequate human rights training
and appropriate improvements in standard operating procedures and controls by
that corporation or company).
(iv). Seek
agreement between all Member States to ensure that:
(a) All riot
control, prisoner transport and extraction technology which is in use or
proposed for use in all prisons, (whether state or privately run), should be
subject to prior approval by the competent member authorities on the basis of
independent research;
(b)
Automated systems of indiscriminate punishment such as built in baton round
firing mechanisms. should be prohibited.
(c). The use
of electroshock restraining devices or other remote control punishment devices
including shock- shields should be immediately suspended in any private or
public prison in the European Union, until and unless independent medical
evidence
43
can clearly demonstrate that their use
will not contribute to deaths in custody, torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.
(v) The
European Parliament should be requested to establish a rigorous independent and
impartial inquiry into the use of stun belts, stunguns and shields, and all
other types and variants of electroshock weapons in Member States, to assess
their medical and other effects in terms of international human rights
standards regulating the treatment of prisoners and the use of force; the
inquiry should examine all known cases of deaths or injury resulting from the
use of these instruments, and the results of the inquiry should be published
without delay
(vi).
Prohibit the use of kill fencing and lethal area denial systems in any prison
whether private or public, within the European Union.
Millennia of
research and development have been expended in devising ever more cruel and
inhumane means of extracting obedience and information from reluctant victims
or achieving excruciatingly painful and long-drawn-out deaths for those who
would question or challenge the prevalent status quo. What has changed in more
recent times is (i) the increasing requirement for speed in breaking down
prisoners' resistance; (ii) the adoption of sophisticated methods based on a
scientific approach and (iii) a need for invisible torture which leaves no or
few marks which might be used by organisations like Amnesty International to
label a particular government, a torturing state.103 According to
Amnesty, there is also an increasing trend for torture and ill treatment to
directed at common criminal suspects and social 'underdogs' such as immigrants
and members of racial minorities (Forrest, 1996). Today, the phenomena of
torture has grown to a worldwide epidemic. A report by the Redress Trust in
1995, found that 151 countries were involved in torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment (Fig. 38), despite the fact that 106 states have ratified, acceded to
or signed the Convention Against Torture.104
The advent
of modern torture technique can be traced back to the Russian NKVD, which used
sensory deprivation and multiple levels of brutality to induce stress before
'conveyor'style questioning by relays of interrogators for days on end, thereby
industrialising state terror. These approaches had the dual requirement of
extracting information and breaking down personality in order to elicit public
confessions as the era of the 'show trial' opened up.105 There is a continuum
between such coerced confessions and torture.106
These
techniques can themselves be regarded as part of an evolving technology which
can be further researched and developed before being transferred elsewhere.
Again, like all the technology of political control, torture technology has three
components, hardware, software and liveware (the human elements), which are all
woven together to form manipulative programmes of socio-political control. The
hardware can include both modern and medieval prisoner restraining, disabling
and repressive technologies, for example leg shackles, thumbcuffs, and
suspension equipment, which despite being prohibited by Rule 33 of the United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules For the Treatment of Prisoners(United Nations,
1955),107 are
still being manufactured(Fig. 39 & Fig. 40);108 it also encompasses
blunt trauma-inducing drugs (e.g. Aminazin, apomorphine, curare, suxamethonium,
haloperidol, insulin, sulfazin, triftazin, tizertsin, sanapax, etaperazin,
phrenolong, trisedil, mazjeptil, seduksin and motiden-depo (Plate and Darvi, 1981).
After World War II, the USA, for example, undertook considerable research on
the use of drugs for obtaining intelligence from interrogees independent from
their volition, for example, project Chatter.109 This research was
expanded during the Korean War and included laboratory experiments on animals
and
44
humans using
Anabasis aphylla, scoplamin and mescaline in order to determine their speech
inducing qualities. Overseas experiments were conducted as part of the
project."110
The CIA later expanded this work in what became known as Projects Bluebird and
Artichoke. A whole series of projects were then initiated under Projects
MKDELTA and MKULTRA which were concerned with "the research and
development of chemical, biological and radiological materials capable for
employment in clandestine operations to control human behaviour."111 Much of the CIA work
on behaviour modification was later adapted towards less-lethal disabling
chemicals.112
More recently, Spain has been accused of using vagrants to test the use of
anaesthetic drugs to make it easier for the security forces to kidnap guerillas
of the Basque separatist organisation ETA.113
7.1 Torture Hardware
Other
torture hardware includes electroshock weapons, electrically heated hot tables,
whips, iron-chain filled rubber hoses, cat-o'-nine-tails, clubs, canes,
specially designed torture devices and interrogation rooms using white noise
(Fig. 41) (Sweeney 1991a and 1991b) and stroboscopic UV light (New Scientist,
1973). Much of this equipment is home made but some of the newer technologies
are purpose built and may be used by successive law enforcement agencies after
one torturing regime is replaced by another. For example, the 'Apollo machine'
which was devised by SAVAK, the Shah's secret police in Iran (it delivered an
electric shock to sensitive parts of the body, while a steel helmet covered
prisoners' heads to amplify their screams), was also used by the succeeding
regime's religious police. (Mather,1982)
Helen
Bamber, Director of the British Medical Foundation for the Treatment of the
Victims of Torture, has described electroshock batons at 'the most universal
modern tool of the torturers'. (Gregory, 1995) Recent surveys of torture
victims have confirmed that after systematic beating, electroshock is one of
the most common factors (London, 1993); (Rasmussen, 1990). If one looks at the
country reports of Amnesty International, electroshock torture is the Esperanto
of the most repressive states. Many examples of its use have been reported
including Austria,114
Greece (Council of Europe, 1994); China (Amnesty International 1992b),
Ballantyne, 1992, 1995); and Saudi Arabia (Amnesty International, 1994).
Amnesty International has just published a survey of fifty countries where
electric shock torture and ill treatment has been recorded since 1990.115
According to
the manufacturers, the new pulsed variants of electroshock weapon were
developed in the 1980's on the basis of biomedical research. They come in
several variants including hand held prods and batons, (Fig. 42) electrified
riot shields (Fig. 43) and electrified dart systems like the Taser (Fig. 44.).
Electroshock weapons work on the induction coil principle. They are battery
powered devices which step up the voltage several thousand fold to produce a
high voltage low amperage shock that affects the victim's muscle control. As
well as severe pain and a temporary paralysis, such weapons also achieve a
psychological effect because of the dancing display of crackling blue lightning
which traverses the electrodes of both shields and prods.
An
independent survey by the UK Forensic Science Service (FSS) (commissioned by
the British Home Office), examined the possible hazardous effects of a range of
different electroshock devices on the human body (Robinson, et al., 1990). The
FSS study reported that receiving a typical discharge from an electroshock prod
up to half a second startles and repels the victim; one to two seconds and the
victim loses the ability to stand up; three to five seconds and loss of
skeletal muscle control is total and immobilization occurs. The effect can last
for between five and fifteen minutes. The FSS study also reported that modern
pulsed electroshock weapons are more powerful than the old fashioned cattle
prods by nearly two
45
orders of
magnitude.
Portable
electrified riot shields have been manufactured since the mid-1980's for
prisoner capture and control. They comprise a transparent polycarbonate plate
through which metal strips are interlaced. A button activated induction coil in
the handle sends 40,000 - 100,000 volts arcing across the metal strips,
accompanied by intermittent indigo flashing sparks and an intimidating crackle
as the air between the electrodes is ionized. They work by charging up and then
instantly discharging a capacitor, to produce a chain of high impulse shocks. A
sales video shows how the victim can be instantaneously thrown to the ground on
impact, completely incapacitated.
Manufacturers'
claims that these products are "safe" are open to interpretation.
Deaths have been reported from both Tasers116 and from shock
shields.117 One
of the key experts used by manufacturers of electroshock weapons to justify
claims of the generic safety of these devices has refuted such an
interpretation.118
There is also the need to take into account the political context in which many
of these weapons are used since push button torture may be just one methodology
applied as part of an entire spectrum of abuse.
7.2 Torture Software
Apart from
such hardware, there are also numerous standard operating procedures which form
the 'software' component of torture. Examples of training supplied to
authoritarian regimes include the low intensity conflict training used to
capture, stress and 'soften up' dissidents (Watson 1980), advisory support and
technical assistance, including teaching of scientific methods of 'deep
interrogation' procedures and the more brutal forms of human destruction.
Research and
development in modern torture techniques and technologies has focused upon
methods which cause suffering and intimidation without leaving much in the way
of embarrassing long-term visible evidence of brutality. However, researchers
in torture rehabilitation are gradually evolving more sophisticated methods for
detecting and verifying the use of torture (Karlsmark, et al., 1988; Rasmussen
and Skylv, 1993).
A vast range
of torture techniques have been evolved.119 The names of these
techniques signify how systematized this behaviour has become. Some torturing
states evolve their own lexicon of systematized abuse. For example, in China there
are dian ji (electrical assault), gui bian (down on knees whipping), jieju
(chains and fetters), shouzhikao (finger cuffs), zhiliaio (rod fetters),
menbanliao (shackleboard) (Figs. 39, 40, & 45.) and so on, (Human Rights
Watch, 1992; Amnesty International, 1992b).120 A similar set of
routinized torture techniques emerged in Latin America in the 1970's. (Figs.
46, 47 & 48).
The flow of
modern repressive 'technique' includes expertise in courses on low intensity
conflict management in operations deemed to be 'counter terror' or operations
other than war. Some of these approaches are formally coded.121 In January 1997, for
example, a CIA 'Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual' was released in
response to a FOIA request and detailed torture methods against suspected
subversives during the 1980's refuting claims by the agency that no such
methods were taught there.122
Intense
interrogation methodologies border on torture, particularly when they
incorporate scientific approaches based on psycho-pharmacology or sensory
deprivation, or involve levels of physical terror and softening-up processes of
intimidation which sap the will of the prisoner to resist. What has evolved
from this quest for ever more powerful techniques to break the
46
human spirit
is a classical form of operant conditioning designed to teach the target psyche
debilitation, dependence and dread (Biderman & Zimmer, 1965). (See Chart
10). Just occasionally, hard evidence of such research comes to light (Anon,
1993). In the case of Northern Ireland, BSSRS member Tim Shallice was probably
the first to identify a scientific methodology at work in the pre-interrogation
treatments (See Chart 11) used on detainees in the first wave of internment
introduced into Northern Ireland in 1971. Shallice identified the real nature
of the special treatment dished out to a selected few - associating it with
sensory deprivation techniques (Shallice, 1973) (See Chart 12), and an
experiment where those targeted were "guinea pigs" according to
McGuffin (1974).
In Northern
Ireland, the findings of pioneer sensory isolation pioneers such as Hebb, 1958;
Smith & Lensky, 1959, Lilly, 1955 and Zubek and Solomon, et al. 1959, were
modified by the British Army to create a new process of coercive and
debilitating torture which left no marks.123 Hebb found that
after leaving such experiments, volunteers were disorientated and very
suggestible to propaganda. We can conclude that in the far more disturbing
conditions of arrest, the anxiety created by these techniques would confuse the
victims' thought processes so much that they would fall easy prey to the bad
man-good man act. The works of Lilly, Smith and Lensky showed that among the
after-effects of sensory deprivation experiences were loss of identification,
feelings of unreality and disorientation. Fear and panic were found to be
common in anyone remaining in an environment of perceptual deprivation for more
than two hours. As was apparent from the psychological research, anything over
24 hours 'at the wall' would be sufficient to induce psychotic breakdown. It
has now been established that the long term effects of such experiences are
traumatic neuroses comparable to shell shock or in modern parlance, it rapidly
induced post traumatic stress syndrome.124
We know that
such approaches are designed to intimidate the wider population rather than
just to extract specific information from any one individual; they are
heuristic and can be taught to others (See McHardy, 1976 and the Times,
1980). The parallels of the British techniques with those of the CIA Human
Resource Training Manual discussed above are striking. The CIA manual discusses
using intense fear, deep exhaustion, solitary confinement, unbearable anxiety,
standing to attention for long periods of time, sleep and food deprivation,
stripping suspects naked and keeping them blindfolded in windowless, dark
interrogation rooms with no toilet. Only in January of 1997, did the CIA
formally renounce and prohibit its agents from using these torture manuals.125 In the meantime,
variants of this methodology have appeared elsewhere, e.g., by the Palestinian
Authority which was set up in May 1994.126
Some
interrogation techniques are intended to kill. For example the use of a heavy
wooden roller to crush the limbs of detainees in Kashmir. This practice results
in the release of myoglobin, heme and other related muscle proteins and toxins
(Rhabdomyolysis) which leads to acute renal failure. In the absence of kidney
dialysis, the results are fatal.127 Other regimes have
resorted to delayed poisoning of their dissidents who die after their release
from incarceration, e.g. by the use of Thallium which was deployed against
Kurds in Iraq and most recently (according to the ongoing Truth Commission), by
South Africa's Apartheid regime.128
7.3 Torture Liveware
In any
bureaucracy of repression, there are personnel schooled in the ideological
attitudes necessary to keep such systems in operation (Fig.49). In some cases
this schooling takes place literally, for example at the infamous School of the
Americas based at Fort Benning in
47
|
General Method
|
Effects
(Purposes)
|
Variants
|
|
1.
