Glimmerglass Intercepts Undersea Cable Traffic for Spy Agencies

Glimmerglass Intercepts Undersea Cable Traffic for Spy Agencies by Pratap Chatterjee, Special to CorpWatch August 22nd, 2013

Glimmerglass 2011 presentation on CyberSweep. Glimmerglass, a northern California company that sells optical fiber technology, offers government agencies a software product called “CyberSweep” to intercept signals on undersea cables. The company says their technology can analyze Gmail and Yahoo! Mail as well as social media like Facebook and Twitter to discover “actionable intelligence.” Could this be the technology that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) is using to tap global communications? The company says it counts several intelligence agencies among its customers but refuses to divulge details. One thing is certain - it is not the only company to offer such capabilities - so if such data mining is not already taking place, that day is not far off. "Revolutions in communications technologies are usually followed by revolutions in collection capabilities," Jeffrey Richelson, a senior fellow at the National Security Archives and the author of the definitive guide to the U.S. intelligence agencies, told CorpWatch. The recent leaks by whistleblower Edward Snowden to the Guardian newspaper specifically suggest that the NSA is tapping undersea cables although no details on the specific technology have yet been published. Notably Snowden has revealed evidence that the NSA paid £15.5 million ($25 million) in 2009 to “radically” upgrade a listening station operated by its U.K. equivalent – the Government Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ) in Bude, north Cornwall, England, where many of the cables surface. If GCHQ and the NSA installed Glimmerglass’s commercial optical fiber switching technology on the undersea cables to tap the torrent of data that crosses the Atlantic, they will be able to pair it up with CyberSweep to make sense of the information, according to advertising claims made in a treasure trove of documents on dozens of surveillance contractors released by Wikileaks. Privacy experts say that if the NSA is using this Glimmerglass technology, it will prove whistleblower Edward Snowden’s claim that the government is collecting everyone’s communications, regardless of their citizenship or innocence. Vanee Vines, a spokesperson for the NSA, declined to comment to CorpWatch on either Glimmerglass or the tapping of the undersea cables. Glimmerglass officials did not return multiple email and phone calls. CyberSweep On the Glimmerglass website, the company claims that CyberSweep can process optical signals to “extract the data source format” and aggregate the data for “probes” to uncover “actionable information from the flood of data on persons of interest, known and unknown targets, anticipated and known threats.” More details on what Glimmerglass claims CyberSweep can do are explained in “Paradigm Shifts” – a confidential 18 page Powerpoint presentation made in 2011 by Jim Donnelly, the Glimmerglass vice president of North American sales. The document was released by Wikileaks as part of the Spy Files series in December of that year. On page five of the presentation, Glimmerglass notes that CyberSweep is an “end to end cyber security solution” that can “select, extract and monitor” all “mobile and fixed line data, voice and video, internet, web 2.0 and social networking” with “probes and sniffers.” On the following page, it notes that its product can be used at “submarine landing stations” – a reference to the locations where the undersea cables are connected to terrestrial systems. On page eight, Glimmerglass provides specific examples of what it can gather – like Gmail, Yahoo! Mail as well as Facebook and Twitter. Over the next four pages it offers screenshots of these capabilities. One display of what CyberSweep is capable of is a visual grid of Facebook messages of a presumably fictional person named John Smith. His profile is connected to a number of other individuals with arrows indicating how often he connected to each of them. Each individual can be identified with images, user names and IDs. Another pane shows the detailed chat records. Yet another graphic shows Facebook connections between multiple individuals, presumably to identify networks. A third graphic is a grid of phone calls made by an individual with a pane that allows an operator to select and listen to audio of any specific conversation. Other images show similar demonstrations of monitoring webmail and instant message chats. Where is this product being used? In a product video on the company website, Glimmerglass states that their optical data management products have been used by the U.S. intelligence agencies for the last five years. The video specifically mentions data transmissions from Predator drones and well as the tapping of undersea fiber optic cables, but it does not go into any details. “The challenge of managing information has become the challenge of managing the light,” says an announcer. “With Glimmerglass, customers have full control of massive flows of intelligence from the moment they access them.” The description mirrors the technology described in documents provided by Edward Snowden to the Guardian newspaper. Collecting All the Signals The GCHQ Advantage Why go overseas to collect the data? Well, there are legal obstacles in the U.S. to collecting phone calls made by U.S. citizens – such a program would violate the fourth amendment to the U.S. constitution that protects individuals against invasion of privacy. (Exceptions are granted for communications with foreigners if government agencies suspect terrorism under a 1981 presidential executive order, although they still need approval of the U.S. Attorney General). But given that U.S. laws stop at the border, foreign spy agencies like GCHQ can legally pick up and store any and all information from data that travels outside the country, suggest reporters at the Guardian newspaper. “We know the NSA is forbidden from spying on American citizens; in the case of (Faizal) Shahzad (the would-be Times Square bomber in New York), this question remains – was GCHQ doing it for them?” ask the Guardian reporters, noting that the GCHQ now has the “opportunity to build such a complete record of someone's life through their texts, conversations, emails and search records” allowing it to make a "unique contribution to the NSA in providing insights into some of their highest priority targets.” In a document released by Snowden, Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, the NSA director, was quoted on a June 2008 visit to an intelligence facility in the U.K., saying: "Why can't we collect all the signals all the time? Sounds like a good summer project." According to the leaked documents, a three year trial project was soon set up with a $25 million grant from the NSA to "radically enhance the infrastructure” at the Cyber Development Centre in Bude, Cornwall, as well as potentially at other sites like the GCHQ base in Cheltenham. Probes were installed on 200 undersea cables and in the fall of 2011, a project code-named Tempora was launched with the help of NSA analysts who came to help at the Bude site. At least seven companies took part in the project - British Telecom, Global Crossing, Interoute, Level 3, Viatel, Verizon Business and Vodafone Cable – according to the German paper Suddeutsche Zeitung, all of whom manage major undersea cable systems. Under Tempora, a three day buffer of global internet traffic was held at any given time - totaling some 600 million "telephone events" a day or as much as 21 petabytes (million gigabytes) of data. While much of it was deleted through a process called Massive Volume Reduction for reasons of space, the meta-data (such as the details of who called whom, and when, but not the content) was held for as long as 30 days. Snowden’s documents suggest that GCHQ now "produces larger amounts of metadata than NSA" which was being analyzed by 300 U.K. analysts in addition to 250 NSA analysts, as of last May. The U.K. analysts were encouraged to dig deep since they had a less onerous oversight regime compared to the U.S. "Over the last five years, GCHQ's access to 'light' (has) increased by 7,000%," a Tempora official is quoted as saying in another Powerpoint document cited in the Guardian. "We will have exploited to the full our unique selling points of geography, partnerships, the UK's legal regime and our skilled workforce." A recent interview of a “senior intelligence official” by the New York Times confirmed that “the N.S.A. is temporarily copying and then sifting through the contents of what is apparently most e-mails and other text-based communications that cross the border” by making a “clone of selected communication links.” The official did not state where the communications were being intercepted. Optical Tapping It so happens that the undersea cables are an extremely convenient place to collect all the signals all the time: An estimated 90 percent of trans-border telecommunications data travels along the transatlantic cables, even if they are merely connections between an individual in Asia and another in Africa, especially if they are using services like Skype. These cables date back in history to 1858 when they were first installed to support the international telegraph system, with the British taking the lead to wire the far reaches of its empire. Today a multi-billion dollar shipping industry continues to lay and maintain hundreds of such cables that crisscross the planet – over half a million miles of such cables are draped along the ocean floor and snaked around coastlines - to make landfall at special locations to be connected to national telecommunications systems. The original cables were made of copper but about 25 years ago, they were replaced by fiber-optic cables. The oldest undersea cable was Trans Atlantic-8 (installed in 1988 by AT&T to transmit data from Tuckerton, New Jersey to Bude, Cornwall) which transmitted data at 280 megabits per second. The latest cables like Yellow/Atlantic Crossing 2 (installed in 2000 and upgraded in 2007 by Level Three Communications from Brookhaven, New York to Bude, Cornwall) is capable of transmitting data at an astonishing 640 gigabits per second, which is roughly equal to 7.5 million simultaneous phone calls. In order to make sure that data and voice are transmitted quickly and accurately across the world even if cables break or equipment fails, cable companies break the data into separate tiny packets that are dispatched over what they call “redundant fiber optic paths” across the ocean before it is captured and re-assembled on the other side, where it also becomes easy to intercept the data unobtrusively. This is where Glimmerglass comes in. In September 2002, the company started to ship a pioneering technology to help transmit data accurately over multiple optical paths. Their patented “3D Micro-Electro-Mechanical-System (MEMS) mirror array” is composed of 210 gold-coated mirrors