Iranian espionage at an Israeli air base (azerbeijan site)

 

Treadts (ameaças, Portugal intel)

 

DEFEX armament (Portugal intel) (??) why judge at Spain?

 Preciso de uma source para provar que a DEFEX e uma empresa portuguesa, e há qualquer coisa errado nisto! Senao é um big deal vender para Arábia Saudita (independentemente dos bribes) já é um big deal, vender peças para modernizar os carros de combate da Venezuela, contra o embargo! Eu posso vender a história a qualquer newspaper!

Spain signed €48 million in irregular arms deals with Saudi Arabia | 9 November 2018 | El Pais

An investigation by the Spanish High Court, Audiencia Nacional, into the sale of defense equipment to Saudi Arabia has confirmed the payment of bribes and illegal commissions by the public company Defex in 11 contracts signed between 2005 and 2013 worth a combined €48 million.

As exportaçoes de Portugal de armamento em 2020 foram: Pakistao 543 milhoes Nigéria 57 milhoes (=Irao) Angola 42 milhoes Arábia Saudita 40 milhoes Bangladesh 27 milhoes Roménia 46 milhoes (Portugal intel)

 

Angola-Guinea (portugal Intel)

 Angola / Guinea Case: In November 2012, Portuguese authorities identified payments of USD 2.5 million made in Portugal by a Portuguese company to an Angolan official. Portuguese authorities stated that the case involves Angolan interests in Guinea and senior political officials in two countries. The case is “complex”, “very sensitive” and “could affect international relations”. The allegations were detected through an STR in November 2012

Portugal and Iran 2011 (portugal intel)

 Plane Acquisition (Iran) Case: According to a media report, Iran attempted to purchase an airliner from a sultan of unknown nationality in 2002. A Portuguese national of Syrian origin was an intermediary in the deal. Iran claimed that the then-head of the Iranian acquisition authority was allegedly bribed, presumably by the Portuguese intermediary. The intermediary then pocketed rather than transferred the purchase money to the seller. In April 2008, a Swiss court ruled that evidence gathered pursuant to an MLA request could be transmitted to Iran. This decision was reversed on appeal in 2011. Portuguese authorities first learned about the case after they were informed by the Working Group of a media article containing the allegation. Thereafter, they interviewed an individual in Portugal who was in the business of aircraft purchases, and who stated that he had not heard of the transaction. Portuguese authorities then terminated the case because the identity of the Portuguese intermediary was unknown. They did not seek further information from Iran or Switzerland.

old submarines sold as new one's (Portugal intel)

 The 2004 EUR 1 billion Portuguese purchase of two submarines from German contractors, HowaldtswerkeDeutsche Werft, MAN Ferrostaal, and Thyssen Nordseewerk, (jointly the German Submarine Consortium), has been dogged by allegations of corruption around the main deal and the offset package, valued at EUR 1.21 billion. German executives were accused of “paying their Portuguese counterparts EUR 1 million to disguise old investments as new ones as they sought to fulfil the offset obligations”.21 The scheme is alleged to have cost the Portuguese government EUR 34 million.

http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Licence-to-Bribe-web.pdf

UN Guterres sold weapons to Irav via Chad (Portugal intel)

 ...)Ho bribed not one but two Presidents of the General Assembly, and brokered weapons not only to Chad but also Qatar, whose Al Jazeera got the exclusive of Guterres' selection as SG and after getting spoonfed by Guterres' spokesman Stephane Dujarric on June 19 collaborated to get Inner City Press roughed up and banned since by Guterres' corrupt UN. And STILL  Guterres, whose son does UNdisclosed business in Angola, Namibia, Sao Tomo and Cabo Verde, has not even started an audit, only roughed up the Press and banned it now for 93 days. From this week's filing "Evidence of Transactions with Iran The evidence of the defendant’s interest in and willingness to broker transactions in or with Iran principally consists of emails, spanning a multiple-year period. To choose a few examples (...)

http://www.innercitypress.com/aml1mashreqbankhocefc101218.html

Amanda Marshall - Dark Horse (Original)

caution (portugal intel folder)

 

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