Sunday, April 3, 2016
the Ijtimah aims to reflect the movement’s international dimension and dynamism as well as facilitating contacts between Tabligh members from different countries. The TJ is currently using Portugal as a platform for spreading its pan-Islamic message to Africa (especially to Portuguese-speaking countries like Mozambique) and Latin America (particularly Brazil). Within Portugal, the group relies on mosques and religious sites on the outskirts of Lisbon (eg, in Palmela, Laranjeiro and Odivelas) and on their corresponding madrassas.
Though fairly discrete and committed to projecting an apolitical image, the Portuguese TJ branch has not escaped controversy, at least on one occasion. In January 2008 a terrorist cell composed of 12 men (11 Pakistanis and an Indian) was dismantled in Barcelona before carrying out an attack on the city’s subway system. One of its members admitted to the existence of plans for attacks Germany, the UK, France and Portugal. After the Spanish authorities issued a terrorist alert for these three countries, the Portuguese security agencies started searching for two Pakistani nationals, allegedly members of the Barcelona cell that would have entered Portugal through the TJ’s Jamaats (proselytising groups) on their way to an Ijtimah. However, neither the Pakistanis’ entry or presence was ever confirmed, nor was there any solid evidence pointing to a possible attack in Portugal. Nonetheless, three of the men detained in Barcelona had attended the Ijtimah in the past, between 2004 and 2007.
There was at least another high-profile participant at a Portuguese Ijtimah. Abdelaziz Benyaich, a Moroccan national accused by his country’s authorities of being involved in the Casablanca attacks of May 2003, was in Portugal for an Ijtimah when the bombs exploded. In 2005 Abdelaziz was convicted of belonging to al-Qaeda’s Spanish cell and was sentenced to eight years in prison. Salahedin Benyaich, alias Abu Muhgen, Abdelaziz’s brother, was convicted for the Casablanca attacks and is currently serving time in prison in Morocco, and was a mujahedeen in Bosnia, Chechnya and possibly other countries. Furthermore, Salahedin was close to Allekema Lamari, one of the terrorists responsible for the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks in Atocha Station, Madrid, who committed suicide when surrounded by the police in Leganés, in the suburbs of the Spanish capital.
Known Cases of Possible Jihadist Activities in Portugal
Particularly since 2001, the Portuguese media has echoed some cases of possible Islamist terrorist activities in Portugal. The cases presented below were all reported in the national media, although here we present new data, analysis and conclusions.
Particularly since 2001, the Portuguese media has echoed some cases of possible Islamist terrorist activities in Portugal. The cases presented below were all reported in the national media, although here we present new data, analysis and conclusions.
(a) Operation Alfarroba
In March 2003 a police operation carried out in Lisbon and Quarteira (in southern Portugal) lead to the arrest of 13 Algerians suspected of being involved in the forgery of documents. The identity of these men was never very clear, nor what their intentions were –a lack of information that would become habitual in future cases of possible Jihadist activities in Portugal–. Nonetheless, a name emerged from these arrests: Sofiane Laïb, a 25 year old Algerian national who was in Germany at the time of the arrests in Portugal.
In March 2003 a police operation carried out in Lisbon and Quarteira (in southern Portugal) lead to the arrest of 13 Algerians suspected of being involved in the forgery of documents. The identity of these men was never very clear, nor what their intentions were –a lack of information that would become habitual in future cases of possible Jihadist activities in Portugal–. Nonetheless, a name emerged from these arrests: Sofiane Laïb, a 25 year old Algerian national who was in Germany at the time of the arrests in Portugal.
With a record of petty crime –namely small-scale theft and the forgery of documents–, Laïb was party to a money transfer carried out by one of the 13 Algerians arrested. It has been reported that between 1998 and 2000 Laïb shared an apartment in Hamburg with Mohamed Atta, the leader of the cell responsible for the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US. Whatever the case, it has been confirmed that the young Algerian knew Atta and frequented the same religious and social circles in Hamburg. A few months after the arrest of the 13 Algerians in Portugal, Sofiane Laïb was arrested in downtown Lisbon in possession of forged documents, the sole crime for which he was convicted. After serving a short time in prison, Laïb was expelled to Algiers in April 2006 by the Portuguese authorities. One of his known associates was a Tunisian national called Ben Yamin Issak, alias Ben Youssef Boudhina, himself close to Atta in German Islamist circles.
