Black Mask where are the "bugs" that proove Donald's Trump High Treason against the United States of America, FBI?
Thursday, November 30, 2017
This is Christian VII (29 January 1749 – 13 March 1808) was a monarch of the House of Oldenburg who was King of Denmark-Norway and Duke of Schleswig and Holstein from 1766 until his death. Do you know...what's refined sarcasm? " hristian's reign was marked by mental illness[5] which affected government decisions, and for most of his reign Christian was only nominally king. His court physicians were especially worried by his frequent masturbation."
Wednesday, November 29, 2017
According to israeli security sources, Iran by now has 7 grams of enriched uranium...too late, for doing something, if not having absolutly acquared information where it is. 7 grams oh HEU, are enought for 3 to 4 nuclear ogives. That's why the iranian espionage are so interesssted on pressure sensors, for long range missiles, american technology...and I...remember...helped them to get it.
Private Russian Connections
What Americans know about Donald Trump’s network of Russian/Former Soviet Union (FSU) connections keeps growing. A recent New Yorker report on Trump's “worst deal,” in Azerbaijan scratches the surface. A late 2016 investigative report in The American Interest by James Henry details an array of Trump's ties to an "extensive network of unsavory global underground connections that may well be unprecedented in White House history. In choosing his associates, evidently Donald Trump only pays cursory attention to questions of background, character, and integrity… Trump has also literally spent decades cultivating senior relationships of all kinds with Russia and the FSU."
The following excerpts, including two of five detailed sections from Henry’s report show a pattern of Trump stalking the wealth of Russian/FSU oligarchs amid "vulture capitalism at its worst.” Americans who want to understand what’s behind Trump’s pro-Russia bias can start by tracing his deals and relationships with mobsters, oligarchs and politically connected businessmen. —The Editors
Setting The Stage: Russian Riches and Trump’s Bankruptcies
A few of Donald Trump’s connections to oligarchs and assorted thugs have already received sporadic press—for example, former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort’s reported relationship with exiled Ukrainian oligarch Dmytro Firtash. But no one has pulled the connections together, used them to identify still more relationships, and developed an image of the overall patterns. Nor has anyone related these cases to one of the most central facts about modern Russia: its emergence since the 1990s as a world-class kleptocracy, second only to China as a source of illicit capital and criminal loot, with more than $1.3 trillion of net offshore “flight wealth” as of 2016.
This tidal wave of illicit capital is hardly just Putin’s doing. It is in fact a symptom of one of the most epic failures in modern political economy—one for which the West bears a great deal of responsibility. This is the failure, in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse in the late 1980s, to ensure that Russia acquires the kind of strong, middle-class-centric economic and political base that is required for democratic capitalism, the rule of law, and stable, peaceful relationships with its neighbors. Instead, from 1992 to the Russian debt crisis of August 1998, the West in general—and the U.S. Treasury, USAID, the State Department, the IMF/World Bank, the EBRD, and many leading economists in particular—actively promoted and, indeed, helped to finance one of the most massive transfers of public wealth into private hands that the world has ever seen.
For example, Russia’s 1992 “voucher privatization” program permitted a tiny elite of former state-owned company managers and party apparatchiksto acquire control over a vast number of public enterprises, often with the help of outright mobsters. A majority of Gazprom, the state energy company that controlled a third of the world’s gas reserves, was sold for $230 million; Russia’s entire national electric grid was privatized for $630 million; ZIL, Russia’s largest auto company, went for about $4 million; ports, ships, oil, iron and steel, aluminum, much of the high-tech arms and airlines industries, the world’s largest diamond mines, and most of Russia’s banking system also went for a song. The principal beneficiaries of this “privatization”—actually, cartelization—were initially just 25 or so budding oligarchs with the insider connections to buy these properties and the muscle to hold them.
By the late 1990s these warped policies had laid the foundations for a strong counterrevolution, including the rise of ex-KGB officer Putin and a massive outpouring of oligarchic flight capital that has continued virtually up to the present. For ordinary Russians, this was disastrous. But for many banks, private bankers, hedge funds, law firms, and accounting firms, for leading oil companies like ExxonMobil and BP, as well as for needy borrowers like the Trump Organization, the opportunity to feed on post-Soviet spoils was a godsend. This was vulture capitalism at its worst.
The nine-lived Trump had just suffered a string of six successive bankruptcies. So the massive illicit outflows from Russia and oil-rich FSU members like Kazahkstan and Azerbaijan from the mid-1990s provided precisely the kind of undiscriminating investors that he needed. These outflows arrived at just the right time to fund several of Trump’s post-2000 high-risk real estate and casino ventures—most of which failed.
As Donald Trump, Jr., executive vice president of development and acquisitions for the Trump Organization, told the Bridging U.S. and Emerging Markets Real Estate conference in Manhattan in September 2008 (on the basis, he said, of his own “half dozen trips to Russia in 18 months”):"[I]n terms of high-end product influx into the United States, Russians make up a pretty disproportionate cross-section of a lot of our assets; say in Dubai, and certainly with our project in SoHo and anywhere in New York. We see a lot of money pouring in from Russia."
All this helps to explain one of the most intriguing puzzles about Donald Trump’s long, turbulent business career: how he managed to keep financing it, despite a dismal track record of failed projects. (Campaign fact checkers count six bankruptcies, but these don’t include projects where he held minority stakes.)
According to the “official story,” this was simply due to a combination of brilliant deal-making, Trump’s gold-plated brand, and raw animal spirits—with $916 million of creative tax dodging as a kicker. But this official story is hokum. The truth is that, since the late 1990s, Trump was also greatly assisted by these abundant new sources of global finance, especially from “submerging markets” like Russia.
A Guided Tour of Trump’s Russian/FSU Connections
The following roundup of Trump’s Russo-Soviet business connections is based on published sources, interviews with former law enforcement staff and other experts in the United States, the United Kingdom and Iceland, searches of online corporate registries, and a detailed analysis of offshore company data from the Panama Papers. Given the sheer scope of Trump’s activities, there are undoubtedly other worthy cases, but our interest is in overall patterns.