mounted on microscopic hinges, each measuring just one millimeter in diameter, etched on a single wafer of silicon. Each mirror can be individually managed by remote operators anywhere in the world to capture or bounce the light signals and even more importantly, communicate with the other mirrors to make sure that the rest of the array stays in place, allowing very accurate data transmission. This technology slashed the cost of optical switching by a factor of 100, and the company claims that the switches are very robust with an expected failure rate of once in 30 years. For telecommunication companies, Glimmerglass offers three hardware racks to handle optical data – the entry level “100” system which can handle as many as 96x96 fiber ports for traffic as high as 100 gigabits per second all the way up to the “600” system which can handle 192x192 fiber ports. It also offers the “3000” system which can hold up to 12 racks. Another major advantage of the Glimmerglass technology, according to the company, is that operators can “monitor and test remote facilities” at undersea cable landings from a central office and then select any one of multiple optical signals to distribute it to multiple recipients, as well as ability to redirect any signal. “With Glimmerglass Intelligent Optical Systems, any signal travelling over fiber can be redirected in milliseconds, without adversely affecting customer traffic. At a landing site, this connectivity permits optical layer connections between the wet side and dry side to be re-provisioned in milliseconds from the Network Operations Center with a few clicks of a mouse.” In another section of the public website the company also promotes a product named Glimmerglass Intelligent Optical System (IOS) that combines the 3D-MEMS switches with CyberSweep into an integrated product that has the ability to “monitor and selectively intercept communications.” “Service Providers can use the speed and flexibility of the IOS to select and deliver signals to Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA),” add company brochures uncovered by Wikileaks. “The agency gains rapid access, not just to signals, but to individual wavelengths on those signals (and) make perfect photonic copies of optical signals … for comprehensive analysis.” Glimmerglass does not deny that its equipment can be used to capture global internet traffic by intelligence agencies, in fact it assumes that this is probably happening. “If you are going to monitor (communications traffic), you need to do much of it optically. But clearly, the massive top of the (intelligence gathering) funnel is coming through optically and you need to manage that,” Robert Lundy, the CEO of Glimmerglass for the last nine years, told AviationWeek in 2010. “If we were (installed) at an operations center of some country, our systems could be used to look at all the international entry and exit points for fiber optics. Once you have extracted the wavelengths, you can dynamically select the ones you are interested in and do it all from a remote location.” Keith May, his deputy in charge of business development, has gone even further. “We believe that our 3D MEMS technology – as used by governments and various agencies – is involved in the collection of intelligence from sensors, satellites and undersea fiber systems,” May told the magazine. “We are deployed in several countries that are using it for lawful interception.” Cashing in on the Fiber Boom Lundy is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, with two degrees from Stanford University in the heart of northern California’s high technology Silicon Valley - a Master’s degree in Electrical Engineering and a Masters in Business Administration – making him well placed to ride the fiber optic boom. In addition to the right degrees from the right military and technology colleges, Lundy retired as an Army lieutenant colonel after working for the U.S. Army in Europe where his job was managing contracts for “tactical data systems.” He worked as the first general manager of IBM’s wireless business unit and then he helped found three successful start-ups: Wavtrace, a pioneer in manufacturing wireless broadband access systems for business; Optos, a company that builds optical switches for metropolitan networks; as well as Xtera, a company that provides equipment to push data via submarine cables. Lundy was hired as chief operating officer for Glimmerglass in 2004 when it was a five year old start-up that had patented dozens of 3D MEMS inventions, from its offices in Hayward on the eastern edge of Silicon Valley. Initially the company made its money selling testing and measurement equipment for what Lundy calls their “core optical switch or engine” to a couple of dozen customers in the telecommunications industry like Cisco and Sandvine, but was unable to expand in a major way because of the collapse of the telecommunications industry at the time. (Global Crossing, a major cable operator, had just gone bankrupt, as had WorldCom) The company branched out to make most of its profits from the software to manage the optical switches, rather than the physical hardware which sold for under $100,000 in competition with similar products from companies like Calient. Glimmerglass quickly landed contracts with AMS-IX, the largest internet exchange in Europe, and with Cable & Wireless in the UK. Eavesdropping On The Whole World Analysis of bulk telecommunications data to track as yet unknown targets has long been on the NSA wish list. For decades, the agency stuck to following specific individuals because there was no way to capture and analyze everything. In 2000, two rival projects were commissioned to try to collect “all the signals all the time.” Science Applications International Corporation, based in Tyson’s Corner, Virginia, was given a contract to design a collection system called TrailBlazer, while the NSA’s in-house Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Automation Research Center (SARC) worked on a project called ThinThread. Trailblazer was eventually jettisoned as unworkable after $1.2 billion had been spent. ThinThread was more successful, according to its proponents, because it was able to selectively process important information and dump the rest. The designers also created controls to anonymize the data collection to avoid violating privacy laws. ThinThread could "correlate data from financial transactions, travel records, Web searches, G.P.S. equipment, and any other 'attributes' that an analyst might find useful in pinpointing 'the bad guys,'" writes Jane Mayer in the New Yorker magazine, based on her interviews with former NSA staff. Unfortunately for the SARC team, ThinThread was vetoed by upper management at the NSA in August 2001. But after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the NSA is believed to have returned to the drawing board. Rumor has it that the project was restarted, stripped of any privacy controls. Recently William Binney, a former NSA staffer who helped design ThinThread and has now become a whistleblower, says that the project was a mistake. “I should apologize to the American people,” Binney who was once the technical director for the 6,000 employees of the NSA's World Geopolitical and Military Analysis Reporting Group told Mayer. “It’s violated everyone’s rights. It can be used to eavesdrop on the whole world.” In May 2005, Lundy was promoted to CEO of the company. Four months later - on September 21, 2005 - Glimmerglass Networks was awarded a no-bid contract of $769,600 for telecommunications support equipment for the U.S. Navy Sea Systems Command. Lundy’s experience managing data contracts for the U.S. Army in Europe would not have hindered the sale. Nor would the deep connections of Glimmerglass board member Alan Rogers, a retired U.S. Air Force Major General, who had previously been in charge of planning for the Pentagon at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) headquarters in Brussels. By 2010, Lundy had successfully expanded Glimmerglass’ business by marketing “lawful interception systems” to seven international customers outside the U.S., which appear to include Germany, Israel and the UK as well as two unnamed countries in Asia. “We've become as a result a gold standard in the intel and defense community … they're managing these optical signals so they can acquire, split, move and obtain the necessary information to protect the country,” Lundy told Fierce Telecom, an industry blog, in an interview about global malware threats. “At their undersea landing locations, their major points of presence, on a selective basis they need to acquire and monitor those optical signals … rather than wait to get it off somebody's, when it hits a PC or cellphone.” Questions remain as to how well the Glimmerglass product works. Ed Loomis, who worked on the NSA’s ThinThread signal collection and monitoring project in the 1990s, (see box: Eavesdropping On The Whole World) told CorpWatch that the company claim that they can extract "actionable information" would be limited to little more than selecting from a customer-supplied list of phone numbers, IP addresses, and DNS email addresses. “In order to replicate an analyst's deductive reasoning process to create an artificial intelligence equivalent requires an immense amount of cooperation by an analyst and an understanding of analytic processes by the programmer,” said Loomis. “Unless the two have acquired years of experience in the intelligence production business, I doubt the ‘target analytics’ is as robust as Glimmerglass would have its clients believe.” Are Companies Helping Invade Privacy? Civil liberties experts have denounced the practice of wholesale data collection. “By injecting the N.S.A. into virtually every crossborder interaction, the U.S. government will forever alter what has always been an open exchange of ideas,” says Jameel Jaffer, the deputy legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union. Such collection would also violate numerous legal principles that safeguard individual privacy. In addition to the fourth amendment to the U.S. constitution, human rights experts say that it would violate Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The big questions now are what role did the telecommunication companies play in the data interception and are intelligence contractors like Glimmerglass helping to design the collection and analysis system? "Tempora would not have been possible without the complicity of these undersea cable providers," says Eric King, head of research at Privacy International. “What we, and the public, deserve to know is this: To what extent are companies cooperating with disproportionate intelligence gathering, and are they doing anything to protect our right to privacy?” The Glimmerglass brochures can be downloaded here: http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/glimmerglass/55_glimmerglass-cybersweep.html and http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/glimmerglass/275_transparent-signal-access-and-monitoring.html