In September 2002 Ben Yamin Issak tried to board an airplane in Lisbon headed for London. He carried a false French passport which was detected by a steward at the boarding gate. The extremely poor quality of the documentation suggests that he was eager to get to the UK. Although detected, Ben Yamin Issak was able to leave the airport and later use false Portuguese ID to catch several buses until he arrived in London. Sofiane Laïb was waiting in a car outside the airport in case something went wrong –as it did– and helped Issak evade capture. When he arrived in the UK, he stayed at Kamel Bourgass’s house in Wood Green, north London. Bourgass is an Algerian national who trained in Afghanistan and is suspected of having fought for the Algerian GIA (Groupe Islamique Armée –Islamic Armed Group–). While in the UK, Ben Yamin Issak and Bourgass attended the Finsbury Park mosque, then run by the notorious Imam Abu Hamza al-Masri. In January 2003 they managed to anticipate a police raid which found Jihadist propaganda, Issak’s false Portuguese ID and castor-oil beans (typically used to produce ricin toxin) in Bourgass’s house, thus foiling the well-known ‘London Ricin Plot’. Issak’s false ID had been stolen by Sofiane Laïb from an African staying at a hostel in Lisbon which is associated with illegal immigration and prostitution. Kamel Bourgass was captured a few days later in Manchester after stabbing five police officers with a knife, one of whom died. He is currently serving a life sentence and his arrest triggered a raid by the British authorities on the Finsbury Park mosque, where false documentation used to support Jihadist activities was found. On 12 July 2003 Ben Yamin Issak was arrested in Liverpool trying to board an airplane heading for Barcelona.
(b) The Alleged Euro Cup Plot and the Hofstad Group link
In June 2004, just before the beginning of the Euro Cup –held in Portugal that year–, the Portuguese media reported that 11 men of Maghrebi origin had been deported to the Netherlands. Despite the fact that the arrest involved more than 20 individuals, only three were considered to be of interest, among them Nouredine el-Fathmi and Mohammed el-Morabit, both Moroccan nationals. Nouredine el-Fathmi had lived in Amsterdam with Mohamed Bouyeri who, in November of that same year, had assassinated the film director Theo van Gogh.
In June 2004, just before the beginning of the Euro Cup –held in Portugal that year–, the Portuguese media reported that 11 men of Maghrebi origin had been deported to the Netherlands. Despite the fact that the arrest involved more than 20 individuals, only three were considered to be of interest, among them Nouredine el-Fathmi and Mohammed el-Morabit, both Moroccan nationals. Nouredine el-Fathmi had lived in Amsterdam with Mohamed Bouyeri who, in November of that same year, had assassinated the film director Theo van Gogh.
At the time of the arrest in 2004 there was an established link between el-Fathmi and el-Morabit, who were arrested in a hostel in Oporto, and the Hofstad Group –a well known Jihadist organisation in the Netherlands–.
Among other material, the Dutch authorities had previously seized a declaration by Nouredine al-Fathmi in which he declared his intention of dying in the name of Allah. However, no evidence sufficient to ensure a conviction for terrorist activities was ever found in Portugal, and therefore he and the others were deported to the Netherlands where they were interrogated by the Dutch authorities and then released due to lack of evidence.
There was some speculation about a possible attack on the foreign dignitaries attending the Euro Cup, also aimed at the then Portuguese Prime Minister, José Manuel Durão Barroso. Although it was a plausible, no actual evidence of a planned terrorist attack was ever discovered.
Given the intelligence gathered by the Dutch authorities, and the surveillance and efforts of the Direcção Central de Combate ao Banditismo of the Polícia Judiciária (at present theUnidade Nacional de Combate ao Terrorismo, or Counter Terrorism Unit of the Judicial Police), the arrest of these three men seems to have been a relatively over-hasty and ill-considered decision.
Nouredine el-Fathmi was again arrested in 2005, this time in Amsterdam on his way to Lelylaan Station while in the possession of firearms and ammunition. In January 2006 the Dutch public prosecutor claimed to have ample evidence that the Hofstad Group was indeed a Jihadist organisation, directed by a six-man council to which Mohamed Bouyeri and el-Fathmi belonged. In March 2006 el-Fathmi and Mohammed el-Morabit were sentenced by a Rotterdam court to five and two years imprisonment respectively. Bouyeri was also convicted at the trial for being the ringleader, although he was already serving a life sentence for the assassination of Theo van Gogh. Nouredine el-Fathmi was also implicated in what the Dutch intelligence called the ‘Piranha Network’, a group plotting to assassinate senior Dutch politicians and bomb a government building.
(c) Serguei Malischev and Spain’s Audiencia Nacional
It has been reported that in October 2004 the Spanish authorities warned Portugal of a terrorist cell trying to acquire explosives in Bragança, in northern Portugal, with the aim of perpetrating an attack against Madrid’s Audiencia Nacional. However, there are members of the Portuguese intelligence community who claim there was no such tip-off.
It has been reported that in October 2004 the Spanish authorities warned Portugal of a terrorist cell trying to acquire explosives in Bragança, in northern Portugal, with the aim of perpetrating an attack against Madrid’s Audiencia Nacional. However, there are members of the Portuguese intelligence community who claim there was no such tip-off.
In May 2005 Portugal deported Serguei Malischev, a man suspected of being involved in this plot as well as having strong connections to Jihadist groups. Malischev, a Belarus national, remained under arrest in Portugal for two months due to immigration irregularities before being deported to Belgium, the country that had issued his Schengen visa. During his time in Portugal, as in many other cases, no evidence of terrorist activity was discovered. Still, Malischev had an apparently real interest in entering the country since he tried to do so twice: the first attempt failed, while the second was successful.