Note that none of the activities and business connections related here necessarily involved criminal conduct. While several key players do have criminal records, few of their prolific business dealings have been thoroughly investigated, and of course they all deserve the presumption of innocence. Furthermore, several of these players reside in countries where activities like bribery, tax dodging, and other financial chicanery are either not illegal or are rarely prosecuted. As former British Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey once said, the difference between “legal” and “illegal” is often just “the width of a prison wall.”
So why spend time collecting and reviewing material that either doesn’t point to anything illegal or in some cases may even be impossible to verify? Because, we submit, the mere fact that such assertions are widely made is of legitimate public interest in its own right. In other words, when it comes to evaluating the probity of senior public officials, the public has the right to know about any material allegations—true, false, or, most commonly, unprovable—about their business partners and associates, so long as this information is clearly labeled as unverified.
Furthermore, the individual case-based approach to investigations employed by most investigative journalists and law enforcement often misses the big picture: the global networks of influence and finance, licit and illicit, that exist among business people, investors, kleptocrats, organized criminals, and politicians, as well as the “enablers”—banks, accounting firms, law firms, and havens. Any particular component of these networks might easily disappear without making any difference. But the networks live on. It is these shadowy transnational networks that really deserve scrutiny.
Bayrock Group LLC: Kazakhstan and Tevfik Arif
We’ll begin our tour of Trump’s Russian/FSU connections with several business relationships that evolved out of the curious case of Bayrock Group LLC, a spectacularly unsuccessful New York real estate development company that surfaced in the early 2000s and, by 2014, had all but disappeared except for a few lawsuits. As of 2007, Bayrock and its partners reportedly had more than $2 billion of Trump-branded deals in the works. But most of these either never materialized or were miserable failures, for reasons that will soon become obvious.
Bayrock’s “white elephants” included the 46-story Trump SoHo condo-hotel on Spring Street in New York City, for which the principle developer was a partnership formed by Bayrock and FL Group, an Icelandic investment company. Completed in 2010, the SoHo soon became the subject of prolonged civil litigation by disgruntled condo buyers. The building was foreclosed by creditors and resold in 2014 after more than $3 million of customer down payments had to be refunded. Similarly, Bayrock’s Trump International Hotel & Tower in Fort Lauderdale was foreclosed and resold in 2012, while at least three other Trump-branded properties in the United States, plus many other “project concepts” that Bayrock had contemplated, from Istanbul and Kiev to Moscow and Warsaw, also never happened.
Carelessness about due diligence with respect to potential partners and associates is one of Donald Trump’s more predictable qualities. Acting on the seat of the pants, he had hooked up with Bayrock rather quickly in 2005, becoming an 18 percent minority equity partner in the Trump SoHo, and agreeing to license his brand and manage the building.
Exhibit A in the panoply of former Trump business partners is Bayrock’s former Chairman, Tevfik Arif (aka Arifov), an émigré from Kazakhstan who reportedly took up residence in Brooklyn in the 1990s. Trump also had extensive contacts with another key Bayrock Russian-American from Brooklyn, Felix Sater (aka Satter), discussed below. Trump has lately had some difficulty recalling very much about either Arif or Sater. But this is hardly surprising, given what we now know about them. Trump described his introduction to Bayrock in a 2013 deposition for a lawsuit that was brought by investors in the Fort Lauderdale project, one of Trump’s first with Bayrock: “Well, we had a tenant in … Trump Tower called Bayrock, and Bayrock was interested in getting us into deals.”
According to several reports, Tevfik Arif was originally from Kazakhstan, a Soviet republic until 1992. Born in 1950, Arif worked for 17 years in the Soviet Ministry of Commerce and Trade, serving as Deputy Director of Hotel Management by the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse. In the early 1990s he relocated to Turkey, where he reportedly helped to develop properties for the Rixos Hotel chain. Not long thereafter he relocated to Brooklyn, founded Bayrock, opened an office in the Trump Tower, and started to pursue projects with Trump and other investors.
Tevfik Arif was not Bayrock’s only connection to Kazakhstan. A 2007 Bayrock investor presentation refers to Alexander Mashevich’s Eurasia Group as a strategic partner for Bayrock’s equity finance. Together with two other prominent Kazakh billionaires, Patokh Chodiev (aka Shodiyev) and Alijan Ibragimov, Mashkevich reportedly ran the Eurasian Natural Resources Cooperation. In Kazakhstan these three are sometimes referred to as “the Trio.”
The Trio has apparently worked together ever since Gorbachev’s late 1980s perestroika in metals and other natural resources. It was during this period that they first acquired a significant degree of control over Kazakhstan’s vast mineral and gas reserves. Naturally they found it useful to become friends with Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s long-time ruler. Indeed, State Department cables leaked by Wikileaks in November 2010 describe a close relationshipbetween the Trio and the seemingly perpetual Nazarbayev kleptocracy.
In any case, the Trio has recently attracted the attention of many other investigators and news outlets, including the September 11 Commission Report, the Guardian, Forbes and the Wall Street Journal. In addition to resource grabbing, the litany of the Trio’s alleged activities include money laundering, bribery and racketeering. In 2005, according to U.S. State Department cables released by Wikileaks, Chodiev (referred to in a State Department cable as Fatokh Shodiyev) was recorded on video attending the birthday of reputed Uzbek mob boss Salim Abduvaliyeva and presenting him with a $10,000 “gift” or “tribute.”
According to the Belgian newspaper Le Soir, Chodiev and Mashkevich also became close associates of a curious Russian-Canadian businessman, Boris J. Birshtein. who happens to have been the father-in-law of another key Russian-Canadian business associate of Donald Trump in Toronto. We will return to Birshtein below.
The Trio also turn up in the April 2016 Panama Papers database as the apparent beneficial owners of a Cook Islands company, International Financial Limited. The Belgian newspapers Het Laatste Nieuws, Le Soir, and La Libre Belgique have reported that Chodiev paid €23 million to obtain a Class B banking license for this same company, permitting it to make international currency trades. In the words of a leading Belgian financial regulator, that would “make all money laundering undetectable.”
The Panama Papers also indicate that some of Arif’s connections at the Rixos Hotel Group may have ties to Kazakhstan. For example, one offshore company listed in the Panama Papers database, Group Rixos Hotel, reportedly acts as an intermediary for four BVI offshore companies. Rixos Hotel’s CEO, Fettah Tamince, is listed as having been a shareholder for two of these companies, while a shareholder in another—Hazara Asset Management—had the same name as the son of a recent Kazakhstan Minister for Sports and Tourism. As of 2012, this Kazakh official was described as the third-most influential deputy in the country’s Mazhilis (the lower house of Parliament), in a Forbes-Kazakhstan article.
