Friday, May 5, 2017

It's not possible for an app to send/receive ICMP Echo Requests on Android. (Maybe there is a way on rooted devices)....you can use UDP broad/multicast messages instead



APP 

-UDP Sender / Receiver is a simple utility application that allows you to send UDP datagrams to another client (perhaps to another instance of this application running on another device) or allows you to just listen for UDP packets. Messages can be sent as either ASCII or HEX.

-There are two modes the application can run in, Send / Receive or Receive only. Send / Receive allows you to send UDP datagrams and if selected, to listen for a response based on the timeout you set. Receive only listens indefinitely for UDP packets and outputs the result in the response section. 

-Big advantage not found in other UDP applications is that it allows you to specify the local port to bind to. This is useful if you are trying to diagnosis NAT problems (Full Cone Nat, Port Restricted NAT or Symmetric NAT).

-Outputs the sender (destination) IP the datagram was received from. Outputs the sender (destination) port the datagram was received from as well. This is useful to diagnosis NAT problems.

-Gets and displays your local IP by clicking the overflow action item and clicking 'My IP Address'.

-saves the local port, remote ip and remote port to the application's preferences.


UDP Sender / Receiver

PEGI 3 PEGI 3
Contém anúncios
Esta aplicação é compatível com o seu dispositivo.
 

Imagine you have an Alcatel OneTouch and you want to send messages that the "system" won't ever cache : 3 scams

With the multitude of modern firewalls and IDS’ now looking out for SYN scans, these three scan types may be useful to varying degrees. Each scan type refers to the flags set in the TCP header. The idea behind these type of scans is that a closed port should respond with an RST upon receiving packets, whereas an open port should just drop them (it’s listening for packets with SYN set). This way, you never make even part of a connection, and never send a SYN packet; which is what most IDS’ look out for.
The FIN scan sends a packet with only the FIN flag set, the Xmas Tree scan sets the FIN, URG and PUSH flags (see a good TCP/IP book for more details) and the Null scan sends a packet with no flags switched on.
These scan types will work against any system where the TCP/IP implementation follows RFC 793. Microsoft Windows does not follow the RFC, and will ignore these packets even on closed ports. This technicality allows you to detect an MS Windows system by running SYN along with one of these scans. If the SYN scan shows open ports, and the FIN/NUL/XMAS does not, chances are you’re looking at a Windows box (though OS Fingerprinting is a much more reliable way of determining the OS running on a target!)
The sample below shows a SYN scan and a FIN scan, performed against a Linux system. The results are, predictably, the same, but the FIN scan is less likely to show up in a logging system.
 1 [chaos]# nmap -sS 127.0.0.1
   2
   3 Starting Nmap 4.01 at 2006-07-06 17:23 BST
   4 Interesting ports on chaos (127.0.0.1):
   5 (The 1668 ports scanned but not shown below are in state:
   6         closed)
   7 PORT     STATE SERVICE
   8 21/tcp   open  ftp
   9 22/tcp   open  ssh
  10 631/tcp  open  ipp
  11 6000/tcp open  X11
  12
  13 Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.207
  14         seconds
  15 [chaos]# nmap -sF 127.0.0.1
  16
  17 Starting Nmap 4.01 at 2006-07-06 17:23 BST
  18 Interesting ports on chaos (127.0.0.1):
  19 (The 1668 ports scanned but not shown below are in state:
  20         closed)
  21 PORT     STATE         SERVICE
  22 21/tcp   open|filtered ftp
  23 22/tcp   open|filtered ssh
  24 631/tcp  open|filtered ipp
  25 6000/tcp open|filtered X11
  26
  27 Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1.284
  28         seconds

Ping Scan [-sP]

This scan type lists the hosts within the specified range that responded to a ping. It allows you to detect which computers are online, rather than which ports are open. Four methods exist within Nmap for ping sweeping. The first method sends an ICMP ECHO REQUEST (ping request) packet to the destination system. If an ICMP ECHO REPLY is received, the system is up, and ICMP packets are not blocked. If there is no response to the ICMP ping, Nmap will try a “TCP Ping”, to determine whether ICMP is blocked, or if the host is really not online. A TCP Ping sends either a SYN or an ACK packet to any port (80 is the default) on the remote system. If RST, or a SYN/ACK, is returned, then the remote system is online. If the remote system does not respond, either it is offline, or the chosen port is filtered, and thus not responding to anything. When you run an Nmap ping scan as root, the default is to use the ICMP and ACK methods. Non-root users will use the connect() method, which attempts to connect to a machine, waiting for a response, and tearing down the connection as soon as it has been established (similar to the SYN/ACK method for root users, but this one establishes a full TCP connection!) The ICMP scan type can be disabled by setting -P0 (that is, zero, not uppercase o).