MOZAMBICAN BUSINESSMAN TALKS OF CORRUPTION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

MOZAMBICAN BUSINESSMAN TALKS OF CORRUPTION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
Date: 2010 January 28, 06:21 (Thursday)	Canonical ID: 10MAPUTO86_a
Original Classification: SECRET,NOFORN	Current Classification: SECRET,NOFORN
Handling Restrictions: -- Not Assigned --	Character Count: 10749
Executive Order: -- Not Assigned --	Locator: TEXT ONLINE
TAGS: EINV - Economic Affairs--Investments; Foreign Investments | KDEM - Democratization | KMCA - Millennium Challenge Account | MCC - Millennium Challenge Corporation | MZ - Mozambique | PGOV - Political Affairs--Government; Internal Governmental Affairs | PREL - Political Affairs--External Political Relations | SNAR - Social Affairs--Narcotics	Concepts: -- Not Assigned --
Enclosure: -- Not Assigned --	Type: TE
Office Origin: -- N/A or Blank -- Office Action: -- N/A or Blank --	Archive Status: -- Not Assigned --
From: Mozambique Maputo	Markings: -- Not Assigned --
To: Central Intelligence Agency | Defense Intelligence Agency | Millennium Challenge Corporation | National Security Council | Secretary of State | Southern African Development Community | United Kingdom London

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MAPUTO 000086 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, KMCA, MCC, SNAR, EINV, MZ SUBJECT: MOZAMBICAN BUSINESSMAN TALKS OF CORRUPTION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT REF: A. MAPUTO 80

