Agent Staining is a technique that
involves writing a unique marker (or stain)
onto a target machine. Each stain is
visible in passively collected SIGINT
and is stamped into every packet, which
enables all the events from that stained
machine to be brought back together to
recreate a browsing session.”
  
http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  
¤ Packet Staining ::
  
http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  
¤ NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  
http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  
¤ NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  
 “We have seen several targets using Tor.
Our goal was to analyze Tor source code
and determine any vulnerabilities in
the system. We set up an internal Tor
network to analyze Tor traffic, in the
hopes of discovering ways to passively
identify it. We also worked to create
a custom Tor client which allows the
user finer control.” ... ...
  
 “This accomplishes several things.
Most basically, the Tor servers, many
of which are listed on publicly advertised
directory servers, are chosen to act as
a series of proxies. This may seem to
be excessively complex, as a single
proxy server can be used to hide one’s
location, but a single-hop proxy is
vulnerable in two ways. First, by
analyzing the pattern of the traffic
going to and from the proxy server,
it is possible to deduce which clients
are making which requests. Second, if
an attacker owns the proxy server, then
it certainly knows who is asking for what,
and anonymization is ruined. By using
multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant
to both of these attacks. Traffic analysis
becomes extraordinarily difficult, as it
must be coordinated across several machines,
and an attacker must own all the hops
along the circuit in order to trace
requests back to the originating client.”
  
... ...
  
 “In our time in the lab, we found that
running an nmap on a node that is offering
a hidden service will turn up the port
that the hidden service is using to deal
with incoming connections. It can then be
directly connected to, outside of Tor.”
  
... ...
  
 “We would have to try to connect to
each of the ports we see open on a
machine to determine if there is a
hidden service being run. We would not
even know which protocol the hidden
service is running. It may be an HTTP
server, an FTP server, an SMTP server,
etc. The only thing we know is that
the protocol must run over TCP. It is
not enough to attempt to connect once
to each port, using an HTTP GET request.
Several protocols must be tried.”
  
... ...
  
 “It may also be useful to study Tor
directory servers in more detail. Our
work focused solely on the client, but
many attacks would be much easier with
access to more Tor servers. The directory
servers ultimately control which Tor
servers are used by clients. We have found
that a server can put itself on a directory
server multiple times; all it takes is the
server running several Tor processes, each
having a different nickname, open port,
fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only
requires different configuration files
for the different processes, which are
easy to set up. That machine will handle
a disproportionate amount of traffic,
since it is listed several times. This
increases the density of friendly servers
in the cloud without increasing the number
of servers we have set up. Unfortunately,
each listing has the same IP address,
which would be very noticeable to anyone
who inspecting the directories.”
  
http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  
¤ NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  
http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  
¤ NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  
http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  

The classified files – provided previously by NSA
whistleblower Edward Snowden – contain new details
about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
agency has developed to infect potentially millions
of computers worldwide with malware “implants.” The
clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
Internet and phone networks.
  
https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf

NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  
http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm


NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  
http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf


GCHQ ROYAL CONCIERGE Diplomatic Hotel Spy ::
  
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge-de.pdf
  
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge.jpg
  
¤ GCHQ Monitors Diplomats Hotel Bookings ::
  
 Britain’s GCHQ intelligence service monitors
diplomats’ travels using a sophisticated
automated system that tracks hotel bookings.
Once a room has been identified, it opens
the door to a variety of spying options.

So the non radioactive detected constainer is made of :
Lead container with 5.7% antimony;
Paraffin wax charged with 23% barium chromate;
— Polyurethane foam;
— Borosilicate glass

on cargo : air condicioners mislead the gamma detectors

no radioactive trace can be detected by thermal sensors satellites cargo cover with kilos of wax, on the north atlantic.

There is a vessel with traces of radiocative detected by thermal satellite, coming to Europe's West Coast, belonging to a danish transportation company, that stopped in Bermudas coming from Mexico, probably get payed on offshore, hack the ship software and unbalance the cargo, so it can be dropped on the water.

I got an operation: an Eclelon agent run away from southeast asia, went with an old passaport to south africa, there was hint on the old passaport detection system; He got if from a drug mule, that got it from someone looked like him in cape town, he insisted to get payed cash for the passport on BND, he's asking for political asylim in Tadijkstan staying inside an heavy guard army building; he's supposed to having someone passing intel; two options, get inside an killing him or payed Tadjisktan, probably don't want to loose him.

Do you know what is setting up a double agent? Someone sends an email to a journalist, or several emails, telling a story about an american organization fucking south america! but the story is fake, and has no possible damage . Now she goes to the editor and he stalls the publishing wiating for the newspaper admistration clear the story! then the editor is treathd by anonimouse calls! then her laptop disseapers! so the sender is not revealed. Then the local journalist woman , on american payroll,, releases the story, and then she is hired to investigate for the local government; and so, double agent set up!