Isolation.
|
Deprives
victim of all social support of
his ability to resist. Develops and intense concern with self. Makes victim dependent upon interrogator. |
Complete
solitary confinement. Complete isolations. Semi isolation.
Group isolation. |
|
2.
Monopolisation of
Perception. |
Fixes
attention upon immediate
predicament. Fosters introspection. Eliminates stimuli competing with those controlled by captor. Frustrates all action not consistent with compliance. |
Physical
isolation. Darkness or bright light. Barren environment.
Restricted movement. Monotonous food. |
|
3. Induced
Debility
Exhaustion |
Weakens
mental and physical ability to
resist. |
Semi-starvation.
Exposure. Exploitation of wounds. Induced illness.
Sleep deprivation. Prolonged constraint. Prolonged interrogation. Forced writing. Over-exertion. |
|
4.
Threats.
|
Cultivates
anxiety and despair.
|
Threats of
death. Threats of non return. Threats of endless
interrogation and isolation. Threats against family. Vague threats. mysterious changes of treatment. |
|
5.
Occasional indulgences.
|
Provides
positive motivation for
compliance. Hinders adjustment to deprivation. |
Occasional
favors. Fluctuations of interrogators's attitudes.
Promises. Rewards for partial compliance. Tantalising. |
|
6.
Demonstrating
'Omnipotence'. |
Suggests
futility of resistance.
|
Confrontation.
Pretending co-operation taken for granted.
Demonstrating complete control over victim's fate. |
|
7.
Degradation.
|
Makes cost
of resistance more
damaging to self esteem than capitulation. Reduces prisoner to 'animal level' concerns. |
Personal
hygiene prevented. Filthy infested surrounds.
Demeaning punishments. Insults and taunts. Denial of privacy. |
|
8.
Enforcing Trivial
Demands. |
Develops
habits of compliance.
|
Forced
writing. Enforcement of minute rules.
|
Chart 10. Biderman's Chart of Coercion
48
CHART 11: PRE-INTERROGATION TREATMENTS USED ON
DETAINEES
|
1. General assault with truncheons and knuckledusters. Kicks to testicles and stomach. Faces slapped, ears drummed, arms twisted, chest hair pulled. Nose, chest, mouth and throat were held. During these attacks, detainees were alternatively threatened and bribed.
2. Men
were forced to run barefoot over broken glass and stones whilst being beaten
.
3. Some
men were dropped blindfold from helicopters hovering near the ground.
4.
Alsatian dogs were used to savage some of the men.
5.
Torturous exercises were imposed - up to 48 hours for some men.
6. Men
were forced to stand against a wall for many hours with their legs akimbo.
7.
Detainees were repeatedly awakened as soon as they fell asleep.
8. Food
and drink were withheld.
9. Bags
were kept over the heads of some of the prisoners for up to six days.
10. On
certain occasions an electric cattle prod was used.
11. Some
victims had their testicles manually compressed.
12. Others
were burned with matches and candles.
13.
Detainees were urinated upon.
14.
Injections of amphetamine drugs were given to some of the prisoners
15.
Psychological tortures were used such as: Russian roulette; firing blanks,
blindfolding; the use of stockings and surgical masks by the assailants;
forcing men to stare at a white perforated wall in a small cubicle.
|
49
CHART 12: TECHNIQUES USED BY THE BRITISH ARMY IN
NORTHERN IRELAND TO MIMIC SENSORY DEPRIVATION
NORTHERN IRELAND TO MIMIC SENSORY DEPRIVATION
|
1. Prisoners were hooded before interrogation.
2. A sound
machine was used to produce a constant hiss of 'white noise'.
3. Long
periods of immobilization in the 'stoika' position, i.e., being forced to
lean against a wall with legs wide apart standing on the toes, with only the
fingertips touching the wall. Detainees who collapsed from exhaustion were
beaten back into position.
4. Little
or no food or drink.
5.
Prisoners were forced to wear loose overalls several sizes too big.
6. In
addition these men were deprived of sleep for days on end.
|
|
EFFECTS OF
THESE PROCEDURES
Although
these processes were not technically the same as sensory deprivation, the
purpose guiding their use was the deliberate production of related effects.
Measures
1, 2, 3 and 5 cause visual, auditory, tactile and kinaesthetic deprivation
and thus mimic sensory deprivation. Measures 1, 4, and 6, deprive the brain
of the sugar and oxygen necessary for normal functioning. Measures 1, 4 and
6, may also disturb normal body metabolism. Applied together in conditions of
high physical and psychological stress, they could effect rapid nervous
breakdown.
|
50
Georgia,
otherwise known at the 'School of the Assassins' or 'La escuela del golpe' (the
coup school). It has been accused of training death squads in Guatemala and
Honduras, e.g. Battalion 3-16 (Walker, 1994). In 1995, the Baltimore Sun
obtained Freedom Of Information Act documents on Battalion 3-16, (which used
electroshock and rubber suffocation devices on prisoners in Honduras), that
confirmed that the Unit had been trained in interrogation techniques by the CIA
(Baltimore Sun, 11 June 1995). Last year, further manuals were released
under FOIA on Project X, part of the US Foreign Intelligence Assistance
Programme which reveal that until the 1980's, the US military ran an
intelligence training programme in Latin America and elsewhere, that taught
foreign officers to offer bounties for captured or killed insurgents, spy on
non-violent political opponents, kidnap rebels' family members, blackmail
unwanted informants and the use of drugs to facilitate interrogation. Project X
manuals were distributed by the US Army School of Americas but their use was
stopped only in 1991 when the Defense Intelligence Agency raised ethical and
legal questions.129
Thus the
creation of a bureaucracy practising systematic human rights violation will
often include external 'liveware', e.g., the various foreign technical
advisers, counter-insurgency and low intensity conflict strategists,
paramilitary, intelligence and internal security police as well as the 'white
collar mercenaries' who act as key technical operators in any administrative
policy of repression. This 'liveware' category includes all the people who are
conditioned by fear or training to actually put into practice the software and
hardware components of a particular policy of repression.130 For the last decade,
he export of such 'security' training has become a highly profitable commercial
proposition (Gordon, 1987) and it is a characteristic of the trade in torture
technology and expertise that it has become so intensely privatised (Klare and
Arnson, 1981). Such technologies are now entering Europe from the USA.
7.4 International Controls On The Export Of
electroshock & Stun Technology
In theory, a
substantial body of international human rights obligations should effectively
prevent such transfers, including: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article
5 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights; Article 5 of the
American Convention on Human Rights; Article 3 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms; UN Convention Against
Torture; the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials and the UN Standard Minimum Rules For the Treatment of
Prisoners. Yet in January 1995, it was possible for a UK investigative reporter
working for UK Channel 4 Dispatches, to obtain the enthusiastic willingness of
several British companies to supply such devices, which are in fact banned
under UK law (Gregory 1995).
7.5 The European Torture Trail
Until the
Channel 4 Programme, 'The Torture Trail' was shown, it was not widely realized
that such an extensive European electroshock manufacturing and supply base
existed. Undercover TV actors were given privileged access to a secret network
of companies making electroshock weapons and to come away with orders worth
over £3 million (consisting of 10,000 electroshock shields and 5000 shock
batons from British Aerospace (BAe) and 15,000 electroshock units from ICL
Technical Plastics). But perhaps the insights this programme gave into the
procurement and proliferation of electro-control technology is even more
astonishing. Philip Morris, the Sales Manager for Royal Ordnance, agreed to use
the Royal Ordnance's worldwide procurement network to bring the electroshock
deal together, irrespective of the equipment's country of origin or its eventual
destination; Ordnance would organise the whole package. Royal Ordnance's parent
company, invited their clients to meet up at the secretive
51
Covert
Operation & Procurement Exhibition (COPEX), held at Sandown Park racecourse
In November 1994. A wide range of internal security was on display. Foreign
invitees included delegations from China, Algeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Colombia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Turkey.
The
Dispatches team followed through that rendezvous with a meeting at the Royal
Ordnances own offices in Lancashire, where they were shown a 40,000-volt shock
baton made in Eire, together with an electronic riot shield made in Tennessee,
USA, by Nova Technologies, which could immobilise 120 people without a battery
change. While the deal was struck, Royal Ordnance made an extraordinary
confession, that they had sold 8000 german electroshock batons as part of the
Al Yamamah deal to Saudi Arabia.131
A further
insight into the complicity of companies involved in this business was afforded
by the programme's interview with the manager of ICL Technical Plastics in
Glasgow, Frank Stott.132
He claimed that he used to sell shock batons to the apartheid regime in South
Africa, and to Abu Dhabi for the Gulf States; and a year after the Tiananmen
Square massacre, he sold electric-shock weapons to the Chinese authorities via
Hong, with the UK government's blessing, and said that the trip was supported
by the Department of Trade & Industry. Mr. Stott claimed that the Chinese
had an ulterior motive for buying his electroshock weapons: they wanted to copy
them. (China has a prodigious electroshock weapon manufacturing industry (for
example, the Tianjin Bohai Radio Works manufactures 80,000 shock instruments a
year - all quality controlled (Fig. 50). It is instructive to note that one of
the products photographed in China for this programme, an extending
electroshock probe (See Fig. 51), has been awarded a British patent (no.
GB214906A).133
7.6 RECOMMENDATIONS
(i). New
regulations on the nature of in-depth interrogation training should be agreed
which prohibit export of such techniques to forces overseas known to be
involved in gross human rights violation.
(ii). All
training of foreign military, police, security and intelligence forces in
interrogation techniques, should be subject to licence, even if it is provided
outside European territory .
(iii).
Restrictions on visits to European MSP related events by representatives of
known torturing states should be effectively implemented.
(iv) The
Commission should be requested to achieve agreement between member States to:
(a)
immediately prohibit the transfer of all electroshock stun weapons to any
country where such weapons are likely to contribute to unlawful killings, or to
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, for example by refusing any
export licence where it is proposed that electroshock weapons will be
transferred to a country where persistent torture or instances of instances of
electric shock torture and ill treatment have been reported;
b) introduce
and implement new regulations on the manufacture, sale and transfer of all
electroshock weapons from and into Europe, with a full report to the European
Parliament's Civil Liberties committee made each year. [Special consideration
should be given to controlling the whole procurement process, covering even the
making of contracts of sale, (to prevent a purchase deal made in a European
country being met by a supplier or subsidiary outside of the EU, in an effort
to obviate extant controls)].
52
(c). Ensure that the proposed
regulations should cover patents and prohibit the patenting of any device whose
sole use would be the violation of human rights, via torture or the creation of
unnecessary suffering. The onus should be on the patent seeker to show that his
patent would not lead to such outcomes.
(v) The
European Parliament should look at commissioning new work to investigate how
existing legislation within member states of the EU, can be brought to bear to
prosecute companies who have been complicity in the supply of equipment used
for torture as defined by the UN convention of torture. This new work should
examine, in conjunction with the Directorate of Human Rights:
(a) The
extent to which such technology produced by European companies is being
transferred to human rights violators and the role played by international
military, police and security fairs organised both inside and outside European
Borders;
(b) The
possible measures that could be set in place to monitor and track any
technology transfer within this category and any potential role in this
endeavour that might be played by recognised Non-Governmental Organisations.