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B. 07 MAPUTO 1395 MAPUTO 00000086 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Todd Chapman for reasons 1.4 (b+d) 1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The Charge recently met with a Mozambican businessman of European descent--and a longtime friend of the U.S. Embassy--("the source") who described his frustrations with FRELIMO, President Guebuza, and Mohamed Bashir Suleiman (MBS). He complained that they exercise complete control over the licit and illicit economy of Mozambique. The source, who has excellent connections within the Government of Mozambique (GRM), including the private number of the President, as well as a personal relationship with MBS, said "I do not want to do business anymore in Mozambique" because of this triumverate of control. He is liquidating his assets and leaving Mozambique, and says that he now sees the "malaise" in Mozambique as if "he had cataracts, but now see it all." 2. (S/NF) The source describes President Guebuza, who he has known and befriended for the past twenty years as a "vicious scorpion who will sting you," and has an even more grav assessment of MBS. He cautions that FRELIMO is not interested in bettering the life of Mozambique's citizens, but rather its self-enrichment. In the licit economy, the ruling party, FRELIMO, and MBS work in tandem to control the legal and illegal economies and restrict the space for private sector growth by demanding a cut of all significant business transactions. In the illicit economy, MBS dominates money laundering and drug transshipment, providing kickbacks to FRELIMO. Other key players involved in pressuring the business community for bribes or percentage stakes, according to the source, are Domingos Tivane, head of Customs, and former Prime Minister Luisa Diogo. END SUMMARY. ----------------------------------- MOHAMED BASHIR SULEIMAN AND GUEBUZA ----------------------------------- 3. (S/NF) The source is a well-known multi-millionaire businessman with a wide-ranging empire, which according to him is being liquidated to finance his final departure from Mozambique in June 2010. He speculated that over the next term Guebuza would use his business proxies to amass a still larger personal fortune. Guebuza manages his business interests through several front companies, including Celso Ismael Correia's Insitec and Salimo Abdullah's Intelec Holdings. The source said that MBS meets directly with President Guebuza, who has direct knowledge of MBS' funding to both the FRELIMO party (underwriting the recent election campaign) and Guebuza's front companies. The source, who described Correia as a "30 year-old pipsqueak," stated that Correia has no business experience or university degree, but shows great loyalty to Guebuza. 4. (C) Guebuza's business interests in Mozambique are legion. They include stakes in Mocambique Gestores (MG), Maputo Port Development Company (MPDC) which runs Maputo Port, Focus 21, Navique, Vodacom, and SASOL. Guebuza also has a share in Maputo Corridor Logistics Initiative (MCLI) which controls the toll road from Maputo to South Africa, according to the source. Guebuza has shares in a significant number of banks, including BCI Fomento (where Correia is Chairman), Mocambique Capitais, Moza Banco, and Geocapital. Through family members, Guebuza also controls Intelec Business Advisory and Consulting, Beira Grain Terminal, MBT Construction Ltd, Englob Consultants Ltd, Mozambique Power Industries, Macequece Ltd, and Mozambique Natural Resources Corp. 5. (S/NF) One new area that Guebuza appears to be interested in is the gaming industry. The source says that Guebuza forced the Constitutional Council (CC) to review and declare a recent law liberalizing the gaming industry as "constitutional" even though it calls for all casino assets to revert to the state after a defined period of time, in direct contravention of private property laws enshrined in the Constitution. The judges of the CC, who also ruled in favor of decisions during the elections to invalidate large numbers of opposition candidates in the legislative and presidential races, complained of the unconstitutionality of the new law, but were told to give it a favorable ruling, which they did. 6. (S/NF) The source elaborated on the depth of Guebuza's business interests, which range across the economy. He said MAPUTO 00000086 002.2 OF 003 that Guebuza is in on almost all of the "mega-project" multi-million dollar deals via contractual stipulations to work with the Mozambican private sector. One example is Guebuza's involvement in the 2007 purchase of Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric Dam (HCB) from the Portuguese Government for $950 million. $700 million of this was paid by a private consortium of banks, which was arranged by a Guebuza proxy, for which Guebuza received, while he was a sitting president, an estimated commission of between $35 and $50 million. The Portuguese bank which arranged the financing turned over its shares in BCI Fomento, one of the largest Mozambican commercial banks, to a Guebuza-controlled company. --------------- MBS AND FRELIMO --------------- 7. (S/NF) The source, says that FRELIMO brazenly squeezes the business community for kickbacks. As an example, the source said that he has personally seen Manuel Tome, former FRELIMO Secretary General, senior member of the National Assembly, and relative of President Chissano, in MBS' office receiving pay-offs quite openly. Head of Customs Domingos Tivane openly demands and receives payoffs from importers, including MBS. The source stated that one business contact remarked to him that when visiting Tivane's expansive home to deliver a bribe he noticed that the bureaucrat had solid gold fixtures in his bathroom. The source also stated that former Prime Minister Luisa Diogo, until she was removed from the Cabinet (septel), was heavily involved in taking bribes for FRELIMO, of which she kept a percentage. Similar allegations were raised in the 21 January issue of Zambeze, regarding soft loans paid to Diogo's husband Albano Silva, purchases of houses and buildings for a fraction of their value, as well as Diogo's close ties to officials such as Diodino Cambaza, whose corruption trial is ongoing. 8. (S/NF) At the ports, the source commented that FRELIMO has its own clearing agent that handles FRELIMO and MBS business. The clearing agent chronically under-invoices items, avoids the 17% VAT, and also has an arrangement with Tivane's Customs authorities to bypass the ports' mandatory scanning. The source has documentary proof of the under-invoicing by MBS, and poloff has seen MBS' trucks drive through the port without being scanned. Nonetheless, the source said that Government of Mozambique (GRM) officials routinely describe MBS as an "untouchable" due to his connections to Tivane and Guebuza, a situation which is reported to irk a cash-strapped Tax Authority (AT) President Rosario Fernandes. ------------------------- MBS AND OTHER BUSINESSMEN ------------------------- 9. (S/NF) Regarding MBS' retail operation, the source states that MBS does not tolerate competition. The source's milk processing facility was threatened by MBS who used VAT-avoidance and under-invoicing to dump vast quantities of imported condensed milk on the market in order to put the source out of business. Only after the source made an agreement with MBS for exclusive distribution of his milk products, with a 10% kickback on all sales to MBS, did MBS stop his dumping practices. Other businessmen have complained about similar practices in other commodities to include edible oil. The source complained that "even those who bribe" MBS or FRELIMO cannot make a profit under such conditions. ------------------------------ NARCOTICS AND MONEY LAUNDERING ------------------------------ 10. (S/NF) The source says he only has second hand knowledge of drug trafficking and money laundering in Mozambique. He said that "MBS and the 'Nacala dealers' all have offices in Dubai" to facilitate money laundering operations in Mozambique. It is through these operations that after 15 years in business in Mozambique, MBS was able to pay $30 million in cash to establish his shopping plaza downtown, Maputo Shopping, which opened in 2007. The source said that he asked prominent Ismaili/Aga Khan businessman Mustaque Ali how MBS became so rich so fast, and Ali's wry answer was "Johnson's baby powder," a euphemism for drugs. The source noted that the sometimes erratic changes in MAPUTO 00000086 003.2 OF 003 Mozambique's foreign exchange position are due to sudden multi-million dollar transfers of cash overseas tied to money laundering. The source commented that in the past few years there have been several embarrassing situations in which shiploads of drugs, primarily hashish and heroin have washed ashore; however, the media is usually afraid to report on such incidents because no one wants to become another Carlos Cardoso, the courageous Mozambican journalist who was murdered in 2000 while investigating a massive bank fraud tied to then-President Chissano's family. --------------------------------------------- COMMENT: CANDID COMMENTS FROM A CONNECTED MAN --------------------------------------------- 11. (S/NF) The source, a defeated man, has decided to pack his bags and leave his homeland. While he has an axe to grind because he is frustrated with the scope and depth of corruption in Mozambique, his statements corroborate what we have learned from other sources (Ref A). Ties with MBS and other known money launders and narcotraffickers by senior GRM officials are disturbing and demonstrate a short-sighted focus on self-enrichment. The source cautions against building long term relationships with FRELIMO, and fears that, having allowed the illicit economy to prosper, and having advertised Mozambique as a money laundering destination and drug transshipment hotspot, the ruling party will no longer be able to control the nefarious activities within its borders. Rumors and stories of corruption abound in Mozambique, but rarely will a successful well-connected business person be willing to share specific practices based on first-hand knowledge and participation in these practices. CHAPMAN

Armando Guebuza of running the ruling Frelimo Party “like the mafia”,

Mozambique’s former foreign minister, Leonardo Simao, has categorically denied words put into his mouth by the one-time US charge d’affaires in Maputo Todd Chapman.

The supposed statements by Simao are contained in a US diplomatic cable from May 2009 signed by Chapman. The cable is among the latest batch of confidential documents released by the whistle-blowing site Wikileaks.

Chapman claims Simao told him that Frelimo is “corrupt and in need of reform”. The former minister also allegedly accused President Armando Guebuza of running the ruling Frelimo Party “like the mafia”, with Guebuza’s relatives or “cronies” involved “in any significant business deal”.

Simao, Chapman added, did not believe that this would cause a split in Frelimo, and instead “argues the Frelimo will continue to be united because even those who are concerned with the slow pace of reform recognize that they owe their government jobs or privileges to the party - there's no other place to go for employment or economic advancement.”.

Simao has now issued a press release which effectively accuses Chapman of lying. He states that “throughout the years I served in the government, my conduct with international partners was always guided by the need to promote good relations between Mozambique and these partners”. He adds that he remains guided by the same principles, and so regards the words placed in his mouth as “senseless, malicious and tendentious”.

The claims in the cable do not just constitute defamation against Guebuza, but are intended “to stir up conflicts and denigrate my image”.

“Let it be very clear that at no time have I made such statements”, said Simao. “They are the responsibility of those who are using them to attain obscure goals at the cost of my name”.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this affair is that the cable has been eagerly repeated in parts of the Mozambican press as if Todd Chapman were the depository of all truth about the Frelimo government. Gutter press such as the weekly “Canal de Mocambique” have run with the story, and even a serious weekly, “Savana”, gave it credence.

Yet there are obvious problems. Simao was not born yesterday, and having served for ten years as Foreign Minister he knows perfectly well that any discussion with a senior US diplomat, no matter how informal, will find its way back to Washington. Could Simao really want the US State Department to believe that the Mozambican President acts like a mafia boss?

Even if one accepts the simplistic theory that there are two wings in Frelimo, one headed by Guebuza and the other by his predecessor, Joaquim Chissano, with Simao belonging to the latter, it really strains credibility to believe that Simao would have behaved this recklessly.

