Portugal Intel (;) CEO TAP demitida pela TV a 6 de Março de 2023, em 22 de Março Galamba elogia a CEO da TAP , e a TVI tem docs confidenciais do "mau estar" inter ministerial! E quem precisa do SIS ou da PJ?)

 

NATO decoder link 22 decrypt tool

 

Ukraine radioactive contamination map

 

Iran Russia Intel (Ukraine US weapons reverse improvement)

 

US Russia Intel ( S 300 defense system spotted)

 

China Intel (Tek smuggling to NK)

 

Ukraine Intel (maps weapons recovering local routes)

 

(finland end stop of ukranian weapons deliverance) Ukraine Intel

 

https://www.euractiv.com/section/all/short_news/weapons-sent-to-ukraine-may-have-ended-up-in-finnish-underground/

Ukraine Intel - Once the planes are down, the equipment is unloaded onto Ukrainian trucks which then transport their precious cargo directly to the conflict zones (military equipment) or to areas in need (humanitarian aid). However, this airport has also become a potential target for Russian sabotage and security has been drastically increased. A Polish and American detachment is on site to help with the unloading of planes but also to secure the area. Moreover, the base also serves as a logistical hub for the contingent of the 82nd US Airborne Division, positioned 45 km northwest of this airport (Milec airport).

Portugal Intel (IRS database hacked)

 

Portugal Intel (politics) (to be developed)

 

Ukraine Intel (yellow lines the strategy to isolate russian troops)

 

Jack Teixeira's Case (US Ukraine classified (?) docs)

 

Portugal Intel (territory defense strategy)

 

Portugal Intel (Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho)

 

NATO hacking Penetration attack

 

Ukraine Joint Operations Military Maps (Ukraine Intel)

 

Portugal Intel (Top Secret - Operation - Download Sucessfully )

 

Portugal Intel (Orion Aircraft capabilities military review)

 

Portugal Intel ( portuguese army at RCA )

 

https://www.portugalresident.com/portuguese-military-accused-of-crimes-against-humanity-in-central-african-republic/

Portugal - Russia Intel (military)

 The cat-and-mouse game over Europe between Russian war planes and NATO fighter jets has prompted commentators to speculate whether it is all a gigantic plot to drain national air forces of fuel.

The latest antics over the Algarve would suggest that it could be.
Russian Tupolev bombers “overflew” international air space under Portuguese jurisdiction for the second time last week, pushing further into national territory and only turning back after flying as far as Sagres.
The new incursion saw Portuguese F-16s based in Leiria racing to intercept, but this time both fighter jets ran out of fuel.
A third was bring scrambled as the Tupolevs turned back, leading one Portuguese leader writer to conclude “Russia’s strategy is to lead us all into bankruptcy!”
Correio da Manhã deputy editor Miguel Ganhão added: “If they continue with their flights over national territory, we won’t have any money left to fly our planes”.

https://www.portugalresident.com/russian-war-planes-drain-portuguese-fighters-of-fuel/

Brasil Intel (North Korea diplomatic relations stabilished)

 

Portugal Intel (gold)

 https://www.moveaveiro.pt/en/les-reserves-dor-du-portugal-dune-valeur-soudaine-de-plus-de-20-milliards-deuros

Sudan Intel (part 2)

 On November 11, Interfax reported that a draft proposal was worked out between Russia and Sudan for creating a logistic support base at Port Sudan. Though both countries have yet to make an official decision on this mater, talks about a Russian naval base, or at least a support base, have been ongoing since 2017. Should this logistic support base become a reality, Russia would be able to support a permanent naval presence in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and possibly project power into the Indian Ocean as well.

As for security, Sudan will be responsible for securing the exterior of the logistic support base but Russia will allegedly also be allowed to set up temporary military posts in Sudan to guard its support base. Russia will be also responsible for protecting the base from the seaside, provide air defense and maintain internal security inside the base. With Russia being responsible for the air defense of the support base, it seems that the free delivery of air defenses is taken out of context. Rather, Russia will deploy air defense systems that protects it support base and that this protection is also extended to the Sudanese naval base north of Port Sudan.