UDP Scan [-sU]

Scanning for open UDP ports is done with the -sU option. With this scan type, Nmap sends 0-byte UDP packets to each target port on the victim. Receipt of an ICMP Port Unreachable message signifies the port is closed, otherwise it is assumed open. One major problem with this technique is that, when a firewall blocks outgoing ICMP Port Unreachable messages, the port will appear open. These false-positives are hard to distinguish from real open ports. Another disadvantage with UDP scanning is the speed at which it can be performed. Most operating systems limit the number of ICMP Port Unreachable messages which can be generated in a certain time period, thus slowing the speed of a UDP scan. Nmap adjusts its scan speed accordingly to avoid flooding a network with useless packets. An interesting point to note here is that Microsoft do not limit the Port Unreachable error generation frequency, and thus it is easy to scan a Windows machine’s 65,535 UDP Ports in very little time!! UDP Scanning is not usually useful for most types of attack, but it can reveal information about services or trojans which rely on UDP, for example SNMP, NFS, the Back Orifice trojan backdoor and many other exploitable services. Most modern services utilise TCP, and thus UDP scanning is not usually included in a pre-attack information gathering exercise unless a TCP scan or other sources indicate that it would be worth the time taken to perform a UDP scan.

7  IP Protocol Scans [-sO]

The IP Protocol Scans attempt to determine the IP protocols supported on a target. Nmap sends a raw IP packet without any additional protocol header (see a good TCP/IP book for information about IP packets), to each protocol on the target machine. Receipt of an ICMP Protocol Unreachable message tells us the protocol is not in use, otherwise it is assumed open. Not all hosts send ICMP Protocol Unreachable messages. These may include firewalls, AIX, HP-UX and Digital UNIX). These machines will report all protocols open. This scan type also falls victim to the ICMP limiting rate described in the UDP scans section, however since only 256 protocols are possible (8-bit field for IP protocol in the IP header) it should not take too long. Results of an -sO on my Linux workstation are included below.
 1 [chaos]# nmap -sO 127.0.0.1
   2
   3 Starting Nmap 4.01 at 2006-07-14 12:56 BST
   4 Interesting protocols on chaos(127.0.0.1):
   5 (The 251 protocols scanned but not shown below are
   6         in state: closed)
   7 PROTOCOL STATE         SERVICE
   8 1        open          icmp
   9 2        open|filtered igmp
  10 6        open          tcp
  11 17       open          udp
  12 255      open|filtered unknown
  13
  14 Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in
  15         1.259 seconds

8  Idle Scanning [-sI]

Idle scanning is an advanced, highly stealthed technique, where no packets are sent to the target which can be identified to originate from the scanning machine. A zombie host (and optionally port) must be specified for this scan type. The zombie host must satisfy certain criteria essential to the workings of this scan. This scan type works by exploiting “predictable IP fragmentation ID” sequence generation on the zombie host, to determine open ports on the target. The scan checks the IPID on the zombie, then spoofs a connection request to the target machine, making it appear to come from the zombie. If the target port is open, a SYN/ACK session acknowledgement will be sent from the target machine back to the zombie, which will RST the connection since it has no record of having opened such a connection. If the port on the target is closed, an RST will be sent to the zombie, and no further packets will be sent. The attacker then checks the IPID on the zombie again. If it has incremented by 2 (or changed by two steps in its sequence), this corresponds to the packet received from the target, plus the RST from the zombie, which equates to an open port on the target. If the IPID has changed by one step, an RST was received from the target and no further packets were sent. Using this mechanism, it is possible to scan every port on a target, whilst making it appear that the zombie was the one doing the scanning. Of course, the spoofed connection attempts will likely be logged, so the target system will have the zombie IP address, and the zombie system’s logs are likely to contain the attacker’s IP address, so it is still possible, after acquiring logs through legal channels, to determine the attacker, but this method makes it much more difficult to do so than if the packets were sent directly from the attacker. In addition, some IDS and firewall software makes attempts to detect spoofed packets based on the network they arrive from. As long as the zombie host and the attacker are both “out on the Internet”, or on the same network as each other, relative to the target, techniques to identify spoofed packets are not likely to succeed. This scan type requires certain things of the zombie. The IPID sequence generation must be predictable (single-step increments, for example). The host must also have low traffic so that it is unlikely for other packets to hit the zombie whilst Nmap is carrying out its scan (as these will artificially inflate the IPID number!). Cheap routers or MS Windows boxes make good zombie hosts. Most operating systems use randomised sequence numbers (see the OS Fingerprinting section for details on how to check a target’s sequence generation type). The idle scan can also be used to determine IP trust based relationships between hosts (e.g. a firewall may allow a certain host to connect to port x, but not other hosts). This scan type can help to determine which hosts have access to such a system. For more information about this scan type, read http://www.insecure.org/nmap/idlescan.html