The last
Gulf War was in many ways an exception to the changing character of political
conflict. With the end of the Cold War, the future lies increasingly in a
bewildering array of separatist and counter-insurgency wars; border disputes;
ethnic and religious violence; coups d'etat; national security and
counter-revolutionary operations - what the military once called "low
intensity conflicts" and now call "operations other than war."
Civil conflicts in Somalia, Kashmir, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, the former
Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, South Korea and most recently, Albania,
being cases in point.
8.1 The European Trade in Repression
Many of the
major arms companies also have a paramilitary/internal security operation and
diversification into these markets, is increasingly taking place. Weapons
specifically designed to quell dissent are incredibly cheap compared to their
major warfare counterparts like ships, aircraft and tanks, and have the market
advantage of being used almost continuously against the enemy within. The move
into a post-Cold War world has been accompanied by a change in the nature of
warfare. Military scientists are on the threshold of dramatic weapons and
technologies destined to transform internal political control. The clients most
enthusiastically seeking this technology are the torturing states outlined in
Figure 38. In those contexts we can accurately describe the technology of
political control, as technology of repression and identify exports of these
commodities as a repression trade.134
NGO's like
Amnesty International, have begun to catalogue the trade in specialised
military, security and police technologies, to measure its impact on
industrialising repression, globalising conflict, undermining democracy and
strengthening the security forces of torturing states to create a new
generation of political prisoners, extra-judicial killings and
'disappearances'. (Amnesty International, 1996). The key issue for Members of
the European Parliament is how they will deal with the human and political fall
out of what is a systemic process of exporting repression: either importing a
tidal wave of dispossessed refugees, or keeping them in desperation at the
borders of Europe. In the longer term, it is important to
53
examine the
role and function of specific technologies in crushing dissent and to analyze
the trade in repression and its correlates in terms of human displacement -
huge numbers of nonpersons which some country must import. Such refugees will
themselves become targets for further political control and exclusion in the
newly moulded Fortress Europe, now well on the way to putting whole societies
under surveillance, in an effort to deny them permanent residence. The export
of the technology of political control and the flow of refugees must be
understood as part of the same process. There is an urgent need for greater
transparency and democratic control of such exports and a clearer recognition
of their frequent linkage with gross human rights violations in their recipient
states.
As discussed
above, this arsenal of control includes area denial technologies such as razor
wire to seal off selected zones, surveillance, telephone and fax tapping
networks used to track dissidents; computerised communications, command and
control systems linked to data banks and remote terminals(in security vehicles,
border checkpoints etc.); automatic vehicle recognition and tracking equipment;
riot technology including whips, sawn-off shotguns, incapacitating and
less-lethal weapons, such as water cannon, stun grenades, multi-shot riot guns,
plastic bullets, chemical irritants, injector weapons, sound, light and
electromagnetic zapping technologies; pre-fragmented exploding ammunition,
dum-dum bullets, stroboscopic cameras which can photograph every participant in
a demonstration in seconds; helicopter mounted crowd monitoring equipment;
public order vehicles; identity recognition systems; silenced sub-machine guns
and assassination rifles; precision laser and night target acquisition aids;
prison and restraining technologies as well as blunt trauma inducing drugs and
specially designed implements of torture.
To many of
the suppliers attending the specialised paramilitary, police and security
fairs, the answer to the question would you sell your equipment to countries on
the Redress Trust s map of the torturing states (Fig. 38), would be a
resounding yes please' In fact MSP technologies are aggressively marketed at a
series of special fairs and exhibitions which take place all over the world
(See Appendix 1.) Potential customers get an opportunity to sample the latest
wares. (Fig. 52) Weapons are sometimes on display that are banned for use in
many European states (Fig. 53) and some clue is afforded to the dynamics behind
proliferation and conversion of these technologies as European Fairs organisers
target other continents such as Latin America. (Fig. 54). Equipment on display
at such fairs one month sometimes finds a ready application on the streets soon
after. (Fig. 55) At Turkey's IDEF exhibition, European gas back packs were on
display (Fig. 56) as well as a flypast by the UK flying team the Red Arrows,
British licensed production internal security vehicles were exhibited alongside
Russian helicopter attack gunships. (Fig. 57)
In the wake
of growing evidence that MSP transfers from the European Union have contributed
to the deliberate and indiscriminate killing of civilians, disappearances,
torture, and ill treatment on a mass scale, there is widespread public disquiet
at the apparent inaction of the governments of the European Union to address
this concern.135
A few examples examining the MSP transfers to just two human rights violating
countries are sufficient to illustrate the nature of this trade, i.e., European
companies based in:- Austria136;
Belgium137; Denmark138; Finland139; France140; Germany141; Greece142; Italy143; Netherlands144; Sweden145; & the UK146; exporting MSP
supplies to Indonesia; or European companies based in Belgium147; France148; Germany149; Italy150; Netherlands151; and the UK152; exporting MSP goods
to Turkey.
Similarly,
many companies in the UK; Belgium: Switzerland; Germany; Austria; Sweden and
Finland are arranging licensed production through joint ventures with companies
in third countries. For example:Land Rover153; GKN Defence154(UK); FN Nouvelle
Herstal155(Belgium);
54
Heckler
&Koch156(Germany);
Steyr-Mannlicher157(Austria);
FFV Ordnance158(Sweden);
PT Pindad159(Indonesia)
and Pilatus160(Switzerland).
These arrangements have the effect of circumventing European or Member State
strategic export controls.
8.2 European Electroshock Weapon Exports
Pierre Sane,
Secretary General of Amnesty International, speaking on 'The Torture Trail'
called for all governments to investigate and to put in place new mechanisms,
such as public disclosure in advance, to halt the trade in electroshock
equipment which use it to torture. In response to the disclosures on the
programme the European Parliament made a resolution on the 19 January 1995,
which called on the Commission to bring forward proposals to incorporate these
technologies within the scope of the arms export controls and ensure greater
transparency in the export of all military, security and police technologies to
prevent the hypocrisy of governments who themselves breach their own export
bans.(Doc EN\RE\264264474)161
The
ineffectiveness of any action subsequently taken can be judged by the fact that
the same team of TV researchers returned to the torture trail in 1996 and found
it was very much business as usual. Despite the furor created by the first
Dispatches Torture Trail programme, on their second expedition 'Back On The
Torture Trail' the undercover team found that of the eight British companies
contacted only two were unwilling to quote for a new order of 300 electroshock
batons. The most enthusiastic companies featured in this programme were not put
off by the fact that the intended destination was Zaire. None of the companies
featured bothered to check out the fake company's bona fides. In fact they were
faxing their quotations to a public fax bureau machine at a railway station in
Switzerland. Some of these companies said they could get around legal
restrictions by transhipping them so that they would not enter the UK and
seemed well rehearsed in getting around European restrictions. For example,
SDMS's chairman said that they and their South African associates had
previously sold electroshock products to Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Angola,
Mexico, Peru, Burma & Indonesia. Another company offered to avoid export
regulation by selling Dispatches undercover research team, 300 shock batons
made by the Macoisa company of Mexico City at a cost of $25,000. Macoisa's
boss, Alfredo Aguilla, told the undercover team he could export the 40,000 volt
batons on behalf of his British client anywhere they chose. Aguilla told the
programme's producer that bad human rights record were no problem.162
'Back to the
Torture Trail' marked a turning point in human rights organisations
understanding of the implications of loopholes in existing strategic exports
controls legislation. Speaking in the programme, the Secretary Of Amnesty
International, Pierre Sane said: "It is not just good enough to prohibit
the manufacture of this equipment in the UK, or the sale or possession of this
equipment in the UK. Legislation should also prohibit companies from engaging
in offshore sale of this equipment (Gregory, 1996).
8.3 Export Of Implements of Torture From The U.S.A.
Sadly, it no
longer comes as a surprise to discover that other leading Western Liberal
Democracies have been colluding with the torture trade. Yet during the 1980's
some clues were afforded by reports that US companies such as Technipol were
freely advertising thumbcuffs, leg irons and shackles (Klare& Amson, 1981).
The Danish Medical Group of Amnesty found that electronic prods manufactured by
the US Shok-Baton Company had been used in the violation of human rights,163 and a repentant
Uruguayan torturer confessed that he had used US-made electroshock
batons.(Cooper, 1984).164
In fact scores of US companies either manufacture or supply electroshock
devices, thumbcuffs and leg irons.165
55
Chart 13. Police torture exports licensed by
US Commerce Department 1991 - 1993
US Commerce Department 1991 - 1993
|
Recipient no./value of licenses no./value of licenses Recipient no./value of licenses no./value of licenses
for cmdty. OA82C1 for cmdty. OA84C1 for cmdty. OA82C1 for cmdty. OA84C1
____________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
ALBANIA 2/$1,240
LIECHTENSTEIN 1/$5,250
ALGERIA 1/$35 2/$370 LITHUANIA
7/$453,593
ANDORRA 1/$37,500 7/$704,552 MACAO
3/$4,619 4/$3,220
ARGENTINA 26/$7,367,559 104/$10,041,640 MALAYSIA 3/$660,123 16/$150,519
AUSTRALIA (2) 5/$91,408 MALTA 1/$1,778
AUSTRIA 11/$448,068 78/$3,996,467 MEXICO 33/$1,755,366 34/$3,157,455
BAHAMAS
3/$9,978 MONTSERRAT 1/$1,710
BAHRAIN 1/$1,527 MOZAMBIQUE
1/$2,435
BANGLADESH 3/$90 6/$15,704 NEPAL
2/$579
BARBADOS 8/$13,224 THE NETHERLANDS (2) 1/$3,232
BELGIUM (2) 4/$1,312,394 NETH. ANTILLES 1/$3,969 8/$35,228
BELIZE 1/$5,037 8/$18,824 NEW CALEDONIA 11/$30,021
BENIN 1/$1,371 NICARACUA
14/$591,478
BERMUDA
1/$3,112 NIGERIA 3/$2,428,710 6/$89,625
BOLIVIA 9/$655,845 25/$1,084.933 NORWAY 1/$306 7/$76,967
BOTSWANA
3/$7,255 OMAN 3/$7,449 1/$467
BRAZIL
48/$252,334 PAKISTAN 2/$2,759,234 37/$7,069,539
BULGARIA
10/$566,428 PANAMA 11/$111,794 58/$1,566,633
CHILE 20/$260,908 40/$1,208,813 PAPUA NEW GUINEA 5/$33,313 10/$64,417
CHINA
1/$32,250 PARAGUAY 3/$66,000 57/$2,875,177
COLOMBIA 2/$65,500 18/$949,543 PERU 1/$12,881 27/$2,300,885
COSTA RICA 12/$114,624 27/$488,122 PHILIPPINES 1/$37,500 41/$3,865,650
CYPRUS 2/$140 4/$18,749 POLAND 2/$659,332 7/$550,404
CZECH REPUBLIC 2/$47,090 7/$68,025 QATAR 1/$49 4/$167,875
DOMINICA 5/$40,489 ROMANIA
6/$130,128
DOM. REPUBLIC 6/$144,740 90/$1,070,584 RUSSIA
39/$7,349,121
ECUADOR 11/$315,016 63/$1,111,575 RWANDA 1/$404
EGYPT 4/$1,190 4/$8,041 SAUDI ARABIA 14/$5,060,804 14/$5,478,476
EL SALVADOR
66/$707,171 SEYCHELLES 1/$79
ESTONIA
7/$1,704,997 SINGAPORE 7/$5,589 25/$433,443
FINLAND 5/$22,714 52/$2,895,730 SLOVAKIA
1/$270,000
FRANCE (2) 4/$88,237 SLOVENIA 1/$8,934 1/$125,000
FRENCH GUIANA
2/$120,000 SOUTH AFRICA 7/$837,991
THE GAMBIA 2/$2,100 SPAIN (2) 1/$18,379
GEORGIA
1/$210,500 SRI LANKA 1/$9,663
GERMANY (2) 3/$42,925 SURINAM 7/$32,589
GHANA 2/$22,200 12/$1,174,602 SWEDEN 4/$8,911 77/$9,419,883
GRENADA
1/$726 SWITZERLAND 13/$444,243 93/$4,441,647
GUATEMALA 6/$170,771 55/$2,531,484 TAIWAN
1/$6,990
GUINEA 1/$11,500 2/$195,201 TANZANIA
2/$2,005
GUYANA 9/$9,750 THAILAND 3/$396,714 135/$6,134,985
HONDURAS
4/$121,588 TRINIDAD &
TOBAGO 5/$17,568 21/$29,651
HONG KONG 7/$49,646 49/$1,265,271 TUNISIA 4/$39,043
HUNGARY 3/$358,500 12/$1,159,371 TURKEY (2) 2/$154,000
ICELAND (2) 1/$540 UAE 2/$21,062 14/$531,261
INDONESIA 3/$7,076 4/$36,201 UGANDA
1/$1,293
IRAN
1/$219 UKRAINE 5/$2,253,875
IRELAND
15/$214,821 UNITED
KINGDOM (2) 5/$50,387
ISRAEL 21/$160,189 41/$3,689,794 URUGUAY 3/$48,443 48/$1,449,694
ITALY (2) 2/$105,500 VENEZUELA 51/$1,609,012 220/$9,691,215
JAMAICA
11/$110,151 ZAMBIA
1/$3,668
JORDAN 3/$12,400 9/$329,300 ZIMBABWE
8/$20,988
KENYA
1/$2,988
_____________________________________________________
KOREA (SOUTH) 9/$362,666 10/$592,982
TOTALS 365/$27,638,035 2083/$117,270,285
KUWAIT 9/$785,283 13/$767,114
KAZAKHSTAN
24/$3,831,270 Notes: (1) For
explanation of the commodity categories see p. 1.