As for the type of deployments the Russian Navy could undertake from the logistic support base in Sudan, a lot remains open to speculations and will depend the final draft of the agreement. Needless to say, the support base a Port Sudan could function in the same manner as the Russian naval base at Tartus, Syria, functions but to a lesser scale. Tartus allows Russia to keep a small surface action group permanent deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Special attention is to be given to the phrase that nuclear powered vessels can dock in Port Sudan. Should Sudan agree to this, then the Kirov class battle cruisers and nuclear submarines of the Russian Navy could, in theory, dock at and deploy from Port Sudan. Using Port Sudan in order to supply and sustain the deployment of nuclear submarines into the Indian Ocean

https://russianfleetanalysis.blogspot.com/2020/11/a-russian-logistic-support-base-in-sudan.html

Sudan Intel (part 1 )

 Both Burhan and Hemedti have worked to encourage the U.S. to continue its counter-terrorism cooperation with Sudan. Their aim is to convince the U.S. to drop its support for popular calls for democracy and accept their autocratic military rule. 

These goals encouraged Burhan and Hemedti to send high-level military envoys to Israel before carrying out their military coup on Oct. 25, 2021. On the security front, the aim of these meetings was to establish joint intelligence and security relations. It was agreed that the Sudan office of Hamas, identified by both Israel and the U.S. as a terrorist organization, would be closed. Politically, the meetings were part of the military’s effort to get Israel to lobby the U.S. to accept the upcoming coup in Sudan. The Sudanese military has deepened its security relations with Israel in the hope that Israel will press Washington to restart its financial assistance to Khartoum, worth $850 million, and for the international community to reinstate its forgiveness of Sudan’s $60 billion debt.

The Biden administration has also stepped up U.S. involvement in East Africa to protect its interests and allies from al-Shabaab, deploying 450 soldiers into Somalia following a spike in al-Shabaab attacks, which rose 17% in 2021 and were projected to rise by 71% this year

Burhan and Hemedti have also used the potential establishment of a Russian naval base in Port Sudan, in eastern Sudan’s Red Sea coast, as another means of pressuring the U.S. to acquiesce in backing their rule, rather than supporting democracy.

The divisions between Burhan and Hemedti have come into play here as well. Hemedti, who visited Russia on the eve of its invasion of Ukraine, has welcomed Moscow’s bid to build a naval base in Sudan. The Russian private security company Wagner Group has been operating in Sudan with the support of Hemedti’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), extracting minerals for export back home; it is also believed that Wagner is supporting and training the RSF to spread disinformation on social media to counter calls for democracy. 

Sudan and China have deep economic ties in various fields, including agriculture, energy, and mining. Sudan’s exports to China in 2020 reached $766 million, accounting for 19% of its total exports and making China its second-largest trading partner. The strength of bilateral relations explains China’s veto of U.N. Security Council resolutions against Burhan and Hemedti’s coup.

https://www.mei.edu/publications/us-priorities-sudan-stability-or-democracy

Portugal Intel (ammunition suplliers)

 Pt suplliers:

Miliciapro Alsatex Demag cranes & components lda ( also missiles) Euroarmas lda Lasi electronica lda Qualifire import export lda Studia Espingardaria central A montez sa Antero lopes lda Protilis Portugal lda Cacicambra sa Sodarca Lissa lda Thomarbraulio lda

Russia-Ukraine War Intel - NATO's plan, another Normandie at Dnipro River

 Electricity is generated by both hydro and nuclear power plants. Much of the hydro-power is generated on the Dnipro. Many nuclear reactors are west of the Dnipro.

Virtually all of Ukraine's limited oil and gas reserves are in the northeastern part of the country, east of the Dnipro, vulnerable to Russian attack. Thus, Ukraine's ability to produce sufficient liquid fuel to sustain its field forces for a war of any duration is in doubt.