According to a 2015 lawsuit against Bayrock by Jody Kriss, one of its former employees, Bayrock started to receive millions of dollars in equity contributions in 2004, supposedly by way of Arif’s brother in Russia, who allegedly "had access to cash accounts at a chromium refinery in Kazakhstan.”
This as-yet-unproven allegation might well just be an attempt by the plaintiff to extract a more attractive settlement from Bayrock and its original principals. But it is also consistent with fact that chromium is indeed one of the Kazakh natural resources that is reportedly controlled by the Trio.
As for Arif, his most recent visible brush with the law came in 2010, when he and other members of Bayrock’s Eurasian Trio were arrested together in Turkey during a police raid on a suspected prostitution ring, according to the Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot.
At the time, Turkish investigators reportedly asserted that Arif might be the head of a criminal organization that was trafficking in Russian and Ukrainian escorts, allegedly including some as young as 13. According to these assertions, big-ticket clients were making their selections by way of a modeling agency website, with Arif allegedly handling the logistics. Especially galling to Turkish authorities, the preferred venue was reportedly a yacht that had once belonged to the widely revered Turkish leader Atatürk. It was also alleged that Arif may have also provided lodging for young women at Rixos Group hotels.
According to Russian media, two senior Kazakh officials were also arrested during this incident, although the Turkish Foreign Ministry quickly dismissed this allegation as "groundless." In the end, all the charges against Arif resulting from this incident were dismissed in 2012 by Turkish courts, and his spokespeople have subsequently denied all involvement.
Finally, despite Bayrock’s demise and these other legal entanglements, Arif has apparently remained active. For example, Bloomberg reports that, as of 2013, he, his son, and Rixos Hotels’ CEO Fettah Tamince had partnered to pursue the rather controversial business of advancing funds to cash-strapped high-profile soccer players in exchange for a share of their future marketing revenues and team transfer fees. In the case of Arif and his partners, this new-wave form of indentured servitude was reportedly implemented by way of a UK- and Malta-based hedge fund, Doyen Capital LLP. Because this practice is subject to innumerable potential abuses, including the possibility of subjecting athletes or clubs to undue pressure to sign over valuable rights and fees, UEFA, Europe’s governing soccer body, wants to ban it. But FIFA, the notorious global football regulator, has been customarily slow to act. To date, Doyen Capital LLP has reportedly taken financial gambles on several well-known players, including the Brazilian star Neymar.
The Case of Bayrock LLC: Felix Sater
Our second exhibit is Felix Sater, the senior Bayrock executive introduced earlier. This is the fellow who worked at Bayrock from 2002 to 2008 and negotiated several important deals with the Trump Organization and other investors. When Trump was asked who at Bayrock had brought him the Fort Lauderdale project in the 2013 deposition cited above, he replied: “It could have been Felix Sater, it could have been—I really don’t know who it might have been, but somebody from Bayrock.”
Although Sater left Bayrock in 2008, by 2010 he was reportedly back in Trump Tower as a “senior adviser” to the Trump Organization—at least on his business card—with his own office in the building.
Sater has also testified under oath that he had escorted Donald Trump, Jr. and Ivanka Trump around Moscow in 2006, had met frequently with Donald over several years, and had once flown with him to Colorado. And although this might easily have been staged, he is also reported to have visited Trump Tower in July 2016 and made a personal $5,400 contribution to Trump’s campaign.
Whatever Felix Sater has been up to recently, the key point is that by 2002, at the latest, Tevfik Arif decided to hire him as Bayrock’s COO and managing director. This was despite the fact that by then Sater had already compiled an astonishing track record as a professional criminal, with multiple felony pleas and convictions, extensive connections to organized crime, and—the ultimate prize—a virtual “get-out-of-jail-free card,” based on an informant relationship with the FBI and the CIA that is vaguely reminiscent of Whitey Bulger [the Boston-based mobster].
Sater, a Brooklyn resident like Arif, was born in Russia in 1966. He reportedlyemigrated with his family to the United States in the mid-1970s and settled in Little Odessa. It seems that his father, Mikhael Sheferovsky (aka Michael Sater), may have been engaged in Russian mob activity before he arrived in the United States. According to a certified U.S. Supreme Court petition, Felix Sater’s FBI handler stated that he “was well familiar with the crimes of Sater and his (Sater’s) father, a (Semion) Mogilevich crime syndicate boss.” A 1998 FBI reportreportedly said Mogilevich’s organization had “approximately 250 members,” and was involved in trafficking nuclear materials, weapons, and more, as well as money laundering.
But Michael Sater may have been less ambitious than his son. His only reported U.S. criminal conviction came in 2000, when he pled guilty to two felony counts for extorting Brooklyn restaurants, grocery stores, and clinics. He was released with three years’ probation. Interestingly, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York who handled that case at the time was Loretta Lynch, who succeeded Eric Holder as U.S. Attorney General in 2014. Back in 2000, she was also overseeing a budding informant relationship and a plea bargain with Michael’s son Felix, which may help to explain the father’s sentence.
By then young Felix Sater was already well on his way to a career as a prototypical Russian-American mobster. In 1991 he stabbed a commodity trader in the face with a margarita glass stem in a Manhattan bar, severing a nerve. He was convicted of a felony and sent to prison. As Trump tells it, Sater simply “got into a barroom fight, which a lot of people do.” The sentence for this felony conviction could not have been very long, because, by 1993, 27-year-old Felix was already a trader in a brand new Brooklyn-based commodity firm called White Rock Partners, an innovative joint venture among four New York crime families and the Russian mob aimed at bringing state-of-the art financial fraud to Wall Street.
Five years later, in 1998, Felix Sater pled guilty to stock racketeering, as one of 19 U.S.-and Russian mob-connected traders who participated in a $40 million “pump and dump” securities fraud scheme. Facing 20 years in Federal prison, Sater and Gennady Klotsman, a fellow Russian-American who’d been with him on the night of the Manhattan bar fight, turned snitch and helped the Department of Justice prosecute their co-conspirators. Reportedly, so did Salvatore Lauria, another “trader” involved in the scheme. According to the Jody Kriss lawsuit, Lauria later joined Bayrock as an off-the-books paid consultant. Initially their cooperation, which lasted from 1998 until at least late 2001, was kept secret, until it was inadvertently revealed in a March 2000 press release by U.S. Attorney Lynch.