Portuguese company DEFEX, using a host of fake companies in Austria and Holland ...; and suspected role in having financed and supplied the explosives used to blow up the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992
.... Just eight days after the assassination, the vehicle used in the embassy bombing was purchased in Buenos Aires by an individual with a Portuguese accent who signed documents with a last name different from the one on his identification. Three weeks later, the embassy was in ruins

depleted uranium dioxide from Portugal

concelho de Nelas, tomaram conhecimento da existência de um stock de urânio guardado nas instalações da antiga Empresa Nacional do Urânio (ENU). Este stock, de cerca de 200 toneladas de concentrado de urânio (também chamado “yellow cake”), é o que resta das 4370 toneladas produzidas durante 50 anos nas instalações da ENU junto da antiga mina da Urgeiriça.
A existência do stock de urânio, talvez desconhecido de muita gente, originou interrogações sobre a perigosidade do material armazenado, a vulnerabilidade do local e a possibilidade de grupos terroristas dele se apossarem para fabrico de bombas atómicas artesanais a usar em hipotéticos e devastadores atentados.

depleted” uranium dioxide from Portugal ...tal como o report da CIA que conduziu à guerra do Iraque

Many other countries contributed as well; since Iraq's nuclear program in the early 1980s was officially viewed internationally as for power production, not weapons, there were no UN prohibitions against it. An Austrian company gave Iraq calutrons for enriching uranium. The nation also provided heat exchangers, tanks, condensers, and columns for the Iraqi chemical weapons infrastructure, 16% of the international sales. Singapore gave 4,515 tons of precursors for VX, sarin, tabun, and mustard gasses to Iraq. The Dutch gave 4,261 tons of precursors for sarin, tabun, mustard, and tear gasses to Iraq. Egypt gave 2,400 tons of tabun and sarin precursors to Iraq and 28,500 tons of weapons designed for carrying chemical munitions. India gave 2,343 tons of precursors to VX, tabun, Sarin, and mustard gasses. Luxembourg gave Iraq 650 tons of mustard gas precursors. Spain gave Iraq 57,500 munitions designed for carrying chemical weapons. In addition, they provided reactors, condensers, columns and tanks for Iraq’s chemical warfare program, 4.4% of the international sales. China provided 45,000 munitions designed for chemical warfare. Portugal provided yellowcake between 1980 and 1982. Niger provided yellowcake in 1981.

The Armory is an anonymous marketplace where you can buy and sell without revealing who you are. We protect your identity through every step of the process, from connecting to this site, to purchasing your items, to finally receiving them....
To get to The Armoury, you need to deploy a free piece of software called TOR.
TOR routes and reroutes your connection to the internet through a sprawling maze of encrypted nodes around the world, making it a herculean feat to find out who’s who. The Armory’s URL — ayjkg6ombrsahbx2.onion — reflects that, a garbled string of letters and numbers deliberately impossible to memorise. Once you’re actually signed in, you then have to turn to Bitcoins as mandatory currency, a further exercise in computer secrecy and complexity in itself. This ain’t exactly walking into a gun show and walking out with a pistol.

That receiving part is almost as tricky as the labyrinthine purchasing process. How exactly do you illegally ship illegal guns to potential criminals? In pieces. Small pieces. The crafty gun dealers of The Armory aren’t going to just stick an assault rifle into a manilla envelope and drop it into a local mailbox. Rather, buyers get each gun component shipped in shielded packages — disguised to look like other products — that then require self-assembly. You get your gun, the dealer gets his money, The Armory retains its secrecy, and the mail carrier doesn’t realise it’s part of an international weapons smuggling operation

http://www.gizmodo.com.au/2012/07/the-secret-online-weapons-store-that-will-sell-anyone-anything/

Portugal was also accused by US officials of exporting US-calibre artillery rounds to Iran in direct government-to-government agreements. The ammunition was produced in Portuguese factories, some of which operated on American licenses. Because the quantities were relatively small, the Portuguese claimed the deliveries would not affect the course of the war. Moreover, Portuguese officials contended with Fairbanks staffers that their sales were beneficial to the West "because they opened channels of information to Iran lacking ever since the US embassy shut down, and may have helped provide the Iranian military with an alternative to a total switchover to Soviet block weaponry."

But the Portuguese deliveries were not as small as all that. In 1984, Iran edged out Iraq as Portugal's principle arms customer. By 1985, Iran was buying ammunition worth $28 million, or 43.8% of all Portuguese arms exports. In 1986, that figure was believed to climb to 67% (8). Portugal was also known for providing fake EUC's to black marketeers trying to export US equipment to Iran.

Unconfirmed reports also alleged that Norte Importadora, acting with the full approval of the Portuguese Defense Ministry, repaired Iranian F-4 fighters using spare parts out of NATO stockpiles, and that two lots of TOW missiles were shipped to Iran from Portugal in May and December 1986. The first TOW shipment was for 4,020 missiles, at a cost to Iran estimated at $50 million, using Turkey as the fictitious end-user. 2,500 additional TOWs, worth $29 million, were shipped in December disguised as "plumbing equipment and medicine"

Meanwhile, reports in Newsweek and The Washington Post in January and February 1987 revealed that a Portuguese firm, Defex-Portugal, played a leading role in supplying arms to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. The arms were purchased by Energy Resources International, whose registered address in Vienna, Virginia coincided with an office used by General Richard Secord.