Some military production capability should be moved to the western part of the country, particularly for the production of ammunition. At minimum, substantial stocks of liquid fuel will need to be held in western Ukraine. It may even be reasonable to investigate the possibility of producing liquid fuel from soft coal, though the investment costs may currently be beyond Ukraine's reach.

this is where the German General von Manstein had hoped to anchor his defense had Hitler approved his "counter-offensive" alternative to the abortive Kursk offensive. Once the German offensive at Kursk had ground itself to pieces, the Russians launched a massive counterattack that precipitated a virtual race to that river line. The Russians exploited the chaos of the German retreat to place their own bridgeheads across the river before the Germans could fully arrange their defenses. Given this inauspicious start, the Germans still managed to delay the Russians for more than two months along the Dnipro river

To recover most areas of Russian settlement however, the objective would be much more ambitious, and would include the entire oblasts of Kharkiv, Luhanska, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhya, the Crimea, and Odessa. To establish a land bridge to Odessa, it would also be necessary to take Kherson and Mykolaiv. These 9 oblasts, which extend in a belt from north-east to south-central Ukraine, represent roughly 35-40% of the land area of the country. To ensure against counter-attacks it is easy to see how this strategy could grow to include simply all of Ukraine east of the Dnipro., plus Odessa and Mykolaiv. 

Ukraine's fourteen odd heavy divisions and five brigades would have a very difficult time covering this front. A good rule of thumb is that a "medium sized/ medium technology" armored or mechanized division such as the kind the Ukrainians can probably field, can populate 25-35 km of front, on average terrain, with weaponry in sufficient density and depth to provide good prospects for a successful defense against a determined, well-armed, quantitatively superior attacker. If that attacker has enough resources, and if the defender has no reserves of additional units and weapons, the attacker will ultimately grind a hole in this force. Taking the high end of the estimate, the Ukrainian force can cover about 60% of the front with no reserves. This leaves it vulnerable to large scale flanking maneuvers. Or, Ukraine could cover the whole front at one division/60 km, with no reserves.

The emerging Ukrainian force structure is only partially adequate to the strategy outlined above. A western Ukrainian "bastion" will require far more effort than merely holding a mechanized, 6-division strategic reserve. The basic problem is that even this bastion needs to be defended; the Belarus border would generate about 500-600 km of front to be defended, and there would be an 800 km Dnipro River defense line to guard. The reorganized Ukrainian force of eighteen mechanized divisions would still be insufficient. Because many of them would suffer heavy attrition in the battles in the eastern part of the country, the real strength of Ukraine's mechanized forces, by the time they managed to cross the Dnipro (if they did), would be much less than when the fighting started.

Even within the CFE constraints, the Ukrainians ought to be able to organize a very large number of motorized infantry divisions with potent anti-armor and anti-aircraft defenses--neither of which are constrained by CFE. Other key assets that are constrained will have to be strictly rationed--especially tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery. Careful reorganization supplemented by limited procurement could yield a force of roughly 50 infantry divisions, with considerable defensive but little offensive power. These would be supported by 18 (small) mechanized divisions. A dozen of the latter would be committed to delay, and sovereignty-assertion missions in the east. The others would concentrate in the west to create the "bastion."

The rigorous slimming of these units would free up nearly 2500 guns and heavy mortars, 1400 tanks, and an equivalent number of infantry fighting vehicles to provide basic equipment for 50 infantry divisions. Some would say that this use of scarce armor is a mistake, but the historical record suggests that small armored tactical reserves greatly stiffen the defensive power of infantry units. Trucks and engineering assets for these divisions would need to be mobilized out of the civilian economy.

The less mobile air defense assets that Ukraine has inherited from the old Soviet strategic air defense system would provide the basis for air defense belts along the Dnipro and the Belarussian border. Anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM's) currently owned by Ukraine would be distributed across these divisions. As financial resources become available additional ATGMs would be acquired. Substantial numbers of more basic anti-tank weapons-- shoulder fired rockets, large caliber recoilless rifles, and towed high velocity anti-tank guns would be collected from existing military units, or manufactured. Finally, to compensate for the relatively sparse artillery assets in these units, very large numbers of medium mortars (82mm) would be acquired. (120 mm mortars would be better, but they are counted under the artillery ceilings in CFE, and thus Ukraine cannot acquire more of them.) A notional divisional TOE (table of organization and equipment) is presented below

This division should be able to populate with its units and weapons 20-25 km of front in depth with sufficient density, to create substantial problems for an attacker