Unfortunately for Sater, about the same time the NYPD also reportedly discovered that he had been running a money-laundering scheme and illicit gun sales out of a Manhattan storage locker. He and Klotsman fled to Russia. However, according to the New York Times, which cited Klotsman and Lauria, soon after 9/11, the ever-creative Sater succeeded in brokering information about the black market for Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the CIA and the FBI. According to Klotsman, this strategy “bought Felix his freedom,” allowing him to return to Brooklyn. It is still not clear precisely what information Sater actually provided, but in 2015 U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch publicly commended him for sharing information that she described as “crucial to national security."
Meanwhile, Sater’s sentence for his financial crimes continued to be deferred even after his official cooperation in that case ceased in late 2001. His files remained sealed, and he managed to avoid any sentencing for those crimes at all until October 23, 2009. When he finally appeared before the Eastern District’s Judge I. Leo Glasser, Felix received a $25,000 fine, no jail time, and no probation in a quiet proceeding that attracted no press attention. Some compared this sentence to Judge Glasser’s earlier sentence of Mafia hit man “Sammy the Bull” Gravano to 4.5 years for 19 murders, in exchange for “cooperating against John Gotti."
In any case, between 2002 and 2008, when Felix Sater finally left Bayrock LLC, and well beyond, his ability to avoid jail and conceal his criminal roots enabled him to enjoy a lucrative new career as Bayrock’s chief operating officer. In that position, he was in charge of negotiating aggressive property deals all over the planet, even while—according to lawsuits by former Bayrock investors—engaging in still more financial fraud. The only apparent difference was that he changed his name from Sater to Satter.
In the 2013 deposition cited earlier, Trump went on to say “I don’t see Felix as being a member of the Mafia.” Asked if he had any evidence for this claim, Trump conceded, “I have none.”
As for Sater’s pal Klotsman, the past few years have not been kind. As of December 2016 he is in a Russian penal colony, working off a 10-year sentence for a failed $2.8 million Moscow diamond heist in August 2010. In 2016 Klotsman was reportedly placed on a “top-ten list” of Americans that the Russians were willing to exchange for high-value Russian prisoners in U.S. custody, like the infamous arms dealer Viktor Bout. So far there have been no takers. But with Donald Trump as president, who knows?
The Case of 'Well-Connected' Russia/FSU Mobsters
Other interesting Russian/FSU connections have a more residential flavor, but they are a source of very important leads about the Trump network.
Indeed, partly because it has no prying co-op board, Trump Tower in New York has received press attention for including among its many honest residents tax-dodgers, bribers, arms dealers, convicted cocaine traffickers, and corrupt former FIFA officials.
One typical example involves the alleged Russian mobster Anatoly Golubchik, who went to prison in 2014 for running an illegal gambling ring out of Trump Tower—not only the headquarters of the Trump Organization but also the former headquarters of Bayrock Group LLC. This operation reportedly took up the entire 51st floor. Also reportedly involved in it was the alleged mobster Alimzhan Tokhtakhounov, who has the distinction of making the Forbes 2008 list of the World’s Ten Most Wanted Criminals, and whose organization the FBI believes to be tied to Mogilevich’s [another notorious Russian mobster]. Even as this gambling ring was still operating in Trump Tower, Tokhtakhounov reportedly traveled to Moscow to attend Donald Trump’s 2013 Miss Universe contest as a special VIP.
Read James Henry's full report on TheAmericanInterest.com.
"Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton facilitated the transfer a highly enriched uranium (HEU) previously confiscated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) during a 2006 “nuclear smuggling sting operation involving one Russian national and several Georgian accomplices,” a newly leaked classified cable shows..."
ALERTING GOR OF DELIVERY OF SEIZED HEU DURING SEPTEMBER 21 FBI DIRECTOR'S TRIP TO MOSCOW
2009 AMBASSADOR BEYRLE E-MAIL D. 08 MOSCOW 521 Classified By: EUR/PRA: KATHLEEN MORENSKI PER E.O. 12958: REASONS 1.4 (A) AND (G). 1. (SBU) This is an action request: Embassy Moscow please see para 6 and 7; and Embassy Tbilisi please see para 8. 2. (S/NF) Background: Over two years ago Russia requested a ten-gram sample of highly enriched uranium (HEU) seized in early 2006 in Georgia during a nuclear smuggling sting operation involving one Russian national and several Georgian accomplices. The seized HEU was transferred to U.S. custody and is being held at a secure DOE facility. In response to the Russian request, the Georgian Government authorized the United States to share a sample of the material with the Russians for forensic analysis. Director Mueller previously planned to deliver the sample in April (Ref A), but due to a scheduling conflict the trip was canceled. Embassy Moscow LegAtt informed the FSB prior to Mueller's intended April delivery and received confirmation that the FSB would take custody of the sample after the Director's plane landed. EST Moscow also informed Rosatom of the planned transfer and that the U.S. placed a high priority on completing this transfer (Ref B). Once the LegAtt told FSB counterparts the April trip had been canceled, Ambassador Beyrle informed Igor Neverov (Ref C), who said that he understood but was disappointed the trip was postponed. The September 21 visit provides again an opportunity to deliver the requested ten-gram sample from the seized HEU in order to obtain cooperation from the GOR on this nuclear smuggling case and to eventually establish a more productive mechanism of U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear forensics. 3. (S/NF) While there was a reasonable exchange of information with Russian security services at the time of the 2006 seizure, we have had poor cooperation investigating the diversion of HEU, which the United States believes was stolen from a Russian facility. Russia did not respond to papers that then Acting U/S Rood provided Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov in December 2008 reiterating the USG position that Russia should pick up this sample in the United States. Further, when asked for an update on their response to our proposal, Ryabkov told us in early 2009 in Washington that there was an interagency dispute over who would come and pick up the material. 4. (S/NF) Given Russia's reluctance to act so far, FBI Mueller's delivery of this sample will underscore to Russia our commitment to follow through on this case. While some details related to the sharing of information on smuggling networks may be too sensitive to discuss, delivery of the sample could enable us to discuss whether Russian authorities investigated the diversion and prosecuted anyone. Moreover, we hope it will spark discussions on mechanisms to exchange information and material on future incidents of this nature, particularly in light of the commitments made in the July summit U.S.