Serguei Malischev surfaced later in Palma de Mallorca, Spain, were he was accused in December 2005 of belonging to a Jihadist cell led by an Iraqi called Abu Sufian, who –according to police sources quoted in the Spanish media– had direct contact with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, then leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. According to Fernando Andreu, the Spanish judge who presided over the trials of Malischev, Sufian and others, this terrorist cell endorsed proselytising activities and recruited individuals to be later sent to fight in Iraq, Chechnya and other countries in Asia.
Malischev was a chemical-weapons expert with a background in Pakistan and Azerbaijan. He also went by the names of Andrey Misiura and Amin al Anari and died in prison in 2009.
(d) The Four Cape-Verdean Dutch
In February 2006 the Netherlands issued an alert for four Dutch citizens of ethnic Cape-Verdean descent. The group had been involved in a shootout in a Rotterdam pub causing five deaths, after which they fled to Portugal.
In February 2006 the Netherlands issued an alert for four Dutch citizens of ethnic Cape-Verdean descent. The group had been involved in a shootout in a Rotterdam pub causing five deaths, after which they fled to Portugal.
It was said that at least one of them was an Islamist terrorist related to the Hofstad Group, and that the gang’s leader had been trained in the Yemen. However, there is no solid evidence that either the alleged leader, Fernando Jorge Pires, had been trained in the Yemen or that there was any significant link with the Hofstad Group. The shootout in Rotterdam was related to a diamond-trafficking deal that had gone wrong, and the alleged Hofstad link was no more than contact with a Turkish group that, in turn, had some ties with the Dutch terrorist cell. Fernando Jorge Pires was arrested on Christmas Eve trying to board a plane in Lisbon, while two other members were arrested two months later near Amadora, on the outskirts of Lisbon. The fourth man, José Barbosa, was able to escape to Cape Verde.
(e) The Last Public Case: Samir Boussaha
In a European joint operation started by the Italian Carabinieri in Genoa, an Algerian national called Samir Boussaha was arrested in Oporto in November 2007. Although it was argued in the Portuguese media that he had frequent and firm connections with the group arrested in 2004 in Oporto, it seems that the only link was that both Samir and those related with the Hofstad Group attended the same mosque –the only one in that area of Oporto at the time–.
In a European joint operation started by the Italian Carabinieri in Genoa, an Algerian national called Samir Boussaha was arrested in Oporto in November 2007. Although it was argued in the Portuguese media that he had frequent and firm connections with the group arrested in 2004 in Oporto, it seems that the only link was that both Samir and those related with the Hofstad Group attended the same mosque –the only one in that area of Oporto at the time–.
According to the Italian public attorney, the 35-year-old Samir Boussaha and his brother Mourad were suspected of having been members of the GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat –Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat–) and of participating in a recruiting network that sent fighters to Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as of collecting funds for Jihadist operations. There was no evidence of Mourad ever having been in Portugal and, with respect to Samir, although he was under surveillance for years, no hard evidence of terrorist activities was unearthed. The lack of proof from Samir’s surveillance is not necessarily due to his innocence, but rather a result of his caution. Nonetheless, when Boussaha was arrested by the Judicial Police, the apartment where he lived was also found to contain no evidence. Finally, the barbershop where Samir often worked was also above suspicion and the locals who knew him were surprised since they saw the Algerian as a kind, polite and sociable person. Samir Boussaha was extradited to Italy in mid-November 2007.
Conclusion: Apart from suggesting that the authorities should remain on the alert, the cases presented above show that several individuals with disturbing profiles connected with Jihadist activities have entered and spent time in Portugal. However, it has been impossible to establish either their intentions or their activities –ie, the solid evidence needed to guarantee a conviction for terrorism–. The general difficulty in distinguishing between insurgents, terrorists and criminals and of obtaining sound evidence to satisfy a court of law is a reality in Portugal, as it is throughout Europe. But in the process of fitting together the pieces in the jigsaw puzzle of Jihadism in Europe, Portugal is an informational black hole. Many explanations can be offered for such an unsatisfactory state of affairs: the legal framework under which security agencies operate, the shortcoming of the penal code and the lack of preparation and awareness of the country’s political decision makers, among others. The complexity and variety of these possible explanations requires separate research and analysis. Nonetheless, and with regard to this paper’s topic, what is important is that the succession of inconclusive cases –from an empirical perspective– reflect structural problems which should be addressed as they could ultimately signal to Jihadist organisations the sort of weaknesses that they might decide to exploit for their own benefit.
Despite being nebulous and for the most part inconclusive, these cases of possible Jihadist activity in Portugal do suggest some similarities with the situation elsewhere in Europe.