9  Version Detection [-sV]

Version Detection collects information about the specific service running on an open port, including the product name and version number. This information can be critical in determining an entry point for an attack. The -sV option enables version detection, and the -A option enables both OS fingerprinting and version detection, as well as any other advanced features which may be added in future releases. Version detection is based on a complex series of probes, detailed in the Version Detection paper at http://www.insecure.org/nmap/vscan/

10  ACK Scan [-sA]

Usually used to map firewall rulesets and distinguish between stateful and stateless firewalls, this scan type sends ACK packets to a host. If an RST comes back, the port is classified “unfiltered” (that is, it was allowed to send its RST through whatever firewall was in place). If nothing comes back, the port is said to be “filtered”. That is, the firewall prevented the RST coming back from the port. This scan type can help determine if a firewall is stateless (just blocks incoming SYN packets) or stateful (tracks connections and also blocks unsolicited ACK packets). Note that an ACK scan will never show ports in the “open” state, and so it should be used in conjunction with another scan type to gain more information about firewalls or packet filters between yourself and the victim.

11  Window Scan, RPC Scan, List Scan [-sW, -sR, -sL]

The TCP Window scan is similar to the ACK scan but can sometimes detect open ports as well as filtered/unfiltered ports. This is due to anomalies in TCP Window size reporting by some operating systems (see the Nmap manual for a list, or the nmap-hackers mailing list for the full list of susceptible OS’). RPC Scans can be used in conjunction with other scan types to try to determine if an open TCP or UDP port is an RPC service, and if so, which program, and version numbers are running on it. Decoys are not supported with RPC scans (see section on Timing and Hiding Scans, below). List scanning simply prints a list of IPs and names (DNS resolution will be used unless the -n option is passed to Nmap) without actually pinging or scanning the hosts.

12  Timing and Hiding Scans

12.1  Timing

Nmap adjusts its timings automatically depending on network speed and response times of the victim. However, you may want more control over the timing in order to create a more stealthy scan, or to get the scan over and done with quicker. The main timing option is set through the -T parameter. There are six predefined timing policies which can be specified by name or number (starting with 0, corresponding to Paranoid timing). The timings are Paranoid, Sneaky, Polite, Normal, Aggressive and Insane. A -T Paranoid (or -T0) scan will wait (generally) at least 5 minutes between each packet sent. This makes it almost impossible for a firewall to detect a port scan in progress (since the scan takes so long it would most likely be attributed to random network traffic). Such a scan will still show up in logs, but it will be so spread out that most analysis tools or humans will miss it completely. A -T Insane (or -T5) scan will map a host in very little time, provided you are on a very fast network or don’t mind losing some information along the way. Timings for individual aspects of a scan can also be set using the –host_timeout, –max_rtt_timeout, –min_rtt_timeout, –initial_rtt_timeout, –max_parallelism, –min_parallelism, and –scan_delay options. See the Nmap manual for details.

12.2  Decoys

The -D option allows you to specify Decoys. This option makes it look like those decoys are scanning the target network. It does not hide your own IP, but it makes your IP one of a torrent of others supposedly scanning the victim at the same time. This not only makes the scan look more scary, but reduces the chance of you being traced from your scan (difficult to tell which system is the “real” source).

12.3  FTP Bounce

The FTP protocol (RFC 959) specified support for a “proxy” ftp, which allowed a connection to an FTP server to send data to anywhere on the internet. This tends not to work with modern ftpds, in which it is an option usually disabled in the configuration. If a server with this feature is used by Nmap, it can be used to try to connect to ports on your victim, thus determining their state. This scan method allows for some degree of anonymity, although the FTP server may log connections and commands sent to it.