-Russia Joint Statement on Nuclear Cooperation regarding strengthening our cooperation to stop acts of nuclear terrorism. Posts should note that DOE/NNSA's April 2009 determination authorizing distribution of the sample to the Russian Federation only for attribution of the sample in support of a criminal investigation is applicable to the proposed September 21 delivery of the sample to Russia. 5. (S/Rel Russia) Background con't: On April 16, the FSB verbally confirmed to Legatt that we will have no problem with the Russian Ministry of Aviation concerning Mueller's flight (although we probably won't see paperwork until shortly before the trip). The FBI is requiring that the sample be turned over to a Russian law enforcement authority (i.e., FSB) as opposed to an intelligence service (i.e., SVR) or technical authority (i.e., Rosatom). A representative from the responsible Russian Law Enforcement authority, who will accept custody of the sample, must be identified and verified ahead of time. That individual will be required to have signatory authority to accept the sample. Appropriate arrangements need to be made to ensure the transfer of material is conducted at the airport, plane-side, upon arrival of the Director's aircraft. Post should also remind the GOR that this is the material about which the GOR gave the USG nonproliferation assurances in 2008 in a diplomatic note from February 2008 (Ref D). 6. (S/Rel Russia) Action request: Embassy Moscow is requested to alert at the highest appropriate level the Russian Federation that FBI Director Mueller plans to deliver the HEU sample once he arrives to Moscow on September 21. Post is requested to convey information in paragraph 5 with regard to chain of custody, and to request details on Russian Federation's plan for picking up the material. Embassy is also requested to reconfirm the April 16 understanding from the FSB verbally that we will have no problem with the Russian Ministry of Aviation concerning Mueller's September 21 flight clearance. 7. (S/Rel Russia) Post is requested to deliver the following talking points: --We wish to inform you that FBI Director Mueller plans to arrive in Moscow on the evening of September 21 with a ten-gram sample of seized HEU, which you requested for nuclear forensics analysis. --We regret that the April visit by Director Mueller could not take place due to a scheduling conflict. We would be grateful once again for the Russian Federation's willingness to receive the sample and facilitate the logistics for its pick up. --As before, we require confirmation that a representative from a responsible Russian law enforcement authority will be available to accept custody of the sample and have signatory authority to accept the sample. --We require that the transfer of this material be conducted at the airport, on the tarmac near by the plane, upon arrival of the Director's aircraft. --We place a high priority on completion of this sample transfer to facilitate your forensic analysis of the material. --Further, with the delivery of this sample, we hope to collaborate more closely on promoting a more effective relationship between our law enforcement organizations to counter illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. --In particular, such efforts were underscored in the July Summit joint presidential statement on nuclear cooperation regarding our commitments to strengthen cooperation to stop acts of nuclear terrorism. Securing vulnerable nuclear materials and improving nuclear security within our two countries is our highest priority. -- It is our hope to eventually establish a more systematic mechanism to facilitate U.S.-Russian cooperation on investigations into nuclear smuggling cases. We continue to believe that Russia should be concerned by the prospect that HEU was diverted from one of its facilities, and should actively investigate the incident. 8. (S/Rel Georgia) For Embassy Tbilisi: No action is required at this point. As before, State will send instructions at the appropriate time on alerting the Georgian Government when the transfer of the seized HEU is immanent and in Russian custody. 9. (U) Department thanks Post for its assistance. Washington point of contacts are Mike Curry, ISN/WMDT, 202-736-7692 (CurryMR@state.sgov.gov) and Nate Young, EUR/PRA, 202-647-7278 (YoungNH@state.sgov.gov). Please slug all responses for EUR, ISN/WMDT, and T. CLINTON
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE85588_a.html
2009 AMBASSADOR BEYRLE E-MAIL D. 08 MOSCOW 521 Classified By: EUR/PRA: KATHLEEN MORENSKI PER E.O. 12958: REASONS 1.4 (A) AND (G). 1. (SBU) This is an action request: Embassy Moscow please see para 6 and 7; and Embassy Tbilisi please see para 8. 2. (S/NF) Background: Over two years ago Russia requested a ten-gram sample of highly enriched uranium (HEU) seized in early 2006 in Georgia during a nuclear smuggling sting operation involving one Russian national and several Georgian accomplices. The seized HEU was transferred to U.S. custody and is being held at a secure DOE facility. In response to the Russian request, the Georgian Government authorized the United States to share a sample of the material with the Russians for forensic analysis. Director Mueller previously planned to deliver the sample in April (Ref A), but due to a scheduling conflict the trip was canceled. Embassy Moscow LegAtt informed the FSB prior to Mueller's intended April delivery and received confirmation that the FSB would take custody of the sample after the Director's plane landed. EST Moscow also informed Rosatom of the planned transfer and that the U.S. placed a high priority on completing this transfer (Ref B). Once the LegAtt told FSB counterparts the April trip had been canceled, Ambassador Beyrle informed Igor Neverov (Ref C), who said that he understood but was disappointed the trip was postponed. The September 21 visit provides again an opportunity to deliver the requested ten-gram sample from the seized HEU in order to obtain cooperation from the GOR on this nuclear smuggling case and to eventually establish a more productive mechanism of U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear forensics. 3. (S/NF) While there was a reasonable exchange of information with Russian security services at the time of the 2006 seizure, we have had poor cooperation investigating the diversion of HEU, which the United States believes was stolen from a Russian facility. Russia did not respond to papers that then Acting U/S Rood provided Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov in December 2008 reiterating the USG position that Russia should pick up this sample in the United States. Further, when asked for an update on their response to our proposal, Ryabkov told us in early 2009 in Washington that there was an interagency dispute over who would come and pick up the material. 