Considering what time and research has taught us about Jihadism in the EU, Portugal complies with the general picture in the following aspects: most individuals involved in suspected Jihadist activities are originally from the Maghreb, the forgery of documents is often associated with possible cases of Islamist terrorism, the security forces have found it difficult to obtain evidence sufficient to ensure a conviction for the crime of terrorism and individuals suspected of engaging in terrorism or parallel activities are often highly mobile.
However, there is another important characteristic of Jihadism in Europe that seems to be absent from the Portuguese context. As far as is known, there is no sign of internal radicalisation or recruitment or of self-starter cells –even considering the potential perils represented by TJ–. Such a difference with the rest of European could have two explanations: (1) the degree of integration and sense of identity of Portugal’s traditional Muslim community; or (2) the simple fact that home-grown terrorism has not yet been detected. However, given the similarities of the phenomenon throughout Europe, nothing should be ruled out for the future.
Finally, taking into consideration, on the one hand, the high degree of mobility of the suspects involved in the inconclusive episodes detected in Portugal and, on the other, the long-established Jihadist activity in Spain, it is puzzling why there has been no spill-over effect. The existence of a settled and well-integrated migrant community certainly plays a role. Nonetheless, given Spain’s strong commitment to countering terrorism as well as the scores of suspects arrested and then convicted by the Spanish authorities, it is curious that there is no obvious transit of Islamist terrorists across the Iberian Peninsula.
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/international+terrorism/ari113-2010
On 11 June, 2004, Portuguese police arrested a group of Islamist militants in Porto. It is suspected that they planned to assassinate the Portuguese president-designate of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, as well as other foreign guests, at a reception at the Freixo Palace on the night before the opening match of the Euro 2004 championship soccer tournament. Portuguese intelligence received a warning from their Dutch colleagues that three Dutch-Moroccan members of the Hofstad Network had travelled to Portugal. One of the terrorist suspects had shared an apartment with Van Gogh’s killer, and they drove from the Netherlands to Portugal in a VW Golf registered in the name of Bouyeri.
Thursday, March 31, 2016
"HOME MADE" Active Denial System (Directed Energy Weapon)
"But the real value of our attacks today lies in the psychological impact, not in the immediate casualties. For one thing, our efforts against the System gained immeasurably in credibility. More important, though, is what we taught the politicians and the bureaucrats. They learned today that not one of them is beyond our reach. They can huddle behind barbed wire and tanks in the city, or they can hide behind the concrete walls and alarm systems of their country estates, but we can still find them and kill them. All the armed guards and bulletproof limousines in America cannot guarantee their safety. That is a lesson they will not forget."--- Excerpt from The Turner Diaries, by Dr. William L. Pierce.
Overview
The military has a non-lethal Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) called the "Active Denial System." Which, despite all the hoopla and millions in tax-dollars, hasn't actually ever been deployed! Their Active Denial System is basically a 100 kilowatt, 95 GHz gyrotron oscillator (CPI VGB-8095) feeding a high-gain (very narrow beamwidth), rotatable parabolic or phased-array antenna. The idea is for the high-energy RF beam to rapidly heat the outside layer of skin (up to around 130°F), causing the target to flee the immediate area. Due to its 3.2 millimeter wavelength, a 95 GHz beam can't penetrate more than about 0.4 millimeters of living tissue and the "blink" factor will help to protect your eyes. And therein lies the entire problem... Who wants a weapon that only annoys people? We want one that will fry their insides!
The July 1989 issue of 73 Magazine has a really neat article entitled "ATV Transmitter from a Microwave Oven!" by David Pacholok, KA9BYI. The article tells you how to construct a high-voltage power supply and frequency modulator circuit to control the 2.45 GHz magnetron used in a standard microwave oven. The circuit is actually quite clever, and also fairly simple to build, but does requires the use of old television horizontal sweep tubes (6JE6, 6LQ6, or 6MJ6 - with 6MJ6s being the best) to control the current into the magnetron. That's one big problem, as these tubes can be more difficult to find than Barack Hussein Obama's birth certificate. Try checking your local TV repair store (Repair? Huh?) and pick up as many as you can find, along with the matching 9-pin Novar sockets. Most of the other parts, believe it or not, can still be picked up at Radio Shack. Also, since the 73 article is quite thorough, the specific details of the magnetron's control circuit operation will not be covered here. A copy of the article will appear on the website.
The goal for our project is to implement this same circuit into some type of "Poor Man's Active Denial System." The idea being that using a microwave oven magnetron in Continuous Wave (CW) mode, instead of the normal 60 Hz "pulsed" mode, will result in a higher average output power. This is much more desirable for "cooking" a target. You may remember a MythBusters episode where they try to cook a turkey using a high-power pulsed marine (9.4 GHz) radar. While radars do put out alot of radio frequency energy, it is only for a few microseconds. Their overall average RF output power is actually quite low, so they can't really harm the living.