LATVIA 2/$304,082 (2) Australia, Japan, New Zealand and
NATO members do not require
LEBANON 1/$28,140 2/$11,518 validated licences to import commodity
0A82C items.
Source:
Department of Commerce, personal correspondence,
21 April 1995 (available upon request).
|
56
Back in
1984, it emerged that US export regulations even had special customs codes form
such items as 'specially designed instruments of torture' (US Department of
Commerce, 1984) There was even some suggestion (in para 376.14) that the US
government could distance itself from human rights violations through
'judicious use of export controls'. (US Department of Commerce, 1983).
Concerned by the possible scale of the trade in such technologies and the
possibility they could be exported on via Europe which has much laxer arms
export controls and transparency than the US, the UK human rights organisation,
the Omega Foundation, sought comprehensive US export trade statistics. A
Freedom of Information request was put down on Omega's behalf by the Federation
of American Scientists (FAS).
What emerged
was that the new category codes in the export administration regulations have
if anything been extended to include, inter alia:
* 'saps,
thumbcuffs, thumbscrews, leg irons, shackles and handcuffs, specially designed
implements of torture, straight jackets etc. (OA82C)' and
* 'stun
guns, shock batons, electric cattle prods and other immobilization guns
(OA84C)' (United States Department of Commerce 1994).
The
statistics of the export licences of such repressive equipment show that from
September 1991 to December 1993, the US Commerce Department approved over 350
export licences under commodity category OA82C. The further category OA84C
aggregates together data on electric shock batons with shotguns and shells.
Over 2000 licences were granted from September 1991 to December 1993. (See
Chart 13) As feared, the list names many EU Member States including Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany; Iceland, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and
the United Kingdom. While the licenses represent a snapshot of permissions for
the sale to go forward, they do not indicate actual delivery, nor are they
comprehensive since countries in NATO, such as Turkey, do not require a licence
(Arms Sales Monitor, 1995). FAS has pointed out that aggregating data in
this way, by lumping noncontroversial data on equipment such as those on
helmets with controversial data on equipment often used for torture such as
shock batons, effectively frustrates public oversight. Given the nature of some
of the recipients - Saudi Arabia for example, where Amnesty has already
recorded instances of Iraqis being tortured with electric shock batons (Amnesty
International, 1994), many observers feared the worst.166 Pressure to
desegregate such categories in the US eventually proved successful but there
remains a lack of effective checking and some items which should be in the
amended category, are still slipping through.167
8. 4 Controlling The Spread of Push-Button Torture
Alarmed by
new information emerging on the extent of the worldwide trade in torture
technologies, the International Secretariat of Amnesty launched a worldwide
campaign against 'Arming the Torturers, Electroshock Torture and the Spread of
Stun Technology', as this report was being finalized in March 1997 (Amnesty
International 1997). Amnesty's report identified over 100 companies willing to
supply modem stun weapons since 1990168, in twenty
countries, including members of the EU, (Belgium169, France170, Germany171, Luxembourg172, Netherlands173, Spain174 and the United
Kingdom175). The
proposals made by Amnesty International to halt this trade in bush-button
torture, have been incorporated into the policy recommendations below.
57
8. RECOMMENDATIONS
The
Commission should be requested to achieve agreement between Member States to
undertake changes to their respective strategic export controls so that:
(i) All
proposed transfers of security or police equipment are publicly disclosed in
advance, especially electroshock weapons, (including those arranged on European
territory where the equipment concerned remains outside Member States' borders)
so that the human rights situation in the intended receiving country can be
taken into consideration before any such transfers are allowed.;
(ii) Reports
are issued on the human rights situation in receiving countries;
(iii) Member
States Parliaments are notified of all information necessary to enable them to
exercise proper control over the implementation of the law, including
information on human rights from non-governmental organisations;
(iv) Member
States monitor and regulate all exhibitions promoting the sale of security
equipment and technology to ensure that any proposed transfers such as
electroshock weapons, will not contribute to unlawful killings, or to torture
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
(v) All
military, police and security exhibitions are required to publish guest lists,
names of exhibitors, products and services on display and no visas or
invitations should be issued to governments or representatives of security
forces, known to carry out human rights violations.
(vi)The
sender should take legal responsibility for the stated use of military,
security and police transfers in practice, for example making future contracts
dependent on adherence to human rights criteria and that such criteria are
central to the regulatory process.
(vii) The
European Parliament should explore the possibilities of using the Joint Action
procedures used to establish the EU regulations on the export of Dual Use
equipment to draw up common lists of (a) proscribed military, security, police
(MSP)technology and training, the sole or primary use of which is to contribute
to human rights violations; (b) sensitive MSP technologies which have been
shown in the past to be used to commit human rights violations; and (c)
military, security and police units and forces which have been sufficiently
responsible for human rights violations and to whom sensitive goods and
services should not be supplied.
(viii) The
European Parliament should commission new research into the extent to which
European companies are complicity in supplying MSP equipment used to commit
human rights violations and the prospects of instituting independent measures
of monitoring the level and extent of such sales whilst tracking their
subsequent human rights impacts and consequences.
58
With proper
accountability and regulation, some of the technologies discussed above do have
a legitimate law enforcement function; without such democratic controls they
provide powerful tools of oppression. The unchecked vertical and horizontal
proliferation of the technologies of political control described in this
report, present a powerful threat to civil liberties in Europe in the s [as
written] century, particularly if the political context of freedoms of
expression changes in the next century, as many times as it has in the last.
Whilst there are sufficient real abuses of power by the police, internal
security and intelligence agencies to keep the conspiracy theorists busy for
the foreseeable future, technological and decision drift will have an equal if
not more powerful role to play if current trends develop unchecked. The real
threat to civil liberties and human rights in the future, is as likely to arise
from an incremental erosion of civil liberties, than it is from some conscious
plan. The rate of such erosion is speeding up and is rapidly being fuelled by
the pace of innovation in the technology of political control. An arsenal of
new weapons and technologies of political control has already been developed or
lies waiting on the horizon for a suitable opportunity to find useful work.
As the
globalisation of political control technologies increases, Members of the
European Parliament have a right and a responsibility to challenge the costs, as
well as the alleged benefits of so called advances in law enforcement. This
report has sought to highlight some of the areas which are leading to the most
undesirable social and political consequences (such as advances in so called
'non-lethal weapons' or the emergence of a vast international machinery of
communications supervision) and where a return to a fuller form of democratic
control is seen as desirable. The social and political implications of other
innovations mentioned above such as human recognition and tracking
technologies, are under explored and further work should be undertaken. In the
meantime, urgent action is required by other Directorates, to ensure European
technology of political control does not get into the hands of tyrannical and repressive
regimes, as it so often does today. Members of the Committee are requested to
consider the policy recommendations provided in the report as just a first step
to help bring the technology of political control, back under democratic
control.
59
[JYA Note: A
few of the citations lack the year; shown as written.]
1. For a detailed analysis of NARMIC
& NACLA's work in this area, see for example. Police on the Home Front
(NARMIC, 1971). Also see Iron Fist &Velvet Glove: An Analysis of the US
Police, 1976 Published by the Center for Research on Criminal Justice, Berkley.
2. Based on a definition from Winner,
1974.
3. For a discussion of the
perspective in terms of the role technology plays in the future of policing,
see (Nogala, D. 1995).
4. A general reader interested in the
overall state of the art should consult annual publications such as Jane's Security
& Co-In (Counter-Insurgency ) Catalog [provides a wide range of product
information]; British Defence Equipment Catalogue [produced in association with
UK MoD]; International Defence Equipment Catalogue [very detailed catalogue
leaning towards the military and paramilitary end of the spectrum produced by
Monch publications, Germany]; International Defence Directory [very useful
index of companies and products, e.g., listing batons-electronic. Also provides
some useful detail on companies representatives within other countries]; or
periodicals which deal with certain market sectors such as Intersec, Jane's
Defence Review, Jane's Defence Weekly; CCTV Today; Police & Government
Security Technology; Cross Border Control - International, Military Technology;
or for a more radical updating of news, the CILIP report of Berlin, the
Statewatch publication from London or the Fortress Europe newsletter from
Sweden. The Exhibition catalogues of the fairs listed here as Appendix 1, also
provide a revealing insight into what is being traded, by who to whom.
5. For a critical evaluation of the
utility of the various commercial and public domain information sources on
military, security and police technologies, see Abel, 1997.
6. Whilst it remains impossible to
put an exact figure on the global worth of sales of the technology of political
control, most commentators agree that it is rapidly growing . This trend
accelerated at the end of the Cold War when many military companies diversified
their product range into the civilian internal security market. For example,
one estimate suggested that the US market for 'low intensity conflict
merchandise' would increase from $1 billion in fiscal 1991 to $1.5 billion in
fiscal 1996. This was contrasted sharply with a projected 25% decrease in US
Department of Defense (DoD) expenditure on conventional weaponry during the
same period.(Frost& Sullivan International, 1991)
7. A process which reached an
apotheosis with the introduction of robot policemen patrols in the United
States. (Davie, 1984). This work has continued into the Nineties with the
evolution of 'insectoids' for guard duty functions. (see Section 3. on
area-denial)
8. An explanation of the role and
function of Eurodac is provided in the consultants final report to the Council
of The European Union general Secretariat, 'The Eurodac System For Recording
Asylum Seekers' Fingerprints', (O/Ref.:(EUD2/JPB/1&C) Paris, October 11,
1995. For a discussion of the implications of Eurodac, see Fortress Europe,
circular letter No. 46, Sweden, August 1996. A more detailed explanation of the
concept of a technopolitics of exclusion within the context of an evolving
Fortress Europe, is presented in (Abel, et. al. 1991).
9. Klare garnered information on a
few score companies (Klare& Arnson, 1981); Wright managed a few hundred
(Wright, 1987); Whereas the Omega Foundation now has details on over 5,000
companies.
10. Statewatch, October, 1996, pp.
6-7.
11. Einsatz der Stadtpolizei bei den
Auseinandersetzungen vom 1 Mai 1996. bericht der Geschaftsprufngskommission an
den Gemeinderat der Stadt Zurich, Zurich, February 1997, p. 190.
12. For example the CLASSIC (Covert
Local Area Sensor System) system built by Racal UK, which is used detect
illegal immigrants attempting to enter Hong Kong.
60
13. The snake of fire was the
electrified border fence which guarded South Africa's border with Mozambique
and Zimbabwe. According to the South African Bureau for Refugees, it killed
more refugees in three years than the Berlin Wall killed in its entire history.
(New Scientist. 27 Jan 1990)
14. E.g., Morpho systemes in France;
Siemens Automatisierungstechnik in Germany; Security Systems International in
Switzerland; ICL DESC, Ferranti and Unysis in the U.K.