4. (S/NF) Given Russia's reluctance to act so far, FBI Mueller's delivery of this sample will underscore to Russia our commitment to follow through on this case. While some details related to the sharing of information on smuggling networks may be too sensitive to discuss, delivery of the sample could enable us to discuss whether Russian authorities investigated the diversion and prosecuted anyone. Moreover, we hope it will spark discussions on mechanisms to exchange information and material on future incidents of this nature, particularly in light of the commitments made in the July summit U.S.-Russia Joint Statement on Nuclear Cooperation regarding strengthening our cooperation to stop acts of nuclear terrorism. Posts should note that DOE/NNSA's April 2009 determination authorizing distribution of the sample to the Russian Federation only for attribution of the sample in support of a criminal investigation is applicable to the proposed September 21 delivery of the sample to Russia. 5. (S/Rel Russia) Background con't: On April 16, the FSB verbally confirmed to Legatt that we will have no problem with the Russian Ministry of Aviation concerning Mueller's flight (although we probably won't see paperwork until shortly before the trip). The FBI is requiring that the sample be turned over to a Russian law enforcement authority (i.e., FSB) as opposed to an intelligence service (i.e., SVR) or technical authority (i.e., Rosatom). A representative from the responsible Russian Law Enforcement authority, who will accept custody of the sample, must be identified and verified ahead of time. That individual will be required to have signatory authority to accept the sample. Appropriate arrangements need to be made to ensure the transfer of material is conducted at the airport, plane-side, upon arrival of the Director's aircraft. Post should also remind the GOR that this is the material about which the GOR gave the USG nonproliferation assurances in 2008 in a diplomatic note from February 2008 (Ref D). 6. (S/Rel Russia) Action request: Embassy Moscow is requested to alert at the highest appropriate level the Russian Federation that FBI Director Mueller plans to deliver the HEU sample once he arrives to Moscow on September 21. Post is requested to convey information in paragraph 5 with regard to chain of custody, and to request details on Russian Federation's plan for picking up the material. Embassy is also requested to reconfirm the April 16 understanding from the FSB verbally that we will have no problem with the Russian Ministry of Aviation concerning Mueller's September 21 flight clearance. 7. (S/Rel Russia) Post is requested to deliver the following talking points: --We wish to inform you that FBI Director Mueller plans to arrive in Moscow on the evening of September 21 with a ten-gram sample of seized HEU, which you requested for nuclear forensics analysis. --We regret that the April visit by Director Mueller could not take place due to a scheduling conflict. We would be grateful once again for the Russian Federation's willingness to receive the sample and facilitate the logistics for its pick up. --As before, we require confirmation that a representative from a responsible Russian law enforcement authority will be available to accept custody of the sample and have signatory authority to accept the sample. --We require that the transfer of this material be conducted at the airport, on the tarmac near by the plane, upon arrival of the Director's aircraft. --We place a high priority on completion of this sample transfer to facilitate your forensic analysis of the material. --Further, with the delivery of this sample, we hope to collaborate more closely on promoting a more effective relationship between our law enforcement organizations to counter illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. --In particular, such efforts were underscored in the July Summit joint presidential statement on nuclear cooperation regarding our commitments to strengthen cooperation to stop acts of nuclear terrorism. Securing vulnerable nuclear materials and improving nuclear security within our two countries is our highest priority. -- It is our hope to eventually establish a more systematic mechanism to facilitate U.S.-Russian cooperation on investigations into nuclear smuggling cases. We continue to believe that Russia should be concerned by the prospect that HEU was diverted from one of its facilities, and should actively investigate the incident. 8. (S/Rel Georgia) For Embassy Tbilisi: No action is required at this point. As before, State will send instructions at the appropriate time on alerting the Georgian Government when the transfer of the seized HEU is immanent and in Russian custody. 9. (U) Department thanks Post for its assistance. Washington point of contacts are Mike Curry, ISN/WMDT, 202-736-7692 (CurryMR@state.sgov.gov) and Nate Young, EUR/PRA, 202-647-7278 (YoungNH@state.sgov.gov). Please slug all responses for EUR, ISN/WMDT, and T. CLINTON
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE85588_a.html
welcome ! "Who knew that the FBI, too, engaged the services of Spook Steele to continue gathering dirt on Trump? Did that work provide the rationale for the Obama Administration’s going to the FISA Court to get authorization to bug Trump’s associates? What about Robert Mueller? He was head of the FBI when that storied agency was prevailed upon not to announce it was investigating the Russian company that acquired Uranium One, and thereby some 20 percent of U.S. Uranium assets, back when Hillary Clinton was secretary of state and Barack Obama was still pursuing his “reset” with Russia. What’s going on there? And the $140 million (give or take) that found its way into the coffers of the Clinton Foundation around the time of that transfer? Or the $500,000 speaking fee for a short speech by Bill Clinton, paid by a Russian bank working for the Russian company acquiring Uranium One? What about that?"
Monday, November 27, 2017
high secret "most wanted" list - not FBI or Interpol bullshit "This case involving a scheme to sell pressure transducers, usable in gas centrifuge plants, through a Chinese subsidiary of an American company is even more relevant in light of yesterday’s sanctioning by the U.S. government of several Chinese companies associated with serial missile goods and materials proliferator Karl Li ...charges against Sihai Cheng, a resident of Shanghai, for allegedly operating as a middleman seeking U.S. made pressure transducers on behalf of Iran’s nuclear program. Cheng allegedly carried out this activity from 2009 to 2012, using his trading company Sohi Technology Co. Ltd and its locations in Shanghai and Hong Kong...Another Chinese middleman, Qiang Hu, schemed during 2007 to 2012 to facilitate the purchase of pressure transducers likely for Iran’s and other countries’ nuclear programs..."
darling futile milionaire Donald Trump and their friends and ridicoulese barbies...and nuclear smuggling business Wikileaks has released a classified US State Department from 2009 that appears to prove Special Counsel Robert Mueller, head of the Trump/Russia probe, once supplied the Russians with nuclear material.