While not having anywhere near the range or insane RF output power level of the military version, this version of the Active Denial System is still quite useful for slowly (or covertly) heating a remote target. It may also be possible to remotely induce fevers, cataracts, headaches, or other fatigue symptoms in a human target. And, since the 2.45 GHz wavelength is quite long, it may even be possible to cause severe internal tissue, brain, or other organ damage. RF heating of a person's heart can cause all sorts of problems, especially if they have a pacemaker. Imagine being able to remotely induced a heart attack...
Other non-amateur radio related uses for high-powered, continuous wave 2.45 GHz energy:
- Counter-IED Operations: Heating an area with RF can cause plastic explosives to retain some energy which will allow them to be "viewed" via a thermal imaging system. RF energy may also disable detonation or timer electronics.
- Fight Global Warming: There are too many people on the planet. But, are there any White countries with overpopulation problems? Nope! Try using high-energy RF to remotely induce abortions or severly damage a shit-skin fetus.
- SAM Spoofing: Some surface-to-air missiles use high-power CW illumination for the missile to ride on. Point your device at a military airplane and see if it shoots out any cool countermeasures. Can also be used as a decoy to draw in anti-radiation missiles to places you want blown up.
- Surveillance: The Russians used to flood the U.S. embassy with high-power microwaves to try and pick up any "vibrations" in objects caused by people talking. Also try flooding an area with 2.45 GHz and demodulating an odd harmonic (7.35, 12.25 GHz etc.) to extract audio via a modulated non-linear junction.
- Preventing ACORN Fraud: Prevent one of the most corrupt Democrat-supported organizations on the planet, ACORN, from partaking in voter or census fraud. Zap 'em!
- Counter-Body Armor: Your house getting raided because you don't support Obama or own a gun Hollywood liberals don't like? RF passes right through that fancy body armor. The target's "flinch factor" can also give you extra time to aim or to expose vulnerable regions on your attacker. Good for weeding out snipers too...
- Increasing Home Values: Thanks to "diversity," your once quiet neighborhood in probably being destroyed thanks to non-White invaders or other liberal scum. Don't like your new neighbors? Zap 'em! Loud stereos? Zap 'em! Section 8 housing? Zap 'em! Corrupt politicians, lawyers, and bankers? Zap 'em!
- Countering Alarm Systems: Most alarms systems don't like being in high-RF areas, especially video cameras. You might be able to disable or even remotely trigger alarm systems using a device like this. Really freaks dogs out too...
- Frey Effect: Properly pulsed high-power microwave energy can cause people to "hear" things. Seriously. Simple tones are the easiest, while speech requires a "pre-distortion" circuit.
- Doppler Radar: Tap the output of the magnetron via a directional coupler and run it into a mixer to detect phase shifts. This is a good start for a homebrew, long-range Doppler radar. Point it straight up and search for UFOs.
All that from the little box sitting in your kitchen. Holy fuck!
Pictures & Construction
Parts for the 120 VAC main input.A high-amperage line filter, toggle switch, and fuse holder will be mounted inside a square electrical outlet box. The filtered 120 VAC lines will be mounted on standoffs and distributed to the other transformers.The little green blob with two leads is an input surge absorber from an old computer switching power supply. It's used to reduce the large surge current when the power is initially applied.The Radio Shack #273-1511 transformer will provide the 12.6 VAC for the two 6MJ6 tubes (filaments in series) we will be using. It will also provide the +/- power supply for the op-amp in the control circuit.Rear view of the AC input power panel.Try to use a single point ground to reduce any ground loops.There are (optional) ferrite beads on the incoming 120 VAC hot, neutral, and ground leads.A green neon lamp is used as a power indicator.Everything will be mounted to a large aluminium plate.L-brackets are riveted to the plate, which will be used to mount the twelve electrolytic capacitors making up the high-voltage power supply's ripple capacitor.Secured electrolytic capacitor.Twelve 650 µF / 450 VDC electrolytic capacitors will be used.Put a piece of heatshrink tubing over the L-bracket and wrap the bottom of each capacitor with electrical tape.Secure the capacitors using hose clamps.The twelve capacitors ready to go.Proper high-voltage construction techniques would require a little more space between the capacitors and maybe also mount them on some type of insulator. Oh well...Wire the capacitors in series (+ to -) with a 100 kohm / 5W resistor across each one for voltage load sharing.Stock microwave oven transformer.Its secondary provides 3.3 VAC for the magnetron's filament and the high-voltage winding provides around 1,800 VAC.Note that one side of the high-voltage winding is connected to the frame of the transformer (ground). This will need to be disconnected and properly isolated.The magnetic shunts, which are normally installed in a microwave oven transformer, can stay.On the two bottom spade connectors for the 120 VAC primary input, a resistor/capacitor snubber circuit is used to clamp any high-voltage spikes or kick-backs.Isolating the high-voltage secondary.The grounded end was unsoldered and connected to a little stand-off terminal mounted on the transformer's protective cardboard.Not all transformers will be the same, but they will all have one side of the high-voltage winding tied to ground, either with a screw or a solder tab.The case of the transformer was further isolated from the chassis ground using a rubber gasket sheet and nylon washers on the mounting bolts.This is to help reduce any 60 Hz hum, if you'd ever wish to modulate the magnetron's output in the future, so it's not