A 50 division force of infantry divisions would permit a reasonably dense defense of some 1000-1250 km. This is not quite enough, given the 1400 km of northern and eastern perimeter that the bastion will have to defend. Thus, even this force will require very careful management. It may be true that some parts of both lines of resistance offer sufficiently difficult terrain that they can be defended even more economically. The Dnipro line will require a major water-crossing operation by Russian forces; some portions of the river appear to be virtual lakes on a map, and cannot simply be bridged.

https://ssp.mit.edu/publications/2022/a-1994-defense-concept-for-ukraine

The 3 Leopard tanks supplied by Portugal ( UKRAINE) were exchanged by JDAM-ER kits to give precisition to non guided bombs

 

Portugal Intel (SIRP and Army fiber optics cables direct connection)

 

https://www.base.gov.pt/Base4/pt/pesquisa/?type=contratos&texto=SIRP+&tipo=0&tipocontrato=0&cpv=&aqinfo=&adjudicante=&adjudicataria=&sel_price=price_c1&desdeprecocontrato=&ateprecocontrato=&desdeprecoefectivo=&ateprecoefectivo=&sel_date=date_c1&desdedatacontrato=&atedatacontrato=&desdedatapublicacao=&atedatapublicacao=&desdeprazoexecucao=&ateprazoexecucao=&desdedatafecho=&atedatafecho=&pais=0&distrito=0&concelho=0

Portugal Intel (TAP scandal 3)

 

https://www.essential-business.pt/2023/04/19/tap-neeleman-team-received-bonuses-and-salaries-worth-millions/

https://web3.cmvm.pt/sdi/emitentes/docs/FR77135.pdf

Portugal Intel (TAP scandal )

 

1. SRS Legal tratou da saída de Alexandra Reis, da parte da TAP. Marcelo diz que o irmão, Pedro Rebelo de Sousa, tem apenas "posição simbólica" no escritório. Mas é Managing Partner e Fundador da SRS.

Mas logo nas respostas ao relatório preliminar, apresentado às partes pela IGF no final de fevereiro, Christine Ourmiére-Widener e Alexandra Reis, juntas em anexo à auditoria, apontam responsabilidades às sociedades de advogados de topo — Morais Leitão e SRS Legal — a que ambas recorreram, externamente.

3. Mas logo nas respostas ao relatório preliminar, apresentado às partes pela IGF no final de fevereiro, Christine Ourmiére-Widener e Alexandra Reis, juntas em anexo à auditoria, apontam responsabilidades às sociedades de advogados de topo — Morais Leitão e SRS Legal — a que ambas recorreram, externamente.

https://eco.sapo.pt/2023/03/15/servulo-e-o-novo-escritorio-de-advogados-contratado-pela-tap/

2. Already questioned by the blogger if the lack of management contracts made with each administrator every three months in office, as required by law the general inspector confirmed that these contracts do not exist which is “in fact an irregularity” on the part of from the company

https://westobserver.com/news/europe/taps-financial-director-should-have-avoided-false-information-says-finance-inspector/

https://eco.sapo.pt/2022/12/28/caso-tap-marcelo-diz-que-irmao-managing-partner-da-srs-tem-apenas-posicao-simbolica/

arrested Gershkovich in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast on March 30 for collecting information constituting a state secret about the activities of a Russian military-industrial complex enterprise (...) Putin’s reported personal involvement in the arrest suggests that the arrest was likely a retaliatory response to the US arrest of Russian national Sergey Cherkasov on March 24 on charges of acting as agent of a foreign power (...)previously reported that the FSB has made other recent arrests in connection with information about defense enterprises in Sverdlovsk Oblast, and ISW assesses that the Kremlin may use the pretext of threats to Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) to justify crackdowns and further conceal the activities of Russian defense industrial enterprises.

 

Intel on military movement , 8992 usaf radio , eams,sky King

18 EU Banks and 2.1 billion Risk Exposure (Russia Intel Santions )

 

Wagner Group (classified) Russia Intel

 

:) Trump actually asked Zelensky "do us a favour" , and open a corruption case against Biden's business at Ukraine.

 

According to media reports, one of the leaked documents revealed spying on a private conversation between Guterres and Miguel Graca. A fourth transcript found Guterres telling the executive director of his office, Miguel Graca, that he was annoyed with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for asking him to make more trips to Kyiv after he has already made the journey several times over the past year.

 

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