Furthermore, Chapman has a known track record of hostility to Frelimo and to the Mozambican government. Chapman is one of those diplomats who feeds his headquarters with his own prejudices, and has been caught ought before telling outright lies, in earlier cables published by Wikileaks.

Thus a cable published last year contained sensational claims that Guebuza took a kickback of up to 50 million dollars in the handover of the Cahora Bassa dam to Mozambican control, that former Prime Minister Luisa Diogo takes bribes for the ruling Frelimo Party, with a cut for herself, and leading Frelimo parliamentarian Manuel Tome “receives pay-offs openly”.

The source for all these claims was a businessman who could easily be identified. AIM spoke to this businessman and he categorically denied speaking to Chapman about Cahora Bassa, Luisa Diogo or Manuel Tome.

Like Simao now, the business source was particularly angered that Chapman had put insults against Guebuza into his mouth, comparing the President to “a scorpion”.

“That hurt me a lot”, this source told AIM. “I would never insult the President. I have good relations with the President. He has always behaved towards me as a gentleman”.

Chapman’s cable demonstrated gross ignorance about the companies he claimed Guebuza owns. Chapman stated that “Guebuza also has a share in Maputo Corridor Logistics Initiative (MCLI) which controls the toll road from Maputo to South Africa”. But Guebuza cannot have “a share” in the MCLI because it is not a company.

It is a non-profit making organisation, which brings together South African and Mozambican companies and investors in a drive to increase the use of the road and rail links between Maputo port and South Africa. It does not control the toll road, either – Chapman has confused it with Trans-African Concessions (TRAC), the South African company that really does run the Maputo-South Africa motorway.

In another of the cables released last year Chapman claimed that Guebuza has shares in various banks – but two of the bodies he listed, Mocambique Capitais and Geocapital are not banks. Geocapital is not even Mozambican – it is the holding company of the Macau billionaire Stanley Ho, and describes itself as a bridge between China and the Portuguese speaking world.

Chapman seemed unaware that it is perfectly possible to find out who owns shares in Mozambican companies. He claimed that Guebuza is a shareholder in the country’s second largest bank, the BCI. But it is easy to check the list of shareholders and see that Armando Guebuza’s name is not there.

The majority shareholder in the BCI is the Portuguese state bank, the Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD), with 51 per cent. The main Mozambican shareholder in the BCI is the Insitec group, chaired by Celso Correia. In fact Insitec was set up as a family company, and the people who own it are mostly members of Correia’s family. Guebuza does not figure in the list of Insitec shareholders.

Information on the ownership structure of Mozambican banks is publicly available. But Chapman could not be bothered to look it up.

Since the cables released last year are full of lies and inaccuracies, why should we believe this latest Wikileaks “revelation”? What makes Todd Chapman more reliable than Leonardo Simao? Diplomats are not always impartial observers, but often push their own agendas.

Given Chapman’s known hostility to Frelimo, there is nothing unlikely about him abusing his position in order to damage the Mozambican government in the eyes of his employers in Washington.

In 2009, Chapman knew that his time in Mozambique was drawing to a close (he was transferred to Afghanistan). So he took advantage of his last few months to stick the knife into a government and ruling party he disliked, and sent compilations of a few facts, a great deal of rumour and much outright fabrication to the State Department.

A second figure mentioned in the latest cable, businessman Ahmed Camal, has also denied Chapman’s claim that he called the head of the customs service, Domingos Tivane, “the King of Corruption”.

This claim was published in the independent daily newsheet “Mediafax” on 6 September. In a letter printed by the paper on Monday, Camal admits to various informal conversations with Chapman, and states that he is certainly critical of “the lack of political will to fight against corruption”. But he claims he has “a good private and institutional relationship” with Tivane, and denies making any accusations against him.

Again, we must ask – on what grounds, given Chapman’s past, should we believe him rather than Camal?


By Paul Fauvet
Source: AIM

"TRANSPARÊNCIA E RESPONSABILIZAÇÃO EM ANGOLA" Uma Actualização (HRW)

Em Abril de 2010, a Human Rights Watch publicou o seu relatório "TRANSPARÊNCIA E RESPONSABILIZAÇÃO EM ANGOLA".

Atendendo à importância do assunto, transcrevemos aqui um dos seus capítulos:

III. Novas Provas de Corrupção e Má Gestão

As denúncias recentes de corrupção e má gestão contrastam nitidamente com as reformas incipientes do governo. Em Fevereiro de 2010, um relatório do governo norte-americano realçou que a corrupção tinha chegado aos mais altos níveis do governo angolano. Surgiram também alegações de corrupção em relação aos investimentos chineses em Angola, ligados ao Fundo de Investimento Chinês, uma entidade privada que se acredita manter relações estreitas com os governos chinês e angolano.

A Investigação do Senado norte-americano

A 4 de Fevereiro de 2010, a Subcomissão Permanente de Investigações do Senado norteamericano publicou um relatório de 330 páginas que expunha a corrupção, a lavagem de dinheiro e outras actividades levadas a cabo por funcionários do governo e pelos seus associados, em Angola, Guiné Equatorial, Gabão e Nigéria.(34)

A Subcomissão do Senado detém poder de citação (subpoena) e pode obrigar a prestar declarações e apresentar documentos. O seu anterior trabalho pôs a descoberto níveis massivos de corrupção e conduziu a sanções significativas contra instituições e indivíduos.(35) O relatório de 2010 revelou como as receitas de petróleo alimentaram a corrupção e a má gestão em Angola, e destacou a necessidade de transparência e responsabilização governamentais muito maiores.

Os investigadores do Senado analisaram três casos suspeitos que envolviam antigos e actuais funcionários do governo angolano. Dois desses casos têm relevância particular para este relatório e são descritos neste capítulo.

O primeiro consiste numa série de transacções suspeitas feitas entre 1989 e 2007 que envolviam Pierre Falcone, um empresário franco-brasileiro que esteve no centro de um escândalo de corrupção ligado à troca de armas por petróleo durante a guerra civil angolana.

Falcone foi detido em França em 2007 e condenado a seis anos de prisão por crimes de comércio ilícito de armas, fraude fiscal e lavagem de dinheiro ligados ao escândalo angolano.(36)

O segundo, envolve as tentativas suspeitas e, no final, sem êxito do Dr. Aguinaldo Jaime, antigo governador do banco central de Angola e, posteriormente, vice-primeiro-ministro do país, de transferir US$50 milhões de contas do banco central angolano para contas privadas nos Estados Unidos entre Junho e Agosto de 2002, altura em que ocupava o cargo de governador do banco central.(37)

Pierre Falcone

O relatório do Senado norte-americano referiu que Falcone é “um célebre traficante de armas, conhecido pela venda de armamento a Angola durante a guerra civil e pela estreita ligação que mantinha com o Presidente angolano José Eduardo dos Santos.” (38) Os investigadores analisaram um vasto conjunto de transacções efectuadas por Falcone e pelos seus familiares entre 1989 e 2007, a partir de 29 contas do Bank of America (BoA) com base em Scottsdale, no Arizona, onde vivia Falcone. Os investigadores identificaram mais de $60 milhões em transacções suspeitas entre 1999 e 2007.(39)

Falcone foi sujeito a várias investigações criminais ligadas às suas actividades em Angola. Em Dezembro de 2000, as autoridades francesas detiveram Falcone por fraude fiscal e outros crimes ligados ao seu alegado envolvimento na corretagem de um negócio de troca de armamento por dinheiro com o governo angolano, no início da década de 1990. Falcone corretou alegadamente cerca de $600 milhões em negócios de armamento entre 1993 e 1994. A compra destas armas foi alegadamente paga com rendimentos angolanos provenientes de vendas de petróleo, sendo que a Sonangol, por exemplo, pagou algum do dinheiro de uma transacção de 1994 para contas de um banco francês, controladas por uma firma checa, a ZTS OSOS, que forneceu algumas das armas.(40) Falcone passou um ano na prisão após a sua detenção em 2000.