12.4  Turning Off Ping

The -P0 (that’s a zero) option allows you to switch off ICMP pings. The -PT option switches on TCP Pings, you can specify a port after the -PT option to be the port to use for the TCP ping. Disabling pings has two advantages: First, it adds extra stealth if you’re running one of the more stealthy attacks, and secondly it allows Nmap to scan hosts which don’t reply to pings (ordinarily, Nmap would report those hosts as being “down” and not scan them). In conjunction with -PT, you can use -PS to send SYN packets instead of ACK packets for your TCP Ping. The -PU option (with optional port list after) sends UDP packets for your “ping”. This may be best to send to suspected-closed ports rather than open ones, since open UDP ports tend not to respond to zero-length UDP packets. Other ping types are -PE (Standard ICMP Echo Request), -PP (ICMP Timestamp Request), -PM (Netmask Request) and -PB (default, uses both ICMP Echo Request and TCP ping, with ACK packets)

12.5  Fragmenting

The -f option splits the IP packet into tiny fragments when used with -sS, -sF, -sX or -sN. This makes it more difficult for a firewall or packet filter to determine the packet type. Note that many modern packet filters and firewalls (including iptables) feature optional defragmenters for such fragmented packets, and will thus reassemble the packet to check its type before sending it on. Less complex firewalls will not be able to cope with fragmented packets this small and will most likely let the OS reassemble them and send them to the port they were intended to reach. Using this option could crash some less stable software and hardware since packet sizes get pretty small with this option!

12.6  Idle Scanning

See the section on -sI for information about idle scans.

13  OS Fingerprinting

The -O option turns on Nmap’s OS fingerprinting system. Used alongside the -v verbosity options, you can gain information about the remote operating system and about its TCP Sequenmce Number generation (useful for planning Idle scans). An article on OS detection is available at http://www.insecure.org/nmap/nmap-fingerprinting-article.html

14  Outputting Logs

Logging in Nmap can be provided by the -oN, -oX or -oG options. Each one is followed by the name of the logfile. -oN outputs a human readable log, -oX outputs an XML log and -oG outputs a grepable log. The -oA option outputs in all 3 formats, and -oS outputs in a format I’m sure none of you would ever want to use (try it; you’ll see what I mean!) The –append-output option appends scan results to the output files you specified instead of overwriting their contents.

15  Other Nmap Options

15.1  IPv6

The -6 option enables IPv6 in Nmap (provided your OS has IPv6 support). Currently only TCP connect, and TCP connect ping scan are supported. For other scantypes, seehttp://nmap6.sourceforge.net

15.2  Verbose Mode

Highly recommended, -v Use -v twice for more verbosity. The option -d can also be used (once or twice) to generate more verbose output.

15.3  Resuming

Scans cancelled with Ctrl+C can be resumed with the --resume  option. The logfile must be a Normal or Grepable logfile (-oN or -oG).

15.4  Reading Targets From A File

-iL  reads targets from inputfilename rather than from the command-line. The file should contain a hostlist or list of network expressions separated by spaces, tabs or newlines. Using a hyphen as inputfile makes Nmap read from standard input.

15.5  Fast Scan

The -F option scans only those ports listed in the nmap_services file (or the protocols file if the scan type is -sO). This is far faster than scanning all 65,535 ports!!

15.6  Time-To-Live

The -ttl  option sets the IPv4 packets time-to-live. The usefulness of this is in mapping paths through networks and determining ACL’s on firewalls (setting the ttl to one past the packet filter can help to determine information about the filtering rules themselves). Repeated Nmap scans to a single port using differing ttl values will emulate a traceroute style network path map (Try it, its great fun for a while, until you get bored and realise traceroute does it all for you automatically!).