15. The Guardian, May 3, 1995 .
16. Sylvester, R, 1996, Labour Plans
DNA test for everyone from Birth, Telegraph, July 22.
17. E.g., by Avenire Technologie
International and Tour Bull:Worldwide Information Systems.
18. E.g., by helling
Kommanditgesellschaft fur Industrieprodukte.
19. E.g., by Aspley LtD, BAeSEMA Ud,
Bel Tech Security products, Belgrave Group, Cambridge Neurodynamics, DelTech
Security Ltd, Electronics Graphics, GEC Traffic Automation LtD, IO Research
Ltd, Keygrove Marketing, Noble Campion Ltd, NPS Photograph Storage and
retrieval System, Picdar Ud, SD-Scicon UK, Solarray Identification Systems
(SIS), Strategic Imaging Systems(SISYS).
20. E.g., by Axiom Research Co.,
Compu-Colour, Edicon, Epic solutions, Identikit Co Inc, Kyber Group,
Neurometric Visions Systems, Precision Dynamics Corp, Sirchie Fingerprint Labs,
Technology Recognition Systems (TRS), Visatex Corporation.
21. Via companies such as PratiElectro
in Belgium; Spectronic& SST in Denmark; Compagnie Francause d'Exportation;
Crelec Electronique; Data Mast; DLD SA; Elecktron France SA; Export Trading
Services SARL, Protex Arms, Societie des Laboratoires Mouillard, Transtel
Transmissions; VK Electronic in France; HP Marketing & Consulting Wust;
HABRA Electronik; Hussains International; KDM; Micro and Security Electronic;
PK Electronic and Rennhak Nachtsichtsysteme in Germany; ATET SRi in Italy;
ALphaSafety in Luxembourg; Reinaert Electronics in the Netherlands; Defex in
Spain and Spycatcher, Soundex, Lorrraine Electronics PK Electronics, CAZ, Counterspy;
and TR Associates in the UK.
22. Davies, S, (1997), Police tap into
the secrets of technology, Daily telegraph, January 28, p. 7.
23. Whymant, R (1977), 6-legged
superspy scuttles to our aid, Times, 29 January.
24. Quoted from Jane Hunter, Israeli
Foreign Policy, South African and Central America, South End Press. 1987.
25. See, The Surveillance Society,
Sci-Files, BBC, broadcast, BBC2, 3 March 1997 .
26. This new form of carbon will
enable current CRAY type super computers to be carried in the pocket, the
implications of having such storage capacity for policing purposes are barely
assessed since the trend is towards suppressed demand - i.e., police forces use
up whatever capacity they are provided with. (Sci-Files, BBC, UK, 'The Last
Nobel', 17,3,97.)
27.Typical examples include those made
by Sicherheits Transport in Austria; Beherman Demoen & FN Nouvelle Herstal
in Belgium; Timoney Technologies in Eire; Renault, Saviem and Panhard in
France; Bonowi Mercedes Benz, Rheinstahl and Thyssen in Germany; Alma in
Greece; Fiat and Inveco in Italy; Alphasafety in Luxembourg; DAF Special
Products Division in the Netherlands; Nauteknik Defence & Security in Norway;
Bravia -- Sodedade Luso-Brasileira & ITB in Portugal; DEFEX and Santa
Barbara SA in Spain; Hagglunds Vehicles in Sweden; Bucher Guyer and MOWAG in
Switzerland; Aselan Military, FMC & Octobus in Turkey; Alvis, GKN, Glover
Webb, Land Rover, Short Brothers, Transac and Trojan vehicles in the UK.
28. E.g., by the end of 1983 70
martial arts instructors were teaching London police officers Japanese martial
arts techniques - the old techniques were viewed as two pedestrian. These new
techniques go hand in hand with mini-truncheon usage. The techniques were
evolved originally for use in Northern Ireland according to Brigadier Michael
Harvey, the military trainer responsible for teaching them,
61
because of
"the inadequacy of techniques used in Northern Ireland where six soldiers
were often needed to make one arrest." (Sunday Telegraph, 7.7.85)
29. Interview with Professor
Rosenhead, January 1997.
30. For example the Lawrence Livermore
laboratory has developed a pulsed light weapon and a projectile launcher with
impact velocity control; Delta Defence has created a pepper Spray Launcher:
Foster Miller a Diabling Net and Launcher system; Sandia Laboratories have
produced the sticky foam gun. Some of these have already been approved for
example, DEFTEC's semi-lethal shot gun rounds; Alliant's non-lethal launched
ordnance and the Volcano fish-hook mine system, Olin's vehicle stopper.
31. "As soon as a new non-lethal
weapon has been used, the shock effect will be reduced in future."
(Deane-Drummond, 1975).
32. For an excellent discussion, see
Sugarman S & Rand, K, Cease Fire, Rolling Stone, March 10, 1994, pp. 31-39.
33. E.g., Hirtberger, Austria;
Cartridge Factory Lapua, Sako Ltd, Finland; Laboratoire Arcane, Societe
Francaise de Munitions (SFM, France; Dynamit Nobel, Germany; Norma
Projectilfabrik, Sweden; SM Swiss Munition Enterprise; Beechwood, Cobra, Conjay
Arms Co., Edgar brothers, Parker Hale Ltd. in the UK. The development of these
weapons has in fact gone hand in hand with their converse - guns like the
Belgium FN Herstal's Five-seven pistol which can penetrate 48 layers of Kelvar.
Such developments lead to a ratchet-like arms race between the police and their
adversaries on who can out gun whom since it may be the opposition who acquire
the hi-tech first.
34. Guardian, 10/2/96 and the Atlantic
2/90.
35. Speech by Hansjourg Geiger, German
Federal Commission for the Stasi Files, April 14, 1993.
36. David Banisar, Covert Action
Quarterly, No. 56, Spring 1996.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. 'Your number may be up', Times,
May 13, 1994. Company Press release 17,5, 94.
40. For example, Compagnie Francaise
d'Exportation, DLD SA, Elektron France SA, IN SNEC, Positive, SAGEM. Thomson
CSF Securite.
41. E.g., Bosch & HABRA Elecktronic.
42. E.g., Gatsometer BV.
43. E.g., Action Information
management, Arkonia Electronics, CCS UK, MAtra Marconi, McCue, Micromill,
Navstar Systems, Pearpoint, Primary Image, Racal, Radmec, Sarasota Automation,
Securicor Datatrak, Siemens Plessey Controb, Strategi Imaging Systems, Symonds
Travers Morgan, Terrafix, and The Integrated Security Group.
44. Common Position EC No/95, Adopted
by the Council on 20 February 1995, Directive 95/EC of the European Parliament
and the Council, 'On the Protection of Individuals, With Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data'.
45. E.g., debate re use of bugging and
other unconventional methods against motorcycle gangs. (Statewatch, September,
October 1996.
46. E.g., the revelations in the De
Morgen newspaper on 24 April 1996, that the Belgium Intelligence service
"Abemene Dienst Inlichtingen en Veiligheid", had decided to create
regional networks based in various Army barracks to spy on the activities of
Belgian citizens.
62
47. An intense debate has gone on
since 1995 about allowing bugging of personal homes which would need to amend
article 13 of the constitution on the inviolability of residence.
(Unverletzlichkeit der Wohnung).
48. Where a judicial inquiry into
secret surveillance, by the Norwegian surveillance police, was appointed by the
Norwegian Parliament on 1 February, 1996 (Statewatch, May-June. 1996, p. 5)
49. Dutch politicians called for an
inquiry in January 1996, after reports that one of the country's largest banks
was intercepting staff calls. Financial Times, 18.1.96.
50. Where new legislation for both MI5
and for ordinary police has created new powers to bug and burgle. (See
Statewatch, February 1996 and the Guardian, 30 Nov 1996)
51. Reuters World Report, 30 September
1996.
52. For further information, see the
annual reports of the Commission nationale de controle des interceptions de
securite, Paris.
53. Quoted from NARMIC, 1971, p .17,
(who refer to Scheurer's own book (undated), To Walk the Streets Safely, p. 81,
54. These tables are taken from the
papers of Thein,1974; Egnar, 1976 and Wargovitch, 1975. Whilst immediate
political consequences were factored into the equation, little systematic
evaluation seems to have been devoted to the longer-term political consequences
of deploying these weapons. The official view filtered out any consideration of
hidden or dysfunctional impacts of these weapons.
55. These concepts were formally laid
out as follows:
(i) The use
of less-lethal weapons constitutes an aggressive act. If those who are targeted
with these technologies make this interpretation, there is a possibility that
further use will lead them to reply with retaliatory aggressive responses.
(ii) If (i)
is so, then in certain circumstances, the use of less-lethal weapons may be
considered as an overcorrective response. Overcorrective responses can bring
about an opposite effect to the one intended, e.g., uncontrollable conflict and
further polarization.
(iii) If
powers of control were lost because of these dysfunctional processes, a
resurgence of the phenomena under attempted control may develop as the fix
loses its potency. If such processes were applicable to the case of less lethal
weapons and the nature of the underlying dynamic was not recognised, reliance
on ever even more powerful fixes would prove counterproductive. (Wright, 1978,
1987)
56. Hansard, Written Answers, 21
January 1977, col 331.
57. Hansard Written Answer, Friday 28
January, 1977, No. 54 .
58. An account of the circumstances
surrounding these deaths is provided in 'A Report On the Misuse of the Baton
Round in the North of Ireland, Submission to the Mitchell Commission, United
Campaign Against Plastic Bullets, 1995 and Curtis, L, They Shoot Children,
Information on Ireland, 1982.
59. Upshall, DG, 'The effects of CN
& CS on the developing chicken embryo', quoted by Himmsworth, (HMSO, 1971).
60. CR, nicknamed firegas, was developed
in the early seventies as a substitute for CS. It can be dissolved in water and
thus fired from watercannon. The UK company Schermuly marketed a hand held CR
SPAD spray at the British Army Equipment Exhibition in 1988. Although
authorised throughout the UK since 1973, apart from a reported use in the Maze
Prison which the authorities have always denied, CR is thought to remain a
special forces weapon.
63
61. From the Guardian, 27.7.1986.
62. SIPRI, the problem of Chemical and
Biological Warfare, Vol 1, 1971, p. 64.
63. Ballantyne B. 'Riot Control Agents
- Biomedical and Health Aspects of the Use of Chemicals in Civil Disturbances,
Medical Annual (1977), pp.7-41.
64. Jones,R (1973), 'Return To Riot
Control', New Scientist, May 31, pp. 546-547.
65. See Leonard Jason-Lloyd, CS gas -
an indiscriminate weapon?, New Law Journal, July 26, 1991. pp. 1043-1045.
Earlier inhalation toxicology studies indicate that at high levels of CS
exposure to cause chemical pneumonitis and fatal pulmonary edema (whats that
[as written]). Ref. Ballantyne B, Callaway S., 'Inhalation toxicology and
Pathology of animals exposed to o-chloro-benzylidene malononitrile (CS)', Med.
Sci. & Law, 1972; 12:43-65. Kacmarek B, Gaszynski W., Ultrastructure of the
rabbits lung tissue after administration of CS preparation. Acta Med Pol. 1977;
18:327-328.
66. A Parneix-Spake et Al, Severe
Cutaneous Reactions to Self Defence Sprays, Arch Dermatol Vol 1 29, July 1993,
p. 913.
67. The development of tolerance to CS
has been reported by Porton researchers in studies on human volunteers (Beswick
FW, Holland P, Kemp KH, 'Acute effects of exposure to orthochloro-benzylidene
malononitrile (CS) and the development of tolerance'. Br. J. Ind. Medicine.
1972; 29: 298-306.
68. Hu H., Fine J., Epstein P., Kelsey
K., Reynolds P., Walker B., 'Tear gas - Harassing Agent or Toxic Chemical
Weapon', JAMA, August 4, 1989 - Vol 262, No. 5.
69. Gibbons S., Training accident
delays street trials of CS spray., Police Review, 16 June 1995.
70. Chief Constable Ted Crew is
reported in the Independent as saying, "I am advised that were there to be
a civil claim resulting from the use of CS spray, I might find that because we
had trained the officers using it, I had some liability.' (29)
71.Foster, RW and Ramage, AG,
'Observations on the Effects of Dibenzoxazepine (CR) & Nonoyl Vanillyaamide
(VAN) on Sensory Nerves', The British Journal of Pharmacology, March 1975, pp.
