welcome back to war! another weekend...friday...16.05 pm! Plates bulgarian and romenian...internal note of the investigation according with the spanish secret service
Friday, September 14, 2018
Thursday, September 13, 2018
tancos robbering
hello world! Welcome back to war! thursday, 09.42 am! Annack private security contractor, did the job at Tancos. They are looking for a car Plate - 7082JVD.
Wednesday, September 12, 2018
Tuesday, September 11, 2018
hacking drones .5
Faster dictionary decoding with SIMD instructions
why not decrypt gaussian noise...yes, we can decrypt...long time ago with jonh the ripper, and old dictionary attacks...but on the latency air to air...you need to accelarte Fourier with a SIMD decoder
hacking drones . 3
hello world! welcome back to war! tuesday, 09.35 am! So NSA...34 cents for this one...ok?...just a simple explanation, for a very complicated code...drones in Syria and Iran...are guided trough a base at the US...but a MIMi's has a problem trying to sniff the URL...problem cames when this communication is based in air to air com...meaning they have jets flying sending the data encoded with Gaussian algorithm...which...is very complicated...what I have here...is the construction of the sys program...check it out
Monday, September 10, 2018
ok...from uncle zé....you control, the schedule of the vault...there's only one company transporting diamonds...two cars...the moment the truck gets out, you position the cars in front and back...when stops at the traffic light...the back car...blows up the windows from the security...takes them, to the front car...leave the back car...puts the front car with FBI plates...and sirene sound...goes to a down level car parking...there's a car there...transfer the cash...leave both cars, and the maids there...and we are out!...hey...now I know where the kidnapped cop is...on a contentor beared down under the soil, at a florest...
hacking drones .2
back to war...
Neither checksum nor LRC can be considered robust against message corruption. For example, consider the original message (“48656C6C6F20776F726C6421”); suppose we change the last two bytes of the message from 6421 to 6520. Both the LRC and the checksum remain unchanged! (We simply turned one bit ON in an upstream byte, and turned the same-position bit OFF downstream, creating two changes that cancel each other out at checksum time.)
Neither checksum nor LRC can be considered robust against message corruption. For example, consider the original message (“48656C6C6F20776F726C6421”); suppose we change the last two bytes of the message from 6421 to 6520. Both the LRC and the checksum remain unchanged! (We simply turned one bit ON in an upstream byte, and turned the same-position bit OFF downstream, creating two changes that cancel each other out at checksum time.)
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