O Presidente angolano José Eduardo dos Santos reconheceu que os negócios de armamento entre a ZTS OSOS, Falcone e o governo tiveram, de facto, lugar mas afirmou que foram legítimos. Além disso, dos Santos elogiou Falcone pelos seus esforços por terem ajudado a preservar “a democracia e o Estado de Direito” em Angola. Descreveu as acções de Falcone como um “gesto de confiança e amizade da parte do estado francês” para com o governo angolano, que ajudaram a facilitar o “espectacular crescimento, em cooperação com a França, do sector petrolífero” e de outras actividades económicas. O presidente dos Santos também questionou a razão pela qual as autoridades francesas estavam a investigar e tinham detido Falcone, visto que as armas não tinham sido compradas a empresas francesas ou em França, mas sim a empresas da Europa de Leste.(41) Em Setembro de 2003, o governo angolano foi mais longe e nomeou Falcone para o cargo de Embaixador de Angola na Organização das Nações Unidas para a Educação, Ciência e Cultura (UNESCO) com sede em Paris, atitude vista pela maioria dos espectadores como uma tentativa de lhe conceder imunidade diplomática.(42) A decisão do governo originou um escândalo que tomou proporções mundiais. Por exemplo, em Novembro de 2003, Catherine Deneuve, a célebre actriz francesa, renunciou ao cargo de Embaixadora da Boa Vontade da UNESCO em protesto contra a decisão.(43)

Apesar da nomeação do governo angolano, Falcone foi acusado em 2004, em França, e condenado em 2007 e 2009 por crimes ligados ao escândalo angolano e está actualmente a cumprir uma pena de seis anos de prisão em França.(44)

A controvérsia sobre as actividades de Falcone alastrou-se aos Estados Unidos, pois este mantinha uma residência com a esposa, Sonia de Falcone, no Arizona. A Sra. Falcone deu contribuições de campanha substanciais a vários políticos e partidos políticos, algumas das quais acabaram por ser devolvidas. Segundo os registos da Comissão Eleitoral Federal norte-americana, a Sra. Falcone deu, através da sua Essanté Corporation, $20 000 e $80 000 ao Comité Republicano Nacional (RNC) no dia 19 de Maio de 2000, e 16 de Novembro de 2000, respectivamente.(45) Também doou $2000 ao Partido Republicano do Arizona a 8 de Junho de 2000 e $1000 ao Comité Presidencial Exploratório do Governador George W. Bush, a 4 de Abril de 1999.(46) O Arizona Republic divulgou que o Ex-Presidente George H.W. Bush esteve presente num evento exclusivo de angariação de fundos, que exigia a doação de $10 000 por pessoa, a 6 de Outubro de 2000, em que a Sra. Falcone também esteve presente.

As receitas do evento reverteriam a favor da campanha presidencial de George W. Bush. O porta-voz de Falcone no Arizona, Jason Rose, disse ao Arizona Republic que qualquer insinuação de que estas doações eram uma tentativa da parte dos Falcone de conquistar influência junto de Bush era “infeliz, falsa e errada.”(47) A Human Rights Watch contactou o RNC para apurar o estado destas doações e foi informada por um porta-voz do RNC de que todas as contribuições de campanha de Falcone tinham sido devolvidas no início de Janeiro de 2001, para evitar a aparência de que estas tenham sido inapropriadas.(48)

Outros candidatos e partidos também receberam dinheiro. A campanha presidencial de 2000 do actual senador do Arizona, John McCain, recebeu um total de $2 800 da Sra. Falcone, entre Abril de 1999 e Abril de 2000. Os registos da Comissão Eleitoral Federal mostram que todos estes fundos foram eventualmente devolvidos. O Comité Democrático Nacional (DNC) recebeu $2 000 em contribuições da Sra. Falcone a 24 de Maio de 1999. Um porta-voz do DNC disse à Human Rights Watch que não havia qualquer indicação de que o dinheiro tinha sido devolvido, visto não haver razão para suspeitar que poderia ter sido uma doação imprópria, quando foi recebida em 1999.(49)

Sonia Falcone foi acusada pelas autoridades federais do Arizona pelos crimes de fraude de imigração.(50) Em Março de 2007, Falcone declarou-se culpada pelas acusações e concordou abandonar os Estados Unidos como parte do acordo.(51) Segundo relatos, Falcone abandonou o país e partiu para a China em Agosto de 2007.(52)

Os investigadores do Senado detalharam numerosas transacções suspeitas dentro e fora dos Estados Unidos, maioritariamente através de contas detidas pelos Falcone no Bank of America. Entre estas figurava um pagamento de $20 milhões da Sonangol à Companhia Angolana de Distribuição Alimentar Inc. (CADA), uma empresa de que Falcone é coproprietário e que também foi implicada no escândalo de armamento e corrupção.(53) Em Julho de 2007, após terem sido clientes durante 18 anos, o Bank of America encerrou as contas dos Falcone. Segundo o relatório do Senado, “o Bank of America lamentou perante a Subcomissão ter mantido contas de um conhecido traficante de armas que, em Julho de 2007, contava já com várias acusações em França.”(54)

Dr. Aguinaldo Jaime

O Dr. Aguinaldo Jaime é um angolano célebre que ocupou o cargo de governador do Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA) entre Maio de 1999 até Dezembro de 2002, altura em que foi nomeado para assistente do primeiro-ministro. Em 2003, foi nomeado vice-primeiroministro. Ocupou esse cargo até 2009, altura em que foi nomeado para a presidência de uma comissão que promove o investimento privado em Angola.(55)

A investigação do Senado norte-americano detalhou uma série de transacções suspeitas no valor de $50 milhões iniciadas por Jaime quando ocupava o cargo de governador do banco central, entre Junho e Dezembro de 2002. Em cada um dos casos, os fundos foram devolvidos ao banco central porque os bancos estrangeiros suspeitavam das transacções que Jaime autorizou.(56) A Human Rights Watch conduziu uma extensa entrevista a Jaime para o nosso relatório de 2004 sobre a perda de milhares de milhões de dólares dos fundos públicos devido à corrupção e à má gestão, e ao impacto que estas têm sobre os direitos humanos em Angola. Quando questionado pela Human Rights Watch, Jaime recusou repetidamente a divulgação de informação sobre a utilização das receitas de petróleo pelo governo. Jaime também divulgou publicamente declarações que alegavam que “o aquecimento global” era um obstáculo às reformas do governo, incluindo ao aumento da transparência.(57)

O relatório do Senado norte-americano revelou que, a 11 de Junho de 2002, Jaime transferiu $50 milhões da conta Citibank do BNA em Londres para uma conta privada no nome da Mehenou Satou Amouzou, Inc. (MSA). O nome MSA foi baseado num cidadão do Togo que vivia nos Estados Unidos, que disse aos investigadores do Senado ter trabalhado com países africanos para “diversificar os seus recursos.” Mas o relatório do Senado mostrava cepticismo, referindo que Jaime e Amouzou eram os únicos signatários das contas da MSA,(58) que a transferência de fundos partiu de uma conta de “impostos petrolíferos e royalties” do BNA, e que, apesar de alegadamente destinada a investimentos cujo lucro reverteria a favor de “ajuda humanitária para o povo angolano,” havia provas de que se tratava de um esquema fraudulento, sendo que os investigadores encontraram poucas provas de que esta transferência era, de facto, destinada a fins humanitários.