436-7.
72. Los Angeles Times June 18, 1995.
73. ACLU, Oleoresin Capsicum, - Pepper
Spray Update, More Fatalities, More Questions, June, 1995, p. 2.
74. SAE Alsetex.
75. Defense Technology GmbH (Def-Tec)
& IDC Chemie Handels GmbH.
76. Nitspy Defensa Y Contraespionaje.
77. ALM International UD; Civil
Defence Supply; Edgar Brothers;& Safeguard Technology. In June 1994, at an
ACPO Drugs Conference, Civil Defence Supply admitted they were already
importing peppergas sprays and were working on their evaluation with the Home
Office and ACPO.
78. Nancy Rhodes, Pepper Spray,
Product Liability and Cops, Policing By Consent, No.11, August 1 996.
79. See 'Perfect Sound from Thin Air,
New Scientist, 7 September 1996, p. 22.
64
80 See Jane's International Defense
Review, 9, September 96, p. 20.
81. See National Institute of Justice
Solicitation For Law Enforcement, Courts and Corrections Technology,
Development, Implementation and Evaluation, August 1996.
82. Barbara Starr, USA defines policy
on non-lethal weapons, Jane's Defence Weekly, March 6, 1996.
83. Comment from Hildi S. Libby,
systems manager of the Non-Lethal Program, US ARDEC, to the American Defense
Preparedness Association Non-lethal Defence II conference, 6-7 March 1996.
84. Proceedings of the Non Lethal Defence
II conference organised by The American Defence Preparedness Association, held
at Maclean, Virginia, 6-7 March 1996.
85. For example, by Israeli warders
against Palestinian detainees at Ramallah and Jnaid prisons. For accounts, see
Schwartz M, (1984) Israel's Gas Chamber, The Middle East, June., and a report
by the West Bank Amliate of the International Commission of Jurist, Jnaid - The
New Israeli Prison in Nabulus - An Appraisal, October 1984.
86. In South Africa, such a case was
reported in 1981, when four condemned men were subdued with 'teargas' before
being taken to the gallows, (see the Guardian, 16 July 1981).
87. See Statewatch, March-April, 1996,
p. 9.
88. A detailed account of this system
is given in Wilson, A, 'How Rebels Are Silenced', Observer, 27 Feb. 1977 and
Guardian August 8, 1979.
89. These Units were secretly
maintained with full details of their operation only coming to light when a
court case was brought by a civil liberties group, (Guardian, April 8,1980).
90. Covert Action Quarterly, Summer
1993.
91. New York Times, 13 January 1995.
92. Jessica Mitford's, The American
Prison Business, Penguin 1977, provided a good discussion of early behaviour
modification techniques tested in US gaols.
93. Meyer, JAT (1971) Crime Deterrent
Transponder System IEEE AES-7, No. 7, January.
94. Used in New Mexico based home
punishment schemes. See Guardian Nov 8, 1984 for details and the Adam Smith
Institute, 'Justice Policy 1984', for a case arguing the need for such schemes
in Europe.
95. For example last year the UK
treasury announced enforced cutbacks of some 3,000 prison jobs. With the UK
prison population expected to grow by 20,000 over the next 10 years due to the
sentencing changes introduced by Home Secretary Michael Howard, staffing levels
are sliding back to those prevailing at the time of the prison riots in the
late 1980's. In these circumstances, the shortsighted prospect is one of
expensive wardens being replaced with cheaper and more malleable technology,
both passive and punitive.
96. Warren P, 'Prisons go shopping in
face of staff cuts', Computing, 25 January 1996.
97. Restricted Contract Procedure
(CC3160) for Her Majesty's Prison Service, Supply and Transport Services,
Tenders Electronic Daily, Luxembourg.
98. Inmates demand return, Houston
Chronicle, Oct. 30, 1995,
99. Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, 'Investigation of Onondaga Country Jail, Oct 18, 1994. pp.
2-3.
65
100. Law Enforcement Product News.
9.10.95, p. 42.
101. Quoted in Amnesty International,
United States of America - Use of electro-shock belts. June 1996.
102. Presentation to the Non-lethal
Defence II conference, held by the American Defense Preparedness Association
March 1996.
103. Much of the information used in
this section is extracted from Wright 1996 and Amnesty International, 1997(a),
which is largely based on company documentation held by the Omega Foundation.
104. Fig. 1 is taken from the 1996
Annual Report of the Redress Trust. The mission of the Redress Trust (which is
based at 6 Queen Square in London WC1 N 3AR, UK), is 'to promote the
rehabilitation and protection of people who are or at any time have been
victims of torture anywhere in the world, and to help them, and when appropriate,
their families to gain redress for their suffering.'
105. Such were the successes of the
coercive interrogations practiced in the former Soviet Union that the US Rand
Corporation at that time explored the possibility that the 'Russians have
developed and are now using some form of hypnosis possibly in conjunction with
drugs and other treatments, as a technique for eliciting confessions from
persons who, under ordinary forms of duress, would not be likely to comply with
demands for a public recantation'. (See Janis, 1949)
106. See (Gudjonnson, G. 1996) for a
discussion of this process. Gudjonnson quotes R.A. Leo's account of the
changing nature of police interrogation in the USA from the 1930's onwards.
Leo, for example, identified 6 interrogation methods which focussed on pain,
discomfort and torture. These consisted of 'brute force'; 'physical torture';
'deniable physical and psychological coercion'; (e.g. rubber hoses which left
no marks); 'incommunicado interrogation', i.e., isolation from lawyers, family
and friends); 'physical duress' (e.g. food /sleep deprivation); 'threats of
harm'. (Leo 1992) found that these methods declined from the 1930's to be
replaced by psychological methods of interrogation relying on trickery,
manipulation and deception. (See Inbrau, et al. 1986)
107. See United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (United Nations, 1955) which apply
to both leg irons and to stun belts, section 33 says: Instruments of restraint
such as handcuffs, chains, irons and straitjackets should never be applied as
punishment. Furthermore, chains and irons should not be used as restraints.
Other instruments of restraint should not be used except in the following
circumstances: (a) as a precaution against escape during a transfer, provided
that they shall be removed when the prisoner appears before a judicial or
administrative authority.
108. Leg irons, restraints, etc., are
supplied in Canada by Shackles; in China by Chengdushi Mensuochang, Jing An
Import & Export Co., Shandong Muping General Lockware Plant; in France by
Equipol, GK Productions International, Rivolier; in Germany by Bonowi, Clemen
& Jung Inh. V& K Pleithner, Dipl. Ing H. Wallfass, Electron - Import
& Export Co., Helling Kommanditgesellschaft fur Industrieprodukte, Nowar
Security Equipment; in Luxembourg by AlphaSafety; in Spain by Larranaga Y
Elorza; in Taiwan by Pan Right; in the U.K. by Group 4 Total Security, Hiatt
& Co., M.P. Supplies Co.; and in the USA by A.E Nelson Leather, AEDEC,
AETCO, American Handcuff, Arms Tech Inc, Badge Co of New Jersey, Bianchi
International, Hiatt Thompson Co., Law Enforcement Associates, Monadock
Lifetime Products, Peerless Handcuffs, Smith & Wesson and Techopol
International, to name but a few.
109. Project Chatter was begun by the
US Navy in 1947 in coordination with the Army, the Air Force, the CIA and FBI
and for security reasons, handled outside the usual committee machinery of the
Research & Development Board. (Document submitted in evidence to the joint
hearings of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee on Health & the
Senate Judiciary Sub-Committee on Administrative Practice & procedure,
Biomedical and Behavioural Research, Nov. 1975, pp. 988-990.
110. U.S. Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final
Report: Foreign& Military Intelligence, 26 April 1976, report no. 94-755
book 1, pp. 385-422, 'Testing and use of chemical and biological agents by the
intelligence community.'
66
111. There were 149 MKULTRA subprojects
concerned with behaviour modification, drug acquisition. and testing and
administering drugs surreptiously. (CIA Inspector General, memorandum for
Director of Central Intelligence dated 26 July 1963, Report of Inspection of
MKULTRA, submitted in evidence to the joint hearings of the Senate Labor and
Public Welfare Subcommittee on Health and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice and Procedure, Biomedical and Behavioural Research, 1975,
10,12 September and November 1975, pp. 879-905.
112. According to documentation made
available to a Congressional Inquiry, a portion of the Research &
Development Programme of the the TSS/Chemical Division was aimed towards the
discovery of the following materials and methods: (i) Substances which will
promote illogical thinking and impulsiveness to the point where the recipient
would be discredited in public; (ii)materials which will render the induction
of hypnosis easier; (iii) materials and physical methods which will produce
amnesia for events preceding and during their use; (iv) physical methods of
producing shock and confusion over extended periods of time and capable of
surreptious use; (v) substances which produce physical disablement such as paralysis
of the legs, acute anaemia etc.; (vi) substances which alter personality
structure in such a way that the recipient becomes dependent on another person;
(vii) material which will cause mental confusion making it difficult for an
individual to maintain a fabrication under questioning; (viii) substances which
lower ambition and working efficacy when administered in undetectable amounts;
(ix) substances which promote weakness or distortion of eyesight or hearing;
(x) knockout pill which can be surreptiously administered; (xi) a material
whose use in very small amounts makes it impossible to perform any physical
activity whatsoever. (US Senate Committee on Intelligence and Human Resources
Subcommrttee on Health and Scientific Research, joint hearing: Project MKULTRA,
the CIA's Program of Research in Behaviour Modification, 3 August 1977, pp.
123-4).
113. The daily El Mundo quoting
military intelligence files said the 1988 experiments in which a beggar died,
had been dubbed "Operation Mengele" within the service after Nazi
death-camp doctor Josef Mengele. (Reuter September 17, 1996) It should be noted
that in 1980 Amnesty International reported the use of LSD and sensory
deprivation methods against ETA suspects held in La Salve Police Station. (See
New Statesman, 11 December 1981, pp. 12-13.)
114. In October 1996, the Austrian
government approved the publication of a report from the ECPT which contained
allegations that detainees of Austrian as well as foreign nationality were at
risk of grave ill treatment particularly while detained at the Bureau of
Security in Vienna. ECPT reported:
"From various sources the
delegation received allegations according to which people detained by the
Bureau of Security in Vienna during February and March 1994 had received
electric shocks inflicted with batons equipped to administer an electric
discharge. . . . These detainees all described a similar instrument which was a
portable device the size of an electric razor one extremity of which had two
electrodes, a device which a police official carried in a personal bag."
(Amnesty International, 1997)
115. In its report Arming the Torturers
(Amnesty International, 1997) named the fifty countries where electroshock
torture and ill treatment had been carried out in prisons, police stations and
detention centres. They are:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina,
Austria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chad, Chile, China, Cyprus,
Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala,
Haiti, India Indonesia/East Timor, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco/Western
Sahara, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Russian federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Togo, Turkey, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia
Kosovo province, Zaire.
Amnesty
recognises that the real figure is probably higher, "as the use of these
weapons in torture can be very difficult to detect."
116. See for example, Ordog. et. al.
1987; Law & Order, 'Reviewing Taser Usage 1992; Allen, T.B., 1991.
117. See Cusac, A.M, 1996, who quotes
the engineer who examined the electric shield associated with the death of
Harry Landis, a Texan Prison officer in December 1995. He said "The
manufacturer puts in its literature that the shields will not hurt anyone,
including people with heart conditions. But they have
67
not done
studies on people at all They conducted their tests on animals - anesthetized
animals. Do you see the danger here? In one word: adrenalin," That is the
waking human response to electro-shock which results in an adrenalin rush needs
to be taken into account in regard to any assertions of safety in devices of
this type.