16  Typical Scanning Session

First, we’ll sweep the network with a simple Ping scan to determine which hosts are online.
   1 [chaos]# nmap -sP 10.0.0.0/24
   2
   3 Starting Nmap 4.01 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at
   4         2006-07-14 14:19 BST
   5 Host 10.0.0.1 appears to be up.
   6 MAC Address: 00:09:5B:29:FD:96 (Netgear)
   7 Host 10.0.0.2 appears to be up.
   8 MAC Address: 00:0F:B5:96:38:5D (Netgear)
   9 Host 10.0.0.4 appears to be up.
  10 Host 10.0.0.5 appears to be up.
  11 MAC Address: 00:14:2A:B1:1E:2E (Elitegroup Computer System Co.)
  12 Nmap finished: 256 IP addresses (4 hosts up) scanned in 5.399 seconds
Now we’re going to take a look at 10.0.0.1 and 10.0.0.2, both listed as Netgear in the ping sweep. These IPs are good criteria for routers (in fact I know that 10.0.0.1 is a router and 10.0.0.2 is a wireless access point, since it’s my network, but lets see what Nmap makes of it…) We’ll scan 10.0.0.1 using a SYN scan [-sS] and -A to enable OS fingerprinting and version detection.
   1 [chaos]# nmap -sS -A 10.0.0.1
   2
   3 Starting Nmap 4.01 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at
   4         2006-07-14 14:23 BST
   5 Insufficient responses for TCP sequencing (0),
   6         OS detection may be less accurate
   7 Interesting ports on 10.0.0.1:
   8 (The 1671 ports scanned but not shown below are in state:
   9         closed)
  10 PORT   STATE SERVICE    VERSION
  11 80/tcp open  tcpwrapped
  12 MAC Address: 00:09:5B:29:FD:96 (Netgear)
  13 Device type: WAP
  14 Running: Compaq embedded, Netgear embedded
  15 OS details: WAP: Compaq iPAQ Connection Point or
  16         Netgear MR814
  17
  18 Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in
  19         3.533 seconds
The only open port is 80/tcp – in this case, the web admin interface for the router. OS fingerprinting guessed it was a Netgear Wireless Access Point – in fact this is a Netgear (wired) ADSL router. As it said, though, there were insufficient responses for TCP sequencing to accurately detect the OS. Now we’ll do the same for 10.0.0.2…
   1 [chaos]# nmap -sS -A 10.0.0.2
   2
   3 Starting Nmap 4.01 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ )
   4         at 2006-07-14 14:26 BST
   5 Interesting ports on 10.0.0.2:
   6 (The 1671 ports scanned but not shown below are in state:
   7         closed)
   8 PORT   STATE SERVICE VERSION
   9 80/tcp open  http    Boa HTTPd 0.94.11
  10 MAC Address: 00:0F:B5:96:38:5D (Netgear)
  11 Device type: general purpose
  12 Running: Linux 2.4.X|2.5.X
  13 OS details: Linux 2.4.0 - 2.5.20
  14 Uptime 14.141 days (since Fri Jun 30 11:03:05 2006)
  15
  16 Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 9.636
  17         seconds
Interestingly, the OS detection here listed Linux, and the version detection was able to detect the httpd running. The accuracy of this is uncertain, this is a Netgear home wireless access point, so it could be running some embedded Linux! Now we’ll move on to 10.0.0.4 and 10.0.0.5, these are likely to be normal computers running on the network…
   1 [chaos]# nmap -sS -P0 -A -v 10.0.0.4
   2
   3 Starting Nmap 4.01 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at
   4         2006-07-14 14:31 BST
   5 DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 0.10s. Mode:
   6         Async [#: 2, OK: 0, NX: 1, DR: 0, SF: 0, TR: 1, CN: 0]
   7 Initiating SYN Stealth Scan against 10.0.0.4 [1672 ports] at 14:31
   8 Discovered open port 21/tcp on 10.0.0.4
   9 Discovered open port 22/tcp on 10.0.0.4
  10 Discovered open port 631/tcp on 10.0.0.4
  11 Discovered open port 6000/tcp on 10.0.0.4
  12 The SYN Stealth Scan took 0.16s to scan 1672 total ports.
  13 Initiating service scan against 4 services on 10.0.0.4 at 14:31
  14 The service scan took 6.01s to scan 4 services on 1 host.
  15 For OSScan assuming port 21 is open, 1 is closed, and neither are
  16         firewalled
  17 Host 10.0.0.4 appears to be up ... good.
  18 Interesting ports on 10.0.0.4:
  19 (The 1668 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
  20 PORT     STATE SERVICE VERSION
  21 21/tcp   open  ftp     vsftpd 2.0.3
  22 22/tcp   open  ssh     OpenSSH 4.2 (protocol 1.99)
  23 631/tcp  open  ipp     CUPS 1.1
  24 6000/tcp open  X11      (access denied)
  25 Device type: general purpose
  26 Running: Linux 2.4.X|2.5.X|2.6.X
  27 OS details: Linux 2.4.0 - 2.5.20, Linux 2.5.25 - 2.6.8 or
  28         Gentoo 1.2 Linux 2.4.19 rc1-rc7
  29 TCP Sequence Prediction: Class=random positive increments
  30                          Difficulty=4732564 (Good luck!)
  31 IPID Sequence Generation: All zeros
  32 Service Info: OS: Unix
  33
  34 Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 8.333 seconds
  35                Raw packets sent: 1687 (74.7KB) | Rcvd: 3382 (143KB)
From this, we can deduce that 10.0.0.4 is a Linux system (in fact, the one I’m typing this tutorial on!) running a 2.4 to 2.6 kernel (Actually, Slackware Linux 10.2 on a 2.6.19.9 kernel) with open ports 21/tcp, 22/tcp, 631/tcp and 6000/tcp. All but 6000 have version information listed. The scan found the IPID sequence to be all zeros, which makes it useless for idle scanning, and the TCP Sequence prediction as random positive integers. The -v option is needed to get Nmap to print the IPID information out! Now, onto 10.0.0.5…
   1 [chaos]# nmap -sS -P0 -A -v 10.0.0.5
   2
   3 Starting Nmap 4.01 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ )
   4         at 2006-07-14 14:35 BST
   5 Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.5 [1 port] at 14:35
   6 The ARP Ping Scan took 0.01s to scan 1 total hosts.
   7 DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 0.02s. Mode: Async
   8         [#: 2, OK: 0, NX: 1, DR: 0, SF: 0, TR: 1, CN: 0]
   9 Initiating SYN Stealth Scan against 10.0.0.5 [1672 ports] at 14:35
  10 The SYN Stealth Scan took 35.72s to scan 1672 total ports.
  11 Warning:  OS detection will be MUCH less reliable because we did
  12         not find at least 1 open and 1 closed TCP port
  13 Host 10.0.0.5 appears to be up ... good.
  14 All 1672 scanned ports on 10.0.0.5 are: filtered
  15 MAC Address: 00:14:2A:B1:1E:2E (Elitegroup Computer System Co.)
  16 Too many fingerprints match this host to give specific OS details
  17 TCP/IP fingerprint:
  18 SInfo(V=4.01%P=i686-pc-linux-gnu%D=7/14%Tm=44B79DC6%O=-1%C=-1%M=00142A)
  19 T5(Resp=N)
  20 T6(Resp=N)
  21 T7(Resp=N)
  22 PU(Resp=N)
  23
  24 Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 43.855 seconds
  25                Raw packets sent: 3369 (150KB) | Rcvd: 1 (42B)
No open ports, and Nmap couldn’t detect the OS. This suggests that it is a firewalled or otherwise protected system, with no services running (and yet it responded to ping sweeps). We now have rather more information about this network than we did when we started, and can guess at several other things based on these results. Using that information, and the more advanced Nmap scans, we can obtain further scan results which will help to plan an attack, or to fix weaknesses, in this network.