really a requirement.Overview of the 6MJ6's filament transformer (silver-colored - mounted on the electrical box) and also the grid voltage transformer (gold-colored).The series 0.8 µF capacitor in the voltage-doubling circuit is isolated from ground by Zip-tying it to a plastic rod.You can also see the high-voltage load sharing resistors (100 kohm / 5W) aross each of the electrolytic capacitors. These will also help to dissipate any stray voltage when the power is off.High-voltage output from the capacitor bank.Little spring clips were made to connect the 100 ohm resistors to the top cap (plate) on the two 6MJ6s.6MJ6s in place.Optional spring retainers hold the tubes in place.The tube on the lower-right is the "A" tube, the other is the "B" tube.Underside view of the mounting plate showing the tube socket wiring and grid voltage circuit.The top socket is for the "A" tube, the other is for the "B" tube.The 6MJ6's have their filaments wired in series so they can be driven directly with the 12.6 VAC secondary from a Radio Shack #273-1511 transformer.Note the nylon insulation washers on the microwave oven transformer's mounting bolts (lower-left).Magnetron current meter, magnetron cathode current control (Ik), and the transmit-enable (XMIT) switch.The meter is from an old Lab-Volt trainer used in schools. Its full-scale reading is 500 mA DC.HVPR16-06 high-voltage diodes in the voltage doubler circuit.Leaving the shunts in the microwave oven transformer also helps to suppress the large surge current when first powered on. This is necessary to protect the diodes from any over-current transients.Use two diodes in series, as shown, just to be safe.HVPR16-06 Diode Specifications VR 6,000 Volts IF 550 mA VF10.00 Volts
The final high-voltage output connectors will be mounted in a fiberglass electrical box. The magnetron connections will be via banana jacks.Connect the banana jacks like so. Note that the direct filament winding on the microwave oven transformer usually goes to the magnetron's "FA" terminal. Every schematic or datasheet shows them connected differently, so I don't know on that one...Also note the isolated ground lug. This ties back to the single point ground in the main incoming voltage electrical box.Completed high-voltage magnetron connection plate.Toshiba 2M172J magnetron mounted to the horn assembly built in GBPPR 'Zine, Issue #55.The horn has a mounting bracket in the rear to allow for mounting at the focal point of a parabolic dish.A large 120 VAC fan provides continuous air flow over the magnetron's cooling fins.Raytheon markets their Active Denial System for "riot control."This one is designed for "Bolshevik control.""'Nobody wants to be on the wrong side of Ari Emanuel, especially now that his brother is running the White House,' said one television executive, who asked for anonymity to preserve harmony with him."--- June 9, 2009 quote about Ariel Emanuel, Jewish supremacist Rahm Emanuel's brother, in the New York Times (of all places).Current sink circuit board.Differs slightly from the original 73 article due to not having all the same parts. Should work fine though, except for amateur television transmissions.A LF351 op-amp replaces the circuit's original LF357. The LF351's voltage is regulated via (optional) 7812 and 7912 regulators. An IRF510 N-channel MOSFET replaces the VN66AF.Mounting the control circuit board.The two phono jack inputs are for external current control and modulation input. These will be for upcoming projects.The Input Select switch is on the lower-left. The Modulation Input #1 is the phono jack below that, then the Modulation Input #2 (direct) phono jack.Final wiring showing the current meter, transmit switch, and 1 kohm current control potentiometer.Outside test setup.Wasn't sure if it would work or not, but remarkably, everything did check out.An Atari Lynx is used as a RF output indicator.The high-voltage lines to the magnetron are run through vinyl tubing for extra insulation.Then it blew up...Microwave oven transformers are not really designed for continuous current operations, or for use in "real" high-voltage power supplies.As you can see here, the high-voltage secondary winding arced over. Try to find a microwave oven transformer that is physically large or has been coated with some type of resin or sealant.Back up and running with a new microwave oven transformer.This transformer has been coated with some sort of "goo" to help prevent high-voltage arcing.All microwave oven transformers are basically the same, so swapping them out should be no problem. They all seem to have slightly different mounting or wiring configurations, though.A good secondary high-voltage winding on a microwave oven transformer will usually have a DC resistance between 50 and 120 ohms or so. The filament winding will have very low DC resistance, often below 1 ohm. You can use this to check the windings before hand.Is it bad when you can get a frequency counter reading, with no antenna, and standing behind the horn?Test setup of the Litton 2M167 magnetron used in the 2.45 GHz Magnetron to Coax Assembly article in GBPPR 'Zine, Issue #46.This magnetron is being run into a 50 ohm load for testing with a spectrum analyzer.Spectrum analyzer view of the magnetron's RF output transverted (2.278 GHz LO) to fit the range of an IFR service monitor. The spectrum display is 1 MHz per division.On the left, is the output of a Litton 2M167 magnetron. The meter is reading a center frequency of "135.0 MHz," but this converts to an actual output frequency of 2.413 GHz. Note the output is about 1 MHz lower than the center reading. This magnetron was run into a 50 ohm load via a homebrew waveguide-to-coaxial adapter.On the right, is the output of a Toshiba 2M172 magnetron. The meter is reading "177.0 MHz," and the signal is about 1.5 MHz higher than the center frequency. The final output frequency is around 2.4565 GHz. This magnetron was run into an open horn, so there was alot of background RF noise, which raises the noise floor on the analyzer.
