Slope-intercept equation from graph (messiah decrypter part I)

https://www.khanacademy.org/math/algebra-home/alg-linear-eq-func/alg-writing-slope-intercept-equations/e/slope-intercept-equation-from-graph

Slope-intercept equation from graph

Problem

Find the equation of the line.
Use exact numbers.

$y=$y, equals 

$x+$x, plus 

$\small{1}$$\small{2}$$\small{3}$$\small{4}$$\small{5}$$\small{6}$$\small{7}$$\small{8}$$\small{9}$$\small{\llap{-}2}$$\small{\llap{-}3}$$\small{\llap{-}4}$$\small{\llap{-}5}$$\small{\llap{-}6}$$\small{\llap{-}7}$$\small{\llap{-}8}$$\small{\llap{-}9}$$\small{1}$$\small{2}$$\small{3}$$\small{4}$$\small{5}$$\small{6}$$\small{7}$$\small{8}$$\small{9}$$\small{\llap{-}2}$$\small{\llap{-}3}$$\small{\llap{-}4}$$\small{\llap{-}5}$$\small{\llap{-}6}$$\small{\llap{-}7}$$\small{\llap{-}8}$$\small{\llap{-}9}$$y$$x$

Stuck?

f there was a human possibility to calculate the elliptic curve on an infinite random geo space...we, would have God's encryption

MESSIAH CODE PART II 

What is the strict aliasing rule?

http://stackoverflow.com/questions/98650/what-is-the-strict-aliasing-rule

...

Before strict aliasing was introduced, the compiler had to live in a state of paranoia that the contents of buff could change at anytime from anywhere by anybody. So to get an extra performance edge, and assuming most people don't type-pun pointers, the strict aliasing rule was introduced.

Keep in mind, if you think the example is contrived, this might even happen if you're passing a buffer to another function doing the sending for you, if instead you have.

void SendMessage(uint32_t* buff, size_t size32)
{
    for (int i = 0; i < size32; ++i) 
    {
        SendWord(buff[i]);
    }
}

And rewrote our earlier loop to take advantage of this convenient function

for (int i =0; i < 10; ++i)
{
    msg->a = i;
    msg->b = i+1;
    SendMessage(buff, 2);
}

Johnny Cash - Goin' By The Book

Cylink Corporation = RSA Data Security, Inc = Emc Corporation

LINK TO IP ADRESS LIST

MooTools ...I like this Trojan Builder for the Messiah code

https://mootools.net/

MooTools uses a Class called Request.

// create a new Class instance
var myRequest = new Request({
    url: 'getMyText.php',
    method: 'get',
    onRequest: function(){
        myElement.set('text', 'loading...');
    },
    onSuccess: function(responseText){
        myElement.set('text', responseText);
    },
    onFailure: function(){
        myElement.set('text', 'Sorry, your request failed :(');
    }
});

// and to send it:
myRequest.send(data);

SANS Internet Storm Center: port 50050

Host Name    IP Address   

http://www.hcidata.info/host2ip.cgi

Joomla Extension Attacks

Our web honeypots picked up some increased exploit attempts for an old Joomla Content Editor (JCE) Extension vulnerability.

Although this vulnerability is a few years old, botnet owners are heavily scanning for sites that are vulnerable and attempting to exploit them.

Exploit Details

Here are the exploit details from the vulnerability write-up on Exploit-DB:

Web Honeypot Logs - Attack Sequence

Step 1: Attempt to Upload a PHP Webshell

The first step in this attack is to attempt to upload a webshell/backdoor file to the JCE ImageManager. Here is how the attack looked in the default Apache access_log file:

This entry shows a POST request to the ImageManager Joomla Plugin using the "com_jce" option. We can also see a tell-tale sign of a malicious program in the User-Agent string value "BOT for JCE". Unfortunately, the default Apache access_log does not actually log the critical POST payload for this request so we can not see what was sent. Fortunately, we also have our ModSecurity WAF installed so we can go to the detailed audit log file to see the complete transaction. Here is the same transaction as logged by ModSecurity:

We notice a few things here:

• Under Section "B" - We can see the POST request is "MultiPart" meaning that it is an attempt to upload a file attachment.
• Under Section "J" - we can see the meta-data about the file attachment. It was a file called "food.gif".
• Under Section "H" - we see two different rules triggered on this request. One for a missing Accept request header and one from our commercial ModSecurity rules package for the suspicious User-Agent value.

File Attachment Analysis

ModSecurity has the ability to capture and store file attachments. When we inspect the "food.gif" file, we find the following:

This is an obfuscated PHP file. After decoding, we find this section of code:

This is a typical webshell/backdoor that allows the attacker to submit OS commands and upload files:

Step 2: Rename File Extension

After uploading the webshell file, the attacker next needs to rename the file and change the file extension from ".gif" to ".php" so that it will be executed as code by the application. There are known exploit tools to achieve this task. Here is an example screenshot of a PHP exploit page:

The source code of the page shows the attack details:

The highlighted section show the JSON request body content that uses the "folderRename" action to change the uploaded file extension. This is how the actual attack attempt looked in the ModSecurity audit log file:

Note under Section H that our commercial rule captured this attack attempt.

Step 3: Access the Webshell

The last step in the attack sequence was for the attacker to try and access the webshell file:

Since the exploit attempt did not work, the honeypot returned a 404.

https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/-Honeypot-Alert--JCE-Joomla-Extension-Attacks/

Nickelback - Million Miles An Hour (Lyric Video)