Thursday, May 4, 2017

hey guys...do you want to steal security credentials, from iranian scientists in Vienna?

How to read packed binary data in Go?


The Python format string is iih, meaning two 32-bit signed integers and one 16-bit signed integer (see the docs). You can simply use your first example but change the struct to:
type binData struct {
    A int32
    B int32
    C int16
}

func main() {
        fp, err := os.Open("tst.bin")

        if err != nil {
                panic(err)
        }

        defer fp.Close()

        for {
            thing := binData{}
            err := binary.Read(fp, binary.LittleEndian, &thing)

            if err == io.EOF{
                break
            }

            fmt.Println(thing.A, thing.B, thing.C)
        }
}
Note that the Python packing didn't specify the endianness explicitly, but if you're sure the system that ran it generated little-endian binary, this should work.
Edit: Added main() function to explain what I mean.
Edit 2: Capitalized struct fields so binary.Read could write into them.

Tuesday, May 2, 2017

oK, i suppose prof Huoshima wants to know this! Jesus Christ did this transforming a liquid into a solid material using light energy...and we Humankind have the patent

Process for depositing a material on a substrate using light energy 
US 5820942 A
RESUMO
The present invention is generally directed to a process and a system for transforming a liquid into a solid material using light energy. In particular, a solution containing a parent material in a liquid form is atomized in a reaction vessel and directed towards a substrate. The atomized liquid is exposed to light energy which causes the parent material to form a solid coating on a substrate. The light energy can be provided from one or more lamps and preferably includes ultraviolet light. Although the process of the present invention is well suited for use in many different and various applications, one exemplary application is in depositing a dielectric material on a substrate to be used in the manufacture of integrated circuit chips.

Sunday, April 30, 2017

Again...back to war! types od iniciating mechanism of IED's are based on ambient ( temperature, somke/gas, sound, IR rays, proximity, humidity, x rays, or light) and commands made by car remote, cordless bell, fm radio, command wire or areo modelling. Now there's a very important features I want to share, command by intervals (with cameras )

The basic premise of the circuit is to use the 555 timer to output high at regular intervals (10s, 30s, etc.), activating a transistor which serves as a switch closing the “shutter” portion of the voltage divider and triggering the shutter on the GF1.