Quando o Bank of America (BoA) na Califórnia recebeu, pela primeira vez, os fundos para a conta da MSA, a transferência foi permitida. No entanto, posteriormente, o BoA começou a questionar se não se trataria de uma transacção fraudulenta ou corrupta. Após alguns dias, congelaram os fundos. O relatório do Senado referia que Amouzou e o seu advogado “ameaçaram” e “gritaram com” um funcionário do BoA que recusou disponibilizar os fundos.

O BoA também referiu que a disponibilização dos fundos do BNA foi autorizada por Jaime e enviada para uma conta de que Jaime era signatário, contribuindo para aumentar as suspeitas que pairavam sobre a transacção. A 26 de Junho de 2002, Jaime enviou uma carta ao BoA a pedir que os fundos fossem devolvidos. Os fundos foram devolvidos a 1 de Julho de 2002.(59)

O incidente podia apenas ter-se tratado de uma transferência errónea feita por Jaime ou de uma tentativa de defraudar o BNA. No entanto, o relatório do Senado referiu que, a 2 de Agosto de 2002, Jaime informou o banco HSBC de que o banco central iria fornecer um bilhete do tesouro no valor de $50 milhões para ser usado pela MSA como garantia, alegadamente destinado a financiar projectos de desenvolvimento em Angola. Os fundos foram transferidos em duas parcelas de $30 milhões e $20 milhões, a 13 e 14 de Agosto respectivamente. Jaime ordenou a transferência dos bilhetes do tesouro para uma terceira conta no banco Wells Fargo, detida por um advogado que trabalhava com a MSA. Apesar de Jaime ter autorizado a transacção, o Wells Fargo começou a acreditar cada vez mais que a mesma fazia parte de um esquema fraudulento e devolveu os fundos a uma conta do BNA no HSBC, cujo único signatário era Jaime. Jaime tentou, então, transferir os fundos para uma conta do Comerica Bank, detida pela mesma pessoa que detinha a conta encerrada do Wells Fargo, mas a transferência não chegou a ser finalizada. Jaime também tentou que o HSBC emitisse um recibo negociável equivalente a $50 milhões, mas o HSBC sentiu-se desconfortável com o pedido.(60) Um dos funcionários do HSBC responsáveis pela conformidade referiu,

Este pedido, juntamente com um pedido invulgar recebido no mês anterior
para transferir estes mesmos títulos para uma conta mantida noutro banco,
que não estava no nome do Banco Central, preocupou-nos ... Estamos
preocupados com o facto de que estes pedidos invulgares continuam a sernos
colocados, e com a pressão enorme que é exercida sobre o banco para
que os aceite. Com base no que aqui vejo, parecem fazer parte de um
esquema complexo para defraudar o Banco Central dos seus títulos.(61)

Jaime ordenou que os fundos fossem devolvidos ao BNA a 12 de Dezembro de 2002. Por essa altura, tinha já sido nomeado assistente do primeiro-ministro. Os fundos foram finalmente devolvidos ao BNA a 3 de Janeiro de 2003.(62)

Os investigadores do Senado norte-americano referiram que as transacções de Jaime “teriam provavelmente resultado na perda ou roubo dos fundos.”(63) Como tal, as transacções apontam para a existência de maiores problemas no seio do governo em 2002, ano em que o governo não foi capaz de justificar pelo menos $347 milhões.(64) Durante o mandato de Jaime enquanto governador do banco central, que teve a duração de cerca de três anos, o governo foi incapaz de justificar perto de $2,4 mil milhões.(65) Nem Jaime nem o governo angolano responderam aos pedidos de entrevista feitos pelos investigadores do Senado norte-americano.(66)

Falta de Transparência Ligada a Investimentos Chineses em Angola

A análise mais detalhada à opacidade e possível corrupção do governo angolano foi levada a cabo pelo Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House), um respeitado instituto baseado no Reino Unido. Em particular, o Chatham House investigou o privado Fundo Internacional da China (CIF). Em 2005, o CIF forneceu pelo menos $2,9 mil milhões para financiar a reconstrução pós-guerra em Angola. Ao contrário de outros investimentos chineses, esta assistência foi supervisionada pelo Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional (GRN) de Angola. Esta entidade responde apenas perante a presidência angolana. O CIF é uma entidade privada com sede em Hong Kong, presidida pela Sra. Lo Fong Hung e o marido Wang Xiangfei.

O Chatham House divulgou que “o CIF parece ter sido bem-sucedido em posicionar-se entre os governos chinês e angolano (e entre a Sonangol e a Sinopec), e controla o acesso aos recursos angolanos.” O seu relatório referia que “o CIF foi capaz de chegar a esta posição reunindo, no início, uma equipa de quatro empresários bem-relacionados que mantinham estreitas ligações com algumas agências governamentais chinesas. Graças aos seus conhecimentos, celebraram vários contratos e a posição do CIF tornou-se praticamente inatacável.” No entanto, não existem provas directas de que o governo chinês controla ou detém a empresa, e o governo chinês sublinhou publicamente que se trata de uma empresa privada. Por exemplo, Ma Zhaoxu, um porta-voz do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros chinês, disse, em resposta a uma questão sobre um outro investimento controverso do CIF na Guiné, que o CIF “é uma empresa internacional registada em Hong Kong. Os seus investimentos na Guiné são de sua inteira responsabilidade. O governo chinês nada tem a ver com as suas operações de negócios, nem tem conhecimento de detalhes das mesmas.”(67)

Da mesma forma, o China Daily divulgou que a embaixada chinesa no Zimbabué “certifica que o Fundo Internacional da China Ltd. é uma empresa internacional, registada em Hong Kong ... O governo chinês nada tem a ver com as suas operações de negócios.”(68)

No seu relatório, o Chatham House refere que o CIF tinha também formado várias parcerias com a Sonangol, incluindo a China Sonangol International Holding Limited (CSIH), e disse que estas parcerias também estavam ligadas a alguns negócios controversos, tais como transacções que envolviam Pierre Falcone e Arcady Gaydamak.(69)

O CIF também tem gerado controvérsia em outras partes do mundo. Tal como foi mencionado em cima, dirigentes militares da Guiné-Conacri anunciaram um negócio de investimento com a CIF no valor de $7 mil milhões, a 13 de Outubro de 2009.(70) Esse dia foi também um dia de luto nacional na Guiné em protesto conta o massacre premeditado de manifestantes da oposição política guineense, cometido por membros da guarda presidencial do governo militar.(71) O acordo de exploração mineira desencadeou uma onda internacional de reprovação, por ter sido anunciado pouco tempo depois do massacre de 28 de Setembro. Ironicamente, a delegação original do CIF, reunida para negociar o acordo da Guiné, incluía o presidente da Sonangol, Manuel Vicente, que é também membro da administração da CSIH.(72)

A Human Rights Watch acredita que o governo chinês devia pressionar o CIF para que seja mais transparente em relação às suas actividades na China e no resto do mundo. No caso de Angola, um importante ponto de partida seria apoiar a publicação de uma auditoria à Sonangol, um parceiro-chave do CIF, tal como é exigido pelo Acordo Stand-By do FMI.