118. Prof Kaufman of Heinrich Heine
University in Dusseldorf in a letter to a member of Germany Amnesty MSP Group
dated 2 November 1995 cautions that an opinion he gave on a particular product
ten years ago could not be used by others since his "expert opinion
referred explicitly to the model of the apparatus which was presented to us in
those days." In the light of "a great number of changing manufacturers
and distributors of such apparatus . . . refer more or less directly to the
above mentioned opinion." Prof Kaufman's view is that this is
"basically inadmissable as from the point of view of the
electrophysiology, assertions on risks can only be made on the exact knowledge
of the respective operational data." He viewed a US advert which used his
work as "completely devious". . . "since the models presented
were examined only as far as safety technics were concerned - we never participated
in any sort of 'optimization of the weapon' aimed at obtaining certain
effects." Prof Kaufman being aware that "as far as it appears from
the manufacturers prospectus - the apparatus offered on the market nowadays
differ widely in their operational data from the apparatus then tested."
In other words manufacturers are misusing scientific data on one specific
device to justify the safety of many new electroshock weapons which is simply
inadmissable.
119. See Forrest, 1996, Chap 5 &
Chap 7 for a more detailed discussion.
120. The Tibetan monk featured in Fig.
H, Palden Gyatso spent decades in prison and labour camps and was
systematically tortured. At one desperate point he told a member of the Omega
Foundation that he ate his boots to survive. On his release he managed to
obtain the instruments used in torture by his Chinese captors and smuggle them
out of his country. He said of the electroshock devices. "They use this on
your body. If they press that button your whole body will be in shock. If they
do it for too long you lose consciousness but you do not die. If they press
this button, you can die."
121. Excellent discussions on the
codification of counter-terror procedures and their proliferation in practice
are provided by Chomsky and Herman (1979) and McClintock 1985a; 1985b; 1992).
122. Quoted from the Baltimore Sun,
'Torture was taught by CIA, 27 January 1997. The Human Resources Exploitation
manual appears to have been based on a predecessor called KUBARK
Counterintelligence Interrogation, (July 1963) used in the Vietnam period which
was declassified at the same time.
123. The initial effects of the
procedures in Fig. M are as follows:
Measures (1), (2), (3) and (5) cause
visual, auditory, tactile and kinaesthetic deprivation. Measures (1), (4),
& (6) deprive the brain of the sugar and oxygen necessary for normal
functioning. Measures (1), (4), & (6) may disturb normal body metabolism.
124. For a further account of the
sensory deprivation techniques used in Northern Ireland see the British Medical
Association, 1986. Allegations of continued ill treatment of detainees in
Northern Ireland have continued into the nineties, See for example, Committee
on The Administration of Justice, 1991 & 1993).
125. International Herald Tribune 29
January 1997.
126. The Palestinian Authority and its
many police forces have been accused by Amnesty of torturing detainees using,
for example, position abuse and sleep deprivation or interrogation via assaults
whilst a sack was placed over the victim's head. (Amnesty International,
Palestinian Authority, Prolonged political detention, torture and unfair
trials, London, 2 December 1996.
127. Personal communication to the
authors from Dr. Siraj Shah of the Kashmir Council for human rights, in London,
dated 5 October, 1993.
68
128. Amnesty International reported
evidence of thallium, a commercial rat poison, being used by the Iraqi
authorities to effect delayed execution of their political detainees.(See
Amnesty International, Political Killings 1983.)
129. Quoted from Priest, D., 'Army's
Project X Had Wider Audience', Washington Post, March 5, 1997.
130. An excellent analysis of the
training of torturers has been achieved by TV producer Rex Bloomstein whose
latest programme on this subject, 'The Roots of Evil' is due to be screened by
the BBC during the autumn of 1997.
131. The Dispatches programme team
concluded that given that the £500,000 cost of the electroshock deal was paid
for in oil, and because BAe would have had to invoice the MoD for payment and
the UK government would have had to issue an export licence, they must have
known what was going on (Lashmar, 1995).
132. Stott sits on the board and is a
founding member of the Association of Police and Public Security Suppliers,
Britain's foremost commercial promoter of police technology and internal
security equipment supplies.
133. Electroshock weapons are carried
by all prison camp guards in China. According to Pierre Sane, the Secretary
General of Amnesty International, the use of shock weapons in China today 'has
become so endemic that it is almost impossible to document and follow the cases
of the number of victims.'
134. The concept of a trade in the
technology of political control was originally described by NARMIC and NACLA
and formalised by Wright (1977, 1978) and Klare & Arnson, 1981).
135. European Union: human rights and
military, security and police transfers - When will established criteria be
implemented?", July 1994, p. 8.
136. Austria: Steyr Mannlicher supplied
AUG 5.56mm assault rifles for service with the Indonesian Parachute and
Counter-Terrorist police units (Military Powers 10/91).
137. Belgium: FN Herstal supplied M49
sub machine guns, FAL 7.62mm Assault Rifles, Minimi 5.56mm light machine guns
for police and security force use (Military 10/91) and have a representative
office in Jakarta (Defence Manufacturers Association ASEAN Report [DMA 8/90]).
138. Denmark: Dansk Industri Syndikat
the Madsen sub-machine gun (made under licence by IMBEL, Brazil) used by
Indonesian Police (DMA 8/90).
139.Finland:Sako supplied Valmet rifles
to Security Forces (Jane's Security & Counter-Insurgency Equipment 1990
[COIN 90]).
140. France: Acmat supplied wheeled
armoured vehicles to the Indonesian Police (Military Powers 10/91); Creusot
Loire supplied 205 AMX-13 tracked armoured vehicles (Military Powers 10/91);
GIAT supplied 20 105mm LGI MkII light guns plus a significant quantity of
ammunition (Jane's Defence Weekly [JDWI 21/5/94); Manurhin supplied SG540 SIG
Assault Rifles (DMA 8/90); Morpho Systems supplied an Automated Fingerprint
Recognition System (MiliPol 1993 Catalog); Panhard supplied 18 VBL Light
Amphibious Scout Cars (JDW 18/12/96).
141. Germany: Heckler 8 Koch supplied
MP5 Sub machine guns used by the Indonesian Special Forces and it was reported
that the Indonesian Marines were to take delivery of MSG 90 Military Sniper
Rifles (Asian Defence Journal 11/95) and police & security forces were
already equipped with G3 Rifles (DMA 8/90).
142. Greece: Pyrkal exported ammunition
(Hellenic Defence Industries Catalog 96/7).
143. Italy: Beretta Model 12 Sub
machine guns and BM-59 rifles used by police & security forces (Military
Powers 10/91).
144. Netherlands: NWM de Kruithoorn
20mm ammunition is largely supplied by NWM (DMA 8/90).
145. Sweden: Bofors Indonesia's 40mm
Bofors ammunition is obtained either from Sweden of Chartered Industries of
Singapore (DMA 8/90); FFV (Sweden) sub-machine guns [produced under licence in
Egypt] supplied to Indonesia (COIN 90).
69
146. UK: GKN Defence 10 AT-10s Saxon
GKN Wheeled armoured vehicles supplied to the Indonesian Police (Military
Powers 10/91); Glover Webb Tactica Water Cannon. "Britain fuels Suharto
repression" (Observer 21/7/96); Interarms Military and sporting armaments
(FIS 93); Land Rover Indonesia purchased 1500 Land Rovers in 1979 which are
popular and still in wide use, including 10 for anti-riot duties and 2 for the
Presidential Guard (DMA 8/90); Amongst the British military and security
equipment sold to Indonesia in the last decade. was a prototype of Siemens
Plessey Defence Systems GENERICs - the NATO command information system.
GENERICs can display complex information about events unfolding across a
landscape. It would enable the user to concentrate forces efficiently in
response to demonstrations and riots (Independent, 3/8/96, Technology that
gives the edge to 'Big Brother').
147. Belgium: Cockerill Mechanical
Industries $100 million subcontract to build armoured infantry fighting
vehicles (AIFVs) for Turkish Army (JDW 9/9/89); FN Herstal Minimi 5.56mm light
machine gun used in Turkey (JDW 15/7/89).
148. France: Euro Vectuer (GIAT) has
set up a subsidiary in Turkey [Savunna Sanayii] to oversee the firms contract
for 515 Dragor turrets (JDW 4/2/95); Thomson-CSF the TRS 22XX long range mobile
(NATO Class 1 ) radar has been adopted by Turkey. Local company Tefken is
co-producing 14 examples (International Defense Review [IDR] 9/96).
149. Germany: Alcatel (Radio &
Defense Systems) - Aselsan Electronics (Turkey) manufactures the Alcatel SEL
RATAC-S Surveillance radar under licence (IDR 6/96); Heckler & Koch -
Turkey manufactures H+K rifles and sub-machine guns under licence (American
Academy of Arts & Science 2/94); Thyssen Henschel Fox NBC Reconnaissance
vehicles supplied to Turkey (JDW2/11/91).
150. Italy: Agusta SpA $19 million
contract to supply Turkish Ministry of Defence with 20 AB-206B Jet Ranger Helicopters.
151. Netherlands: DAF has received a
S50 million subcontract to provide weapon station and vehicle integration. The
first 20 AIFVs will be assembled by DAF after which assembly will begin in
Turkey (JDW 9/9/89); Eurometaal - Eurometaal USA listed as exporting several
shipments of grenades to Turkey (PIERS 12/95), Turkey will begin production of
cluster bombs as part of a joint venture between MCIA (Turkey) &
Eurometaal. Under the ten year agreement 206,000 cluster bombs will be produced
for Turkey and 103,000 for Holland (Arms Trade News 21/1/94).
152. UK: Burle Ltd listed as exporting
CCTV equipment (FIS Turkey 94); Chemring Ltd 32,355 complete round flare bombs
and IR Decoy and Chaff-S Ammunition (Turkey Contracts Bulletin 1/95); GEC
Marconi Communication Systems resolved dispute with the Turkish Armed Forces
regarding the contract for the Scimitar H (HF-SSB) radios as part of a £96
million contract started in 1990 (JDW4/2/95); GEC Marconi Secure Systems crypto
devices and spare parts (Turkey Contracts Bulletin 2/95); Pilatus Britten
Norman sold a Multi Sensor Surveillance Aircraft (MSSA) to Turkey for Border
Surveillance for an undisclosed amount (Aerospace Daily 16/6/93); Racal Comsec
Ud - CLASSIC [Covert Local Area Sensor System for Intruder Classification] was
originally developed to detect illegal immigrants attempting to enter Hong
Kong. A total of 1700 systems have been ordered by 31 countries, of which 10
are NATO members (including Canada, Portugal, Spain and Turkey) (IDR 6/96);
Short Brothers - recent customers for the Shorts Shorland vehicles include 40
APCs (Armoured Personnel Carriers) to the Turkish Ministry of Interior to be
used by the Gendarmerie; Transac supplied 'armoured vehicles' (FIS Turkey 94).
153. Land Rover (UK) have a licence
production agreement with Otobus Karoseri (Otokar) of Turkey. Since 1987,
Otokar has built Land Rover 4x4 vehicles under licence with production running
at approx. 2500 vehicles a year. The Scorpion has an all welded steel hull with
around 70% of the automobile components drawn from the well known Land Rover
Defender 90/100 (4x4). Machine gun, night vision and day vision equipment are
standard (JDW 6/8/94). Export licence control is not exercised as the UK
Government classifies the Land Rover components as civilian spare parts. This
is despite the end product being a highly maneuverable and lethal internal
security vehicle. Additional reports have shown how this type of third country
licenced production have allowed MSP transfers that would not be permitted
direct from the UK. It was reported in 1995 that Otokar had obtained a $200
million deal to supply 700 Scorpion vehicles to Algeria (Defense News 2616195).
The UK currently has a military embargo on Algeria.
70
154. GKN Defence (UK): produce Mowag
(Switzerland) armoured and internal security vehicles under licence. Also
produced in Chile and Canada (Armada International 4-5/96). Oman has received
the first batch of GKN Defence built MOWAG Piranha 8x8 vehicles. (JDW 16/9/95).
GKN Defence have also established licenced production of its vehicles in the
Philippines.The first 7 Simba 4x4 APCs have been delivered to the Philippines
Armed Forces. 150 vehicles have been ordered fitted with a 12.7mm Browning MG
armed turret. Eight Simbas will supplied from the UK, several as kits and the
rest assembled at the Subic Bay plant operated by the joint venture Asian
Armoured Vehicle Technologies Corp. A number of variants will probably be
developed.(JDW 30/4/94). It was reported in1989 that the Philippines is
therefore set to become the first ASEAN nation with an armoured vehicle
manufacturing capability and could act as a base for regional export sales.