The 555 is being used in astable mode, which will generate a square wave with regular intervals. There are independent time spans for the output being high and low, and using a diode across R2 allows the delay between high signals to be longer than the length of the high signal itself (i.e. a duty cycle of less than 50%). I set the interval between shots to be about 15s, and the trigger itself lasts about 1s (to make sure that the camera fires, and I put it in single-shot mode to prevent duplicates). The values that gave me those times are a 22µF capacitor (C1), 10kΩ for R1 and 1MΩ for R2. You can adjust the interval between shots with R2, and it’s linear.


https://brandonevans.ca/post/text/building-an-intervalometer-for-the-panasonic-gf1/

PLEASE..DO NOT DISRUPT THE EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

Saturday, April 29, 2017

How a Terrorist's Homemade Bomb Made it Past Security

FSA instruction video; how to make car bomb + explosion 19.10.12

Xerum 525 and Red Mercury

welcome back to war! "The compound represented "mercury antimony salt of the formula Hg2Sb2O7" and it was first produced in the USSR close to <"Research Institute In the field of physics and high energy ">in Dubna in 1968...Due to the presence of [Xerum-525] Bell SS was more than plasma machine with high voltage using the opposite rotation of the cylinders ...represents a reactor intended for release nuclear power caused by the rotation of very high speed plus constant ripple DC high voltage..Fuel Bell is particularly isotopes such as hafnium and tantalum which are izomeres. Most isomers have a very short half-life but tantalum with 180 atomic mass units is extremely long!10 quadrillion years! For tantalum is believed to be linked to exploding stars and with supernovae.Hafnium is 178 atomic mass units another isomer short half-life of 31 years but hyperexcitability. It gives quarter kiloton energy than a kilogram in the form of gamma rays. Research by DARPA as possible explosive.
What has?
-isomers release energy with a change in his spin.
-nuclear magnetic resonance and gravity are the the scientific sphere professor Walter Gerlach project manager of Bell.
-Bell has worked with heavy radioactive substance Xerum-525 pretty salty with isotopes radioactive compound partially based on mercury.
-Red mercury is explosive which exploded hydrogen bombs without the need for a nuclear bomb.
-Xerum-525 is enshrined in both cylinders Bell which rotates at tremendous speed.
-nowadays out materials on the Internet about US magnetic UFO TR-3B with the same propulsion system..


http://www.alienhub.com/threads/xerum-525-fuel-ufo.72766/


Niobium, Hafnium, Tantalum, & Vanadium Alloys 


WHAT ABOUT RDX WITH THESE AND ACETYLENE GAS? 
Cracking safes with thermal imaging
(as a more viable alternative to mind reading)
Copyright (C) 2005 by Michal Zalewski (lcamtuf@coredump.cx)
This inexplicably brief "research" paper presents an interesting physical world attack that may be easily deployed by a determined attacker to compromise many high-security access control systems in use today. Although this paper's findings are hardly groundbreaking (and in some ways, are downright obvious), it includes some cool pictures of what should be most certainly taken into account in risk management, secure zone planning, and when drafting operating procedures for high-risk areas. But most of all, I just wanted to share ;-)
In short, virtually all keypad entry systems - as used in various applications, including building access control, alarm system control, electronic lock safes, ATM input, etc - are susceptible to a trivial low-profile passphrase snooping scheme. This attack enables the attacker to quickly and unobtrusively recover previously entered passphrases with a high degree of success. This is in contrast to previously documented methods of keypad snooping; these methods were in general either highly intrusive - required close presence or installation of specialized hardware - or difficult to carry out and not very reliable (e.g., examining deposited fingerprints - works in low-use situations only, and does not reveal the ordering of digits).
The attacker can perform the aforementioned attack by deploying an uncooled microbolometer thermal imaging (far infrared) camera within up to approximately five to ten minutes after valid keycode entry. Although this may sound outlandish, the heat transferred during split-second contact of individual keys with human body (even through, for example, gloves) is significant enough and dissipates slowly enough to make this possible after the area has been cleared of all personnel.
Furthermore, since the image can be acquired from a considerable distance (1-10 meters is easy to achieve), the attacker can afford to maintain a remarkably low profile through the process.
To put things in perspective, portable (handheld) thermal imaging devices, such as the one pictured above, are commercially available without major restrictions from manufacturers such as Flir or Fluke. Prices begin at $5,000 to $10,000 for brand new units, and top-of-the-line models boast a 0.05 K thermal resolution at impressively low sensor noise levels. The "return on investment" can be quite high in most illicit uses, and indeed - historically, ATM phishers were known to be willing to spend money on specialized equipment such as custom assemblies that included high-end digital cameras with wireless access. As such, the scheme is not as outlandish as it might have seemed.
The following sequence of images demonstrates the feasibility of the attack; in this case, the target is LA GARD ComboGard 3035 electronic lock (with rubber keys) installed on an industrial-grade safe:
Keypad: visible light Keypad: thermal imaging
Keypad in idle state - in visible light (left) and in thermal imaging (right). Minimal ambient temperature variations are present due to different thermal characteristics of materials used in the safe.
Hand: visible light Hand: thermal imaging
A sequence of keys is being pressed (1-5-9). The difference in colors on the right is due to IR camera automatically adjusting to relatively high temperature of human body, to avoid overexposure and blooming.
Residual image: thermal imaging
Code entry complete. All pressed keys are still clearly readable in this thermogram; the sequence of digits can be infered from the relative temperature of these spots - ones with lower registered temperature (more faint color) were pressed earlier than others.
There are some real-world considerations, of course: reuse of digits in a code, very rapid code entry, vastly differing keypress times, and other code entry quirks (say, victim's habit of resting his palm on the keypad) may render the attack less successful, and may make results more ambiguous. That said, it's still nifty, and apparently not limited to bad science-fiction or computer games; civilian access to sufficiently advanced technology is possible. All in all, many airports, numerous bank branches, and various other entities, might want to reconsider the effectiveness of their defenses.
A proper defense against such techniques would be not to rely on keypad-only access control in easily accessible areas, unless additional advanced countermeasures can be implemented (well-implemented scrambling keypads originally intended to thwart fingerprint or key wear analysis, for example). Smart-card, biometric, or plain old key-based protection can be added to reduce exposure.
Side thought: in terms of safe cracking, another interesting area of research is differential power analysis (DPA) of electronic locks. High-security locks on small- and medium-size safes usually have external connectors that can be used to supply emergency battery power to the device; these usually directly connect to the same route that is used to supply primary power, and as such can be used to measure power consumption characteristics and/or capture CPU-generated feedback noise, and possibly to differentiate between valid and invalid keycodes as digits are entered. If you happen to have a good 'scope lying around, give it a try.