Alegações de Corrupção pelo General Fernando Miala

A 24 de Fevereiro de 2006, o Presidente dos Santos anunciou que tinha dispensado o General Fernando Garcia Miala, o poderoso director dos Serviços de Inteligência Externa. O presidente dos Santos também instaurou uma comissão de inquérito para analisar a conduta dos serviços de inteligência.(73) Miala tornou-se chefe dos serviços de inteligência em 2002, e permaneceu uma figura-chave da inteligência até ter sido dispensado. Alguns espectadores especularam que Miala tinha sido afastado por estar a tornar-se num funcionário cada vez mais popular e, como tal, numa potencial ameaça política para o presidente. Foi, de seguida, considerado culpado de insubordinação a 20 de Setembro de 2007 e condenado a quatro anos de prisão.(74) Foi libertado a 9 de Outubro de 2009, na sequência de um indulto presidencial emitido em Abril de 2009.

Durante o julgamento, Miala alegadamente ameaçou identificar altos funcionários do governo que haviam beneficiado das linhas de crédito chinesas do CIF. A ameaça levou funcionários chineses a clarificar que o CIF não estava ligado ao governo. Doadores e ONG também expressaram preocupação em relação à utilização opaca do financiamento do CIF. A 17 de Outubro de 2007, o Ministério das Finanças publicou uma declaração que negava qualquer utilização imprópria dos fundos chineses.(75)

Também se acredita que Miala esteve directamente envolvido nos escândalos de troca de armas por petróleo da década de 1990, que também envolviam Pierre Falcone.(76)

_________________________________________

34 United States Senate, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, “Keeping Foreign Corruption Out of the United States: Four Case Histories,” Majority and Minority Staff Report, 4 de Fevereiro de 2010.
35 Para a descrição de um investigação anterior da Subcomissão do Senado, consultar Human Rights Watch, “Well Oiled: Oil and Human Rights in Equatorial Guinea,” Julho de 2009, pp. 19-38.

36 Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, “Keeping Foreign Corruption Out of the United States,” p. 4.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., p. 248.
39 Ibid., p. 248.
40 Human Rights Watch, The Oil Diagnostic in Angola: An Update (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2001), http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2001/03/01/oil-diagnostic-angola-update.

41 Ibid.
42 “Angola Claims Arms Dealer Appointment to UNESCO was Legitimate,” Agence France-Presse, 26 de Setembro de 2003.
43 “Deneuve Quits UNESCO Post to Protest Angolan Ambassadorial Nomination,” Associated Press, 13 de Novembro de 2003.
44 Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, “Keeping Foreign Corruption Out of the United States,” p. 248.
45 Republican National Committee (RNC), “Report of Receipts and Disbursements to the U.S. Federal Election Commission,” 15 de Junho de 2000, pp. 12, 53, e addendum.

46 Arizona Republican Committee, “Report of Receipts and Disbursements: July 15 Quarterly Report to the U.S.Federal Election Commission,” 13 de Julho de 2000, p. 12; e Governor George W. Bush Presidential Exploratory Committee, “Report of Receipts and Disbursements: July 15 Quarterly Report to the U.S. Federal Election Commission,” 15 de Julho de 1999, p. 1211.
47 Dennis Wagner, “Falcone Firm Gave $100,000 to GOP,” The Arizona Republic, 24 de Janeiro de 2001.
48 Entrevista telefónica da Human Rights Watch a Mark Pfeifle, porta-voz do RNC, Washington D.C., 16 de Fevereiro 2001.
49 McCain 2000 Inc., “Report of Receipts and Disbursements: October 15 Quarterly Report to the U.S. Federal Election Commission,” 15 de Outubro de 1999; McCain 2000 Inc., “Report of Receipts and Disbursements: Monthly Report to the U.S. Federal Election Commission,” 20 de Março de 2000; Democratic National Committee, “Report of Receipts and Disbursements: July 31 Mid Year Report,” 30 de Julho de 1999; Entrevista telefónica da Human Rights Watch a Rick Hess, porta-voz do Comité Democrático Nacional, Washington, 8 de Março de 2001.
50 United States of America v. Sonia Iris Falcone , “Indictment,” Tribunal Distrital dos Estados Unidos, Distrito do Arizona, 10 de Janeiro de 2006.
51 Jill Recharge, “Paradise Valley Socialite Admits to Hiring Illegal Immigrants,” East Valley Tribune, 22 de Março de 2007.
52 Julie Panofsky, “East Valley Philanthropist Deported in Plea Deal,” East Valley Tribune, 29 de Agosto de 2007.

53 Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, “Keeping Foreign Corruption Out of the United States,” p. 260.
54 Ibid., p. 257.
55 Ibid., p. 271. A Human Rights Watch informou os investigadores destas alegações pelo menos em 2007.
56 Ibid., p. 4, 271.
57 Human Rights Watch, Alguma Transparência, Nenhuma Responsabilização: A Utilização das Receitas do Petróleo e o Seu Impacto nos Direitos Humanos (Nova Iorque: Human Rights Watch, Janeiro de 2004).

58 Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, “Keeping Foreign Corruption Out of the United States,” pp. 270-2.
59 Ibid., pp. 270-282.

60 Ibid., pp. 289-301.
61 Ibid., p. 299.
62 Ibid., pp. 299-300.
63 Ibid., p. 270.
64 Human Rights Watch, Alguma Transparência, Nenhuma Responsabilização, p.36.
65 Human Rights Watch, Alguma Transparência, Nenhuma Responsabilização.
66 Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, “Keeping Foreign Corruption Out of the United States,” p. 271.

67 Governo da China: “Comentários do porta-voz do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros Ma Zhaoxu sobre a Cooperação Empresarial entre o Governo da Guiné e o Fundo Internacional da China Ltd,” 19 de Outubro de 2009.
68 “Embassy Says China Int’l Fund Ltd a HK Firm,” China Daily, 30 de Dezembro de 2009.
69 Alex Vines et al., Thirst for African Oil: Asian National Oil Companies in Nigeria and Angola (Londres: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2009), pp. 50-51.

70 “Analysts Question $7b China-Guinea Mining Deal,” Associated Press, 14 de Outubro de 2009.
71 “Guinea: Stadium Massacre, Rape, Likely Crimes against Humanity,” comunicado de imprensa da Human Rights Watch, 17
de Dezembro de 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/12/17/guinea-stadium-massacre-rape-likely-crimes-againsthumanity.
72 Vines et al., Thirst for African Oil, pp. 50-52.
73 “Angolan president sacks spy chief, orders probe of intelligence services,” Agence France-Presse, 1 de Março de 2006.
74 “Ex-Chief of Foreign Intelligence Service Sentenced for Insubordination,” All Africa, 20 de Setembro de 2007.

75 “Esclarecimento Sobre a Linha de Crédito da China,” República de Angola, Ministério das Finanças Comunicado de Imprensa, 17 de Outubro de 2007.
76 Vines et al., Thirst for African Oi , pp. 54-55.

 

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