(JDW 16/12/89).
155. FN Nouvelle Herstal SA (Belgium)
is helping to build an ammunition producing factory in Eldoret, Kenya and is
providing much of the machinery. It is estimated that the factory has cost
between £6-170 million, but the Kenyan Government refuses to discuss the
financing arrangements. The factory will be capable of producing 20 million
bullets a year. (Guardian 20/6/96).
156. Heckler and Koch (Germany). H+K
small arms are produced under licence in many countries throughout the world.
MKE MP5 A3 and MP5 K Sub machine guns for 9mm Parabellum ammunition are
produced by MKE under licence from Heckler and Koch (Germany). Are very similar
in almost all aspects to the original Heckler & Koch version.(Police &
Security Equipment 96/7). In 1994, the American Academy of Arts & Science
reported that H+K rifles were produced under licence in the following
countries: France, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, UK, Mexico, Burma,
Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Thailand. H+K Sub-machine guns were produced
under licence in: Greece, Portugal, Turkey, UK, Iran, Saudi Arabia.(AAAS 2/94).
Such licenced production can mean in practice that Heckler & Koch small
arms are transferred to countries that the European Union may have export
restrictions on. For example it was reported that in "late 1991, 50,000
Heckler & Koch G3 automatic rifles were also supplied to Sudan, probably
via Iran." (JDW 9/5/92).
157. Steyr Mannlicher (Austria): First
batch of 1000 STEYR 5.56mm AUG Assault rifles for Malaysian Armed forces
completed by SME Tools in Malaysia (Total of 65,000 rifles are to be produced
over 5 year period) (JDW 5/10/91).
158. FFV Ordnance (Sweden) 9mm Model 45
sub machine gun - generally known as the Carl Gustaf. Made under licence in
Port Said, Egypt. A silenced version was used by US special forces in S.E.
Asia. The weapon was also copied & produced in Indonesia - currently not in
production. (COIN 90).
159. PT Pindad (Persero) (Indonesia):
PT Pindad has signed a licence agreement with Chartered Industries of Singapore
to produce the CIS 40-AGL 40mm automatic grenade launcher. (JDW 28/5/94). Also
reported as producing the following small arms under licence production
agreements: version of FNC rifle as SS1-V1 and SS1-V2, version of Browning High
Power pistol - made under licence from FN, Belgium; version of Beretta 9mm
Model SMG - made under licence from Beretta, USA; 60mm Mortar - made under
licence from Tampella, Finland; 81 mm Mortar (Quantity 500) (Tampella,
Finland); Model 38/49 SMG and Model 12 SMG - made under licence from Beretta,
USA; Model 45 (Carl Gustav) SMG - made under licence from Sweden; FNC, FN FAL,
FN MAG FN Mauser 98 carbine (used by police) - made under licence from FN,
Belgium; FN Minimi SAW - made under licence from FN, Belgium. (Defence
Manufacturers Association 8/90: Indonesia - Police & Security Equipment Holdings).
160. It was reported in 1994 that the
Swiss company, Pilatus Flugzeugwerke opened a military trainer production line
at its UK subsidiary on the Isle of Wight, called Pilatus Britten-Norman Ltd
(UK), to side step tough new arms-export regulations.(Flight International
6/4/94). One reason suggested for the move was that the Swiss aircraft company
wanted to take advantage of laxer British rules on arms exports. Pilatus
Aircraft, a subsidiary of Oerlikon-Buhrle, currently manufactures the PC-7 and
PC-9 in Stans, near Lucerne. The planes, originally developed for training,
have been widely sold to countries such as Guatemala, Burma, Iraq, Iran and El
Salvador. Swiss law prohibits military sales to 'areas of conflict'. Pilatus
has long claimed that its planes are not military equipment and that, if armies
buy them for training, that is not the same as buying them for killing. At
least one company in Belgium openly offers gun ready conversion services.
(Observer 27/3/94). The UK subsidiary already has a licenced production
agreement with the Philippines, the PADC (Philippines Aerospace Development
Corporation) was reported to be building the Islander light transport and
passenger aircraft. The Islander has A STOL capability and can be used for
cargo, passenger, survey, aerial spraying and in its Martime Defender version,
maritime surveillance operations. The original agreement called for the
transfer of 105 Islanders to the
71
PADC. The
first 6 were built by Britten-Norman and sold by PADC. The next 14 were
delivered unfinished, and the next 35 were assembled by PADC. After
Britten-Norman was acquired by Swiss firm. Pilatus, in 1979. The assembling
licence was suspended. But in March 1980 a new agreement was reached for the
assembly of 12 more Islanders, including one turboprop BN-2T Turbine Islander.
In 1981, PADC were no longer just assembling the Islander but building it from
the ground up. PADC hoped to become the exclusive distributor of the Pilatus
Products in the ASEAN region.(Arms Production 1984).
161.The full text of resolution Doc
EM\RE\264264474 read:
- aware of the European Parliament's
concerns regarding the export of repressive technologies to repressive regimes
that violate human rights,
- disturbed at recent revelations that such
technologies are being produced in at least three European Union (EU)
countries, namely Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom, companies such as
Equipol, France Selection Neral et Cie (France) Tactical Arms International UK
and British Aerospace are all known to have supplied electroshock units,
- horrified
at the
information that these technologies have been exported amongst others to Saudi
Arabia, China, the Gulf States and South Africa under the Apartheid regime,
- aware that these technologies have been used
in gross violation of human rights, aware of government complicity in these
transactions that have been formally banned by the governments concerned, for
example ICL Technical Plastics in Glasgow, which produces electroshock weapons
,
1. Requests
a statement from the governments concerned regarding the allegations;
2. Urges
support for Amnesty International's call for a full investigation into the
extent of the trade in the EU;
3. Calls on the Commission to bring forward
proposals to incorporate those technologies within the scope of arms export
controls and ensure greater transparency in the export of all military security
and police technologies to prevent the hypocrisy of governments who themselves
breach their own export bans;
4. Instructs the President to forward this
resolution to the Council, the Commission and the EU Member State Governments.
162. For further details, see
Ballantyne, 1996.
163. Amnesty International Danish
Medical Group, 1987.
164. The image used in Fig.46 was taken
by this man and supplied to Amnesty International.
165. For example AB Electronics
(electronic restraint devices); AFY Distributors (electroshock batons);Amazing
Concepts (Intimidator electric shock weapons),; Armas No Mortales (electroshock
weapons); B.West Imports (paralyser Stun Batons); Custom Armouring Corp (Nova
Electronic riot equipment); Federal Laboratories Division(Electronic batons);
Hiatt Thompson (restraint devices); Nova Technologies (electronic restraint and
stun devices); Paralyzer Protection (electric shock stun guns and batons);
Ranger Joes (stun guns); Reliapon Police Products (Nova Electronic restraints
and shields); S. & J. Products (electronic restraint devices); SAS R&D
Services (electronic batons); Sherwood Communications Associates UD( Equaliser
and Lightning stun guns); Stun Tech Inc (Electronic immobilisation weapons and
the REACT belts); Taser Industries (electronic dart shock weapons); The Edge
Company (Thunderbolt stun gun); American Handcuff Co., (leg irons); C&S
Security (gang transport chains); Smith & Wesson (belly chains and other
restraining equipment); Technipol International (leg irons and thumbcuffs);
Tobin Tool and Die (shackles); WS Darley (leg irons and belly chains) - to name
but a few companies who have advertised their wares. This information has been
collected from company brochures, Police & Security News (various volumes)
and Thomas Register (1992).
166. Confirmation of these fears was
provided by a secret list of licenses issued by the Commerce Department over
the last decade that was obtained by the US magazine 'Counterpunch', (October
1, 1995), that was not made available to FAS. It cited Air Parts
International's export to Yemen of shock batons with high voltage, Creative
Security's export of shock batons to Saudi Arabia; Jonas Aircraft and Arms
export of saps - (lead bludgeons covered with leather) to Egypt and shock
batons to Saudi Arabia in 1992; Nova Technologies export of electronic stun
guns to the Philippines; Premier Crown Corporation's export of twenty six inch
shock batons with hot centre to Saudi Arabia; Smith & Wesson's export of
shock batons and mace batons to both Saudi Arabia & Yemen; Transtechnology
Corporation's export of riot shields with Arabic inscription to Yemen; and Tri
County Police Supplies export of shock batons to Thailand.
72
167. On November 13, 1995, The US
Secretary of Commerce informed the speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, that he
had disaggregated these items to form a new ECCN. OA83D on the Commerce Control
List. Commerce also added a new section to the Export Administration
Regulations. Section 776.19, "Implements of Torture" to further
segregate these items. (Brown, 1995). Yet even after this review took place, it
was disclosed that the US government had approved the sale of thumbcuffs to
Russia,; blackjacks, stun guns and shock batons to Lithuania, Moldova, Panama
and Tanzania; and electronic riot shields and batons to Mexico.(Lelyveld,
1996).
168. Amnesty is careful to point out in
its reports that it is not making any accusation against any company of direct
complicity in torture but that these companies have offered to supply since
1990. It is not a definitive list because of the difficulty in obtaining data
on the subject in many countries and because of the inevitable business and
market changes.
169. The Belgium companies are thought
to be Belgium Business International (BBI), Browning and Falcon Security &
Telecommunications. In June 1996, De Morgen newspaper quoted a BBI salesman,
'We work via other countries like Spain or no . . . the easiest is Paris. But
if you have your own transitoire [middleman] we just deliver to them..We have
several models. The most useful is no bigger than two packs of cigarettes and
gives shocks of 150,000 volts. The problem with this type of weapon is that you
have to stretch your arm to come into contact with the enemy. That's why I
advise the mattracks [truncheons] with two electrodes at the end - ideal for
riot police or presidential guards. Even last year, the central African
Presidential Guards were equipped with this. Yes, Belgium is rather strict, but
Africa and Latin America permit us to just export it to a middle man and then
we have it depart from there.'
170. The French companies are thought
to be Auto F; Doursoux -Securitec s.a.r.l; Equipol; France Selection; GK
Productions; Glam Securite; Le Protecteur; Nieral & Cie Sarl and SAE
Alsetex (See Fig. 53).
171. The German companies are thought
to be Bonowi; Electron-Import & Export; Enforcer (Pulz & Charbit) GmbH;
M.S.C; M.T.S.; M.V.S.; NOWAR Security Equipment GmbH; Otto Boenicke; PK
Electronic; Rennhak Nachtsichtsysteme; Sicherheitstechnik Schmid (STS); Sipe
Electronic GmbH; Solid Company Sicherheitstechnik Import & Export; TEWI
Textil Wighardt; Tradimex Vertriebs GmbH; Waffenhandel Uwe Ulriche; Wapo
Electronic GmbH.
172.The company refered to is thought
to be Alpha Safety which advertised such products in 1993 but is thought to be
no longer trading.
173. The company referred to is thought
to be Reinaert Electronics.
174. The company referred to is thought
to be NitSpy Defensa Y Contraespionaje.
175. The companies referred to were
largely uncovered by the Channel 4 Dispatches programmes, referred to in the
text. (Gregory 1995,1996) They include British Aerospace Defence Ltd (Royal
Ordnance Division); CCS Communication, Control Inc; Compass Safety
International; ICL Technical Plastics UD; International Procurement Services; J
& S Franklin UD; PK Electronic International UD; SDMS Security Products UD.
73
JYA Note: A
detailed Bibliography composed of pages
74-100 is a separate file (85K);or a Zip-compressed
version (32K).
[Back cover]
|
STOA PROGRAMME
European Parliament
Directorat-General for Research Directorate B | |
|
SCH 4/81
L-2929 Luxembourg |
EAS 12
Rue Belliard 97-113 B-1047 Bruxelles |
|
Tel: +352
4300 22511
Fax: +352 4300 22418 |
Tel: +32 2
284 43748
Fax: +32 2 284 49059 |
[End STOA
document]
To get a hardcopy of the
report (112 pages) send a fax request to Scientific and Technological Options
Assessment (STOA) in Luxembourg:
Fax number: 352-4300-22418
No
electronic version is available from STOA. Draft reports remain in paper format
until finalized by the European Parliament. For information see STOA's
publications
Web site:
Web site:
Transcription and hypertext by JYA/Urban Deadline