ExxonMobil did business with Iran, Syria and Sudan through a European subsidiary while President-elect Donald Trump’s nominee for secretary of State was a top executive of the oil giant and those countries were under U.S. sanctions as state sponsors of terrorism, Securities and Exchange Commission filings show. That business connection is likely to surface Wednesday at a confirmation hearing for ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The sales were conducted in 2003, 2004 and 2005 by Infineum, in which ExxonMobil owned a 50% share, according to SEC documents unearthed by American Bridge, a Democratic research group. ExxonMobil told USA TODAY the transactions were legal because Infineum, a joint venture with Shell Corporation, was based in Europe and the transactions did not involve any U.S. employees. The filings, from 2006, show that the company had $53.2 million in sales to Iran, $600,000 in sales to Sudan and $1.1 million in sales to Syria during those three years. Who is Rex Tillerson, Trump's secretary of State pick? Secretary of State nominee Rex Tillerson's ties to Russia worry GOP, too
welcome ! " In March 2007, Ravan and the co-conspirators at Corezing agreed on a purchase price of $86,750 for 50 cavity-backed antennas from the United States and discussed structuring payment from Ravan to his Corezing co-conspirators in a manner that would avoid transactional delays caused by the Iran embargo. Ultimately, between July and September 2007, a total of 50 cavity-backed spiral antennas and five biconical antennas were exported from the United States to Corezing in Singapore and Hong Kong." The best I can do for you, no acquared patents available .
An IFM Receiver on a Single PCB
Calculator-size instantaneous frequency measurement (IFM) units, including digital frequency and phase/frequency discriminators
Instantaneous frequency measurement (IFM) devices traditionally have been large, cumbersome assemblies comprising multiple PCBs with the RF sections, and analog and digital circuitry located on separate boards. This configuration is both complicated and costly, and results in large and expensive receiver systems. The new Micro series digital frequency discriminators (DFD) are calculator-sized units that are essentially IFM units on a single PCB. In addition, the new Micro series phase/frequency discriminators (PFD) add a phase measurement capability. These revolutionary new products implement the latest digital, analog and RF technology solution (DARTS) packaging to offer a major reduction in size, weight and power consumption over conventionally built units. The DARTS packaging functionally integrates the RF and digital portions of the product onto a single, multilayer laminated PCB assembly. The result is a compact, lightweight, low cost subassembly that provides 8 bits of frequency and 8 bits of phase discrimination on a pulse-by-pulse basis over a 512 MHz operating bandwidth from UHF to 6 GHz. In addition, programmable read-only memory (PROM) components enable frequency and phase calibration and correction, eliminating the need for costly phase matching of interconnect cables.
The DFD
The model 18 5000 DFD is an 8-bit IFM with 2 MHz of resolution covering a 150 to 550 MHz input frequency range. Figure 1 shows the DFD's basic block diagram. The unit comprises a multilayer laminated assembly combining the RF, digital and analog circuitry, as shown in Figure 2 . The RF portion is a multilayer stripline assembly containing surface-mount, blind-mate coaxial connectors, an RF power divider, a reference line, a 2 ns delay line, embedded layer-to-layer interconnects, phase discriminators and detector diodes.
The model 18 5000 DFD is an 8-bit IFM with 2 MHz of resolution covering a 150 to 550 MHz input frequency range. Figure 1 shows the DFD's basic block diagram. The unit comprises a multilayer laminated assembly combining the RF, digital and analog circuitry, as shown in Figure 2 . The RF portion is a multilayer stripline assembly containing surface-mount, blind-mate coaxial connectors, an RF power divider, a reference line, a 2 ns delay line, embedded layer-to-layer interconnects, phase discriminators and detector diodes.
The RF input is received through the RF input connector, distributed through the stripline layers and converted to baseband through recessed detector diodes installed directly on the stripline layer. This configuration allows the RF to be totally enclosed within the plated RF assembly and eliminates the need for additional shielding or isolation.
The analog/digital (A/D) section comprises eight PCB layers and is bonded directly to the RF section. The detected in-phase/quadrature (I/Q) differential video signals are fed to the A/D section through plated-through holes, and are passed through video amplification, filtering and, finally, to patented 8-bit ring digitizers. The ring digitizer is an application-specific IC developed to convert I/Q information directly to a digital phase word by comparing the relative amplitudes of the I/Q signals. Because this digitizer measures the I/Q ratio, it is insensitive to absolute voltage levels and, thus, provides good linearity in the presence of a varying RF input. The result is a single-chip solution for converting I/Q information to an 8-bit digital phase word without the need for a voltage reference circuit or video scaling and offset circuits. The 8-bit uncorrected phase word is brought to the output connector within 50 ns of the A/D strobe, and also is fed to the flash PROM on the card. This step permits calibration and correction, and is in-system programmable to allow for correction of errors at the system level.
The entire assembly measures 3.00" x 4.00" x 0.75" and dissipates less than 1 W. The addition of a limiting amplifier increases the dynamic range to –60 to +5 dBm and increases the power consumption to 2 W.
The DARTS process allows the devices to be fabricated as panels and uses low cost microwave materials for volume production. This technique coupled with the custom ring digitizer and the use of industrial-grade standard components provide an order-of-magnitude reduction in cost over conventional IFM products.
By scaling the RF components, the RF section can be modified to operate anywhere in the 2 to 6 GHz frequency band. The model 18 5100 DFD operates unambiguously over any 512 MHz band in the 2 to 6 GHz frequency range. Since the output first is corrected through a flash PROM, it can be programmed to start at cell zero at any user-specified frequency. This modification is performed at the point of manufacture prior to shipment or changed in the system by the user through the data connector. Frequencies up to 18 GHz are possible.
By adding another channel with an 8 ns RF delay line, a 10-bit frequency word with 0.5 MHz resolution is generated as in the models 18 
A5000 and 18 A5100, shown in Figure 3 . This configuration provides increased frequency measurement accuracy to 1 MHz RMS and increased frequency resolution.
A5000 and 18 A5100, shown in Figure 3 . This configuration provides increased frequency measurement accuracy to 1 MHz RMS and increased frequency resolution.
The PFD
Since the heart of the IFM is the phase discriminator, which, essentially, is a quadrature IF mixer (QIFM), the logical offshoot of the single-channel Micro DFD is a single-channel phase discriminator or QIFM. When used as a phase discriminator, the input cables must be phase matched to eliminate a phase slope with frequency. If the input frequency is known, the phase slope can be calibrated out.
Since the heart of the IFM is the phase discriminator, which, essentially, is a quadrature IF mixer (QIFM), the logical offshoot of the single-channel Micro DFD is a single-channel phase discriminator or QIFM. When used as a phase discriminator, the input cables must be phase matched to eliminate a phase slope with frequency. If the input frequency is known, the phase slope can be calibrated out.