Thursday, April 27, 2017

[ RadSafe ] Dirty Bomb Material Report?

Robert D Gallagher rdgallagher at nssihouston.com 
Tue Apr 4 11:54:07 CDT 2006



How many Curies of Tritium were contained in exit signs in the 9/11
structures that fell?

I feel certain at the time the release of Tritium was the least of
everybodies worries.

Bob Gallagher
NSSI Houston


-----Original Message-----
From: radsafe-bounces at radlab.nl [mailto:radsafe-bounces at radlab.nl]On
Behalf Of Flanigan, Floyd
Sent: Tuesday, April 04, 2006 11:32 AM
To: Mercado, Don; Robert Atkinson; John Jacobus; radsafe at radlab.nl
Subject: RE: AW: [ RadSafe ] Dirty Bomb Material Report?


I am assuming this is gaseous H3 which would be little threat upon
postulated release except to someone right on top of them at the moment
of breech? Once in the atmosphere, would the H3 not dissipate rapidly
and be diluted to levels of non-concern in a very short period of time?

Actually, Hydrogen-3 is usually produced as follows:

Lithium-6 + neutron --> Tritium + Helium-4

Only the neutron (which is used up) and Tritium itself are radioactive
or dangerous. In addition, Tritium decays as follows:

Tritium --> Helium-3 + Electron + Electron anti-neutrino

Again, all of these are harmless, Helium-3 is not radioactive.

Anyone else see this issue this way?

Floyd W. Flanigan B.S.Nuc.H.P.

-----Original Message-----
From: radsafe-bounces at radlab.nl [mailto:radsafe-bounces at radlab.nl] On
Behalf Of Mercado, Don
Sent: Tuesday, April 04, 2006 10:09 AM
To: Robert Atkinson; John Jacobus; radsafe at radlab.nl
Subject: RE: AW: [ RadSafe ] Dirty Bomb Material Report?

I had a phone call last week from a guy who wanted to know about selling
the H-3 exit signs on eBay. He had about 20 of them and wanted to know
the relative hazard. He found my name through Radsafe. Anyway, that's
about 200 Ci of H-3 going for sale to John Q. Public if he didn't heed
my advice about returning them to the mfgr.

-----Original Message-----
From: radsafe-bounces at radlab.nl [mailto:radsafe-bounces at radlab.nl] On
Behalf Of Robert Atkinson
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2006 7:50 AM
To: John Jacobus; radsafe at radlab.nl
Subject: RE: AW: [ RadSafe ] Dirty Bomb Material Report?


A few check sources is nothing.
If I was looking for material for an RDD I'd visit the local
construction site. A fairly common moisture density gauge contains 8mCi
of Cs137 (50 times the amount suggested for the GAO case, plus a 40mCi
Am241/Be neutron source. They lose about two or three a month according
to the NRC reports.
One (serial No.15636) was stolen in Virginia in1997 and turned up on
eBay about a week ago! It was returned to its original licensee. The GAO
report just shows that the system works, a minimal amount of material
was detected and the identity of the persons involved was established.

Robert Atkinson.
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http://health.phys.iit.edu/archives/2006-April/017025.html