Bugs & Operating Notes
- It gets hot! Very hot! Both the 6MJ6 tubes and the magnetron. Forced air cooling is a must!
- The filaments in the 6MJ6 tubes and the magnetron need to be warmed up prior to applying the plate voltage (i.e., flipping the "XMIT" switch). Give it a good 30 seconds or so.
- The (stock) current control circuit appears to top out around 200 mA into the magnetron. Some magnetrons will require higher current for a cleaner RF output spectrum. Experiment with different magnetrons, if you can.
- Turn the magnetron's cathode current control (Ik) down before you activate the XMIT switch. The magnetron seems to perform better with a slowly increasing cathode current.
- Mount the magnetron/horn assembly at the focal point of a 24 dB WiFi parabolic dish for an ERP output of around 100 kW or more!
- The magnetron's RF output signal tends to "jump" around a bit in frequency, especially if the current is too low.
- 2M167 Magnetron RF Output Power Test A Bird 43 wattmeter with a "25 W / 400-1000 MHz" slug is reading around 5 watts (+37 dBm) and the magnetron is connected via a 20 dB directional coupler. RF output power is then (potentially) around 500 watts (+57 dBm). Not sure how much error is from the out-of-band Bird slug, though.
Microwave Oven Magnetron Current Recommendations Oven Manufacturer Operating Current (mA) Litton 160 - 300 Sharp 200 - 450 Tappan 250 - 325 Whirlpool 240 - 300 Sanyo 200 - 270 Amana RC-10 400 - 500 (1,000 Watts) Litton 70-40 600 - 650 (1,000 Watts) Litton 80-50 600 - - (1,300 Watts) Litton 550 500 - 600 (1,300 Watts) Sharp R-22 350 - 450 (1,000 Watts) Compiled from various repair notes.
Schematics
Notes & Datasheets
http://justpaste.it/19ha
- Higher resolution pictures and the original project article are available in GBPPR 'Zine Issue #62
- 6LQ6 Beam Pentode The 6JE6 and the 6MJ6 are similar to the 6LQ6. (282k PDF) (Alternate) (Pinout) (Example Horizontal Sweep Schematic)
- LF351 JFET Op-Amp (252k PDF)
- IRF510 N-Channel Power MOSFET (1.0M PDF)
- Matsushita 2M167B 2.45 GHz CW Magnetron (744k PDF)
- Directed Energy Weapons Safety (565k PDF)
- Rate Effects in Isolated Hearts Induced by Microwave Irradiation by James L. Lords, Carl H. Durney, Alan M. Borg, and Charles E. Tinney (442k PDF)
- Electrical Induction of Ventricular Fibrillation in the Human Heart A study of excitability levels with alternating current of different frequencies.
- Effects of GHz Radiation on the Human Nervous System Recent developments in the technology of political control, by Harian E. Girard.
- Non-Lethal Technology and Their Human Effects Annex G describes technologies that are being used or are being proposed for use for non-lethal applications. Specific weapon systems are not addressed, except for a few examples. (261k PDF)
- Bioelectromagnetics 2005: Abstract Collection A joint meeting of The Bioelectromagnetics Society and The European BioElectromagnetics Association. (5.7M PDF) (Additional Info)
- Biological Effects of Directed Energy United States Air Force Research Laboratory, November 2002 (3.2M PDF)
- Biological Effects of Electromagnetic Radiation by Arthur W. Guy, IEEE.
- Active Denial System Fact Sheet
- Active Denial System Enabling Technologies (790k PDF)
- Millimeter Waves, Lasers, Acoustics for Non-Lethal Weapons? Physics analyses and inferences, by Dr. Jurgen Altmann. (1.6M PDF)
- Radio Frequency, Active Denial & Psych Weapons by Ted Twietmeyer
- "Safety" of EMP/Microwave Weapons (130k PDF)
- Weaponeering the Future: Direct-Energy Weapons Effectiveness Now and Tommorow by Chadwick F. Fager, Major, USAF. (113k PDF)
- Effects of Directed Energy Weapons by Philip E. Nielsen (1.5M PDF)
- Electromagnetic Weapons and Mind Control From CNN's Special Assignment, from 1985.
- The Magnetron Tube Used in Microwave Ovens Structure and Operation
- Shooting Not to Kill America's development and use of non-lethal weapons.
- Military Readies Directed-Energy Weapons (60k PDF)
- Anderson Company to Make New Weapon for Marines Xtreme Alternative Defense Systems (XADS) Ltd., headquartered in Anderson, Indiana, has been tapped by the U. S. Marine Corps to develop a directed energy weapon for use in riot control and other situations requiring less-than-lethal force.
- 'Telepathic Ray Guns' and Vaporized Shoes: The Truth is Weirder Than You Think (U.S. vs. Donald Friedman)
- Mind Games by Sharon Weinberger. A community of people who believe the government is beaming voices into their minds. They may be crazy, but the Pentagon has pursued a weapon that can do just that.
- Xtreme Defense by Sharon Weinberger. Lightning guns, heat rays, weapons that can make you hear the voice of God. This is what happens when the war on terror meets the entrepreneurial spirit.
- High-Energy Density and High-Power RF by David K. Abe, and G. S. Nusinovich. (Google Books)
- ZAP! Have You Been Targeted by a 'Directed Energy Weapon?' Victims of organized 'Gang Stalking' say it's happening in the USA.
- Team Investigates Active Denial System for Security Applications Sandia press release. (High-Res JPEG #1) (High-Res JPEG #2)
- Wonder Weapons The Pentagon's quest for non-lethal arms is amazing. But is it smart?
- Microwave Mind Control by Tim Rifat
- The Microwave Furor Last month the U.S. confirmed that for some 15 years the Soviet Union has been beaming microwaves at the hulking nine-story U.S. embassy on Moscow's Tchaikovsky Street. From 1976.
- A High-Power, 13 cm Magnetron Transmitter by Chuck Swedblom, WA6EXV. Communications Quarterly, Winter 1991. (3.7M PDF)
- Robert Duncan / Energy Weapons & Testing From December 5, 2007. "Independent investigator Robert Duncan discussed directed energy and neurological weapons and his contention that they've been tested on the public at large. While directed energy is used in microwaves, to remove kidney stones, and in non-invasive surgery, it's also been developed extensively for military purposes, he reported."
- High Power Microwaves Advisory Group for Aerospace Research & Development (AGARD), Conference Proceedings 564 (14.7M PDF)
- Bioeffects of Selected Non-Lethal Weapons U.S. Army (3.7M PDF)
- High Power Microwave Technology and Effects A University of Maryland Short Course presented to MSIC Redstone Arsenal. (4.8M PDF)
- Gyrotron Caution: Wikipedia
- Active Denial System Caution: Wikipedia
- Microwave Burn Caution: Wikipedia
- Millimeter-Wave Area-Protection System and Method U.S. Patent 7,126,477 (Raytheon) (185k PDF)
- Pain Ray Fries Reporter (YouTube)
- Pain Ray Fries Troops (YouTube)
- Angry Mob Zapped by Heat Beam (YouTube)
- Active Denial System Demos (YouTube)
- CBS News: The Ray Gun in Action (YouTube) (News Story)
- Active Denial System Riot Demo (YouTube)
- GBPPR Active Denial System - Spectrum Analyzer View #1 2M167 magnetron, 1 MHz per division. Add 2.278 GHz to the displayed frequency. Multiply the current meter reading (top scale) by "100" for the magnetron's cathode current. (2M WMV)
- GBPPR Active Denial System - Spectrum Analyzer View #2 2M167 magnetron into a 50 ohm load. 0.2 MHz, then 0.5 MHz, then 1 MHz, then back to 0.2 MHz per division. Add 2.278 GHz to the displayed frequency. Multiply the current meter reading (top scale) by "100" for the magnetron's cathode current. 5 watt RF power reading is via a 20 dB directional coupler. (1.4M WMV)
- GBPPR Active Denial System - Spectrum Analyzer View #3 2M172 magnetron, 1 MHz per division. Add 2.278 GHz to the displayed frequency. Multiply the current meter reading (top scale) by "100" for the magnetron's cathode current. (2M WMV)
- GBPPR Active Denial System - Spectrum Analyzer View #4 2M258 magnetron, 1 MHz per division. Add 2.278 GHz to the displayed frequency. Multiply the current meter reading (top scale) by "100" for the magnetron's cathode current. (2M WMV)
- GBPPR Active Denial System - Spectrum Analyzer View #5 2M258 magnetron, 0.2 MHz per division. Add 2.278 GHz to the displayed frequency. Multiply the current meter reading (top scale) by "100" for the magnetron's cathode current. (1.1M WMV)
- GBPPR Active Denial System - Spectrum Analyzer View #6 2M261 magnetron, 1 MHz, then 0.5 MHz, then 0.2 MHz per division. Add 2.278 GHz to the displayed frequency. Multiply the current meter reading (top scale) by "100" for the magnetron's cathode current. (1.4M WMV)
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