A slight modification of the RF section of the two-channel, 10-bit IFM produces a PFD that provides both phase and frequency information. 
The reference-side RF input is split internally into two paths; one directed to a single-channel IFM that provides 8 bits of frequency determination (2 MHz resolution), and the other directed to the reference side of the phase discriminator, as shown inFigure 4 . The phase discriminator measures the phase difference between its inputs, producing output-detected video voltages that vary in amplitude as a function of the sine and cosine of the input phase difference. These voltages are fed to a ring digitizer that provides an 8-bit digital phase word in a single chip. By combining the frequency and phase words in a correction PROM, the phase can be calibrated in the system as a function of frequency. This process eliminates the need for phase matching the RF input cables, and compensates for any offset or slope that occurs across phase or frequency. Table 1 lists the DFD and PFD models and their key specifications.
The reference-side RF input is split internally into two paths; one directed to a single-channel IFM that provides 8 bits of frequency determination (2 MHz resolution), and the other directed to the reference side of the phase discriminator, as shown inFigure 4 . The phase discriminator measures the phase difference between its inputs, producing output-detected video voltages that vary in amplitude as a function of the sine and cosine of the input phase difference. These voltages are fed to a ring digitizer that provides an 8-bit digital phase word in a single chip. By combining the frequency and phase words in a correction PROM, the phase can be calibrated in the system as a function of frequency. This process eliminates the need for phase matching the RF input cables, and compensates for any offset or slope that occurs across phase or frequency. Table 1 lists the DFD and PFD models and their key specifications.
Table I
Key Specification | ||||||
Model
|
18 5010
|
18 5020
|
18 5000
|
18 5100
|
18 A5000
|
18 A5100
|
Type
|
PFD
|
PFD
|
DFD
|
DFD
|
DFD
|
DFD
|
Operating Frequency (GHz)
|
0.15 to 0.55
|
2.00 to 6.00
|
0.15 to 0.55
|
2.00 to 6.00
|
0.15 to 0.55
|
2.00 to 6.00
|
Pulse Width (min) (ns)
|
50
|
50
|
50
|
50
|
50
|
50
|
Dynamic Range* (dBm)
| ||||||
(min)
|
8
|
8
|
5
|
5
|
8
|
8
|
(max)
|
12
|
12
|
9
|
9
|
12
|
12
|
Signal Noise (dB min)
|
10
|
10
|
10
|
10
|
10
|
10
|
Frequency Measurement
| ||||||
Un
ambiguous (MHz) |
512
|
512
|
512
|
512
|
512
|
512
|
Data valid bit
|
yes
|
yes
|
yes
|
yes
|
yes
|
yes
|
Number of bits
|
8
|
8
|
8
|
8
|
10
|
10
|
Resolution (MHz)
|
2.0
|
2.0
|
2.0
|
2.0
|
0.5
|
0.5
|
Accuracy (MHz) RMS
|
4
|
4
|
4
|
4
|
1
|
1
|
Phase Measurement
| ||||||
Un ambiguous phase (º)
|
0 to 360
|
0 to 360
|
No Phase Measurement
| |||
Number of bits
|
8
|
8
| ||||
Resolution (º)
|
1.4
|
1.4
| ||||
Accuracy (º) RMS
|
2.8
|
2.8
| ||||
External Read
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Temp (ºC)
|
-20 to 70
|
-20 to 70
|
-20 to 70
|
-20 to 70
|
-20 to 70
|
-20 to 70
|
Dimensions(")
|
6.00x4.00x 0.75
|
6.00x4.00x 0.75
|
3.00x4.00x 0.75
|
3.00x4.00x 0.75
|
6.00x4.00x 0.75
|
6.00x4.00x 0.75
|
Weight (lb)
|
0.5
|
0.5
|
0.3
|
0.3
|
0.5
|
0.5
|
Power Cons. (W)
|
2
|
2
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
2
|
*Increased dynamic range of -60 to +5 dBm is available on all DFD types
| ||||||
Additional Applications 
Since the phase discriminator essentially is a QIFM, the PFD can be used as a digital phase receiver, as shown in Figure 5 . In this case, the digital frequency output is used to tune an LO to within 10 MHz of the input frequency, which generates an IF at the difference frequency. This signal then can be sampled at a 20 MHz clock rate, which provides phase samples every 50 ns. If this bit stream is monitored over long pulses or over several pulses, the phase data stream can be processed to measure the difference frequency to a very fine resolution (approximately 1/(256 x observation time)). For example, for a 1 ms pulse, the frequency can be measured to a 4 kHz resolution, and 1 Hz resolution can be obtained for a 4 ms observation time.
Since the phase discriminator essentially is a QIFM, the PFD can be used as a digital phase receiver, as shown in Figure 5 . In this case, the digital frequency output is used to tune an LO to within 10 MHz of the input frequency, which generates an IF at the difference frequency. This signal then can be sampled at a 20 MHz clock rate, which provides phase samples every 50 ns. If this bit stream is monitored over long pulses or over several pulses, the phase data stream can be processed to measure the difference frequency to a very fine resolution (approximately 1/(256 x observation time)). For example, for a 1 ms pulse, the frequency can be measured to a 4 kHz resolution, and 1 Hz resolution can be obtained for a 4 ms observation time.
If a log amplifier is added in front of the PFD's reference input, amplitude information can be added to the phase information to generate an R, q representation of the input signal. By analyzing the phase and amplitude data together, a complex representation of the input signal can be generated that allows a wide range of parameters to be extracted, which is useful for signal analysis and characterization. A variation of this technique digitizes the I/Q signals independently, providing a complex measurement by outputting an I/Q or real and imaginary data stream.
ConclusionThe low cost and small size of these new DFDs and PFDs introduce several new areas of applications. Channelized receivers are more attractive because the Micro DFD provides a low cost IFM device that can be applied to each channel. The unit also can be used to measure frequency for setting the frequency of a digitally controlled LO or to fine tune a digitally controlled frequency source. What was once a complex and costly system block now is an easy-to-utilize component that can be incorporated by the system and subsystem designer.
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Satellite hacking Intel 1 (BACK@WAR CyberArmy friends let´s start Satellite GPS navigation hack IT WILL HV A PRICE)
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/63010812/how-to-access-http-port-